

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1325741-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 95 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 96 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 97 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 98 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 99 ~ Referral/Consult;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1204182-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 95 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 96 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Page 98 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 99 ~ Referral/Consult;

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: JULY 30, 1954

FROM : MR. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - Cine

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 3842 PDM/mjc
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91
7-27-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

In the latest monthly report on security informants, which is presently being prepared, it is to be noted that we have dropped from 1092 security informants in June to 1079 at the present time. *(initials)*

Our potential security informants have increased from 743 to 747 during this period. *(initials)*

We have been following each office closely in the matter of informant coverage and within the past two months individual letters have been sent to each office showing a decrease in security informants, unless there has been an appropriate increase in the number of potential security informants, which, of course, would offset to a certain extent such a decrease.

It is felt, however, that we should reiterate to the field generally the necessity for continued progress in informant coverage so that the present trend will be reversed in the immediate future.

ACTION

If you approve, there is attached an SAC Letter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/91 BY 3842 PDM/mjc

Attachment
GFMc:de

RECORDED - 28 13 AUG 16 1954

65 AUG 19 1954

EX-118

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 8/3/54

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #306-54
MADE BY SA THOMAS A. BRONSTADT
SAN ANTONIO OFFICE
PROPOSED REVISION IN FORM FD-209
~~MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDING CONTACTS~~
~~(WITH SECURITY & CRIMINAL INFORMANTS)~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 28420m

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

Cont. Indl - Security Gen

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that Form FD-209 (Memorandum for Recording Contacts With Security and Criminal Informants) be altered to add two more blanks, as follows:

Payment

Time Spent

A sample copy of Form FD-209 is attached for information purposes.

ADVANTAGES

The suggesting employee believes that having the payment recorded on the Form FD-209 will facilitate auditing of blue slips. By having time spent in contacting informants recorded on Form FD-209 he feels this will result in such information being set forth by the Special Agent on a document recording the contact and this procedure will aid in supervision and in preparation of reports concerning time spent by Special Agents in contacting informants. Inspector B. C. Brown favors the suggestion.

DISADVANTAGES

Use of Form FD-209 (Memorandum for Recording Contacts With Security and Criminal Informants) is optional with each Special Agent in Charge, in accordance with 108-F, Manual of Instructions.

Uniform field office system of recording payments to informants was put into effect 7/1/54, in accordance with No Number SAC Letter 54-G. 6/9/54.

Investigative Division is opposed to the adoption of the suggestion and points out that the "Time Spent" figure should include only that time spent in developing new informants, and should not include all contacts with informants, in accordance with 108-H. Manual of Instructions.

Attachment AUG 25 1954
cc-Messrs. Sizoo & Harbo
dmg

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FX-110

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Domestic Intelligence Division does not believe that recording of payment on Form FD-209 would serve any worth-while purpose. In addition, they state that, inasmuch as Number Three Cards maintained by all field offices reflect time spent by agents in contacting informants, having this information recorded on Form FD-209 would serve no worth-while purpose.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: EDM:cs

Present at the Executives Conference of 8/3/54 were Messrs. Callahan, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, Boardman, Rosen, Nichols, Kemper and Mason. The Conference recommended unanimously unfavorable.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

C.I. _____ P.C.I. _____ S.I. _____ P.S.I. _____

DATES OF CONTACT:

TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED:

PURPOSE AND RESULTS OF CONTACT:

Negative: _____ Positive: _____

PERSONAL DATA:

RATING _____

COVERAGE _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 fms/mc
JC

1- _____

1- _____

66-2542-3-854

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 30, 1954

FROM : SAC, Birmingham (134-New)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE : Re Manu

~~Confidential~~
CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 DMV/mrj
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2. 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7/27/91

Re Manual of Instructions, Section 107-0

Enclosed herewith is blind memorandum regarding the following security informant of this office, who is not paid a salary or expenses on a regular basis: *e. [signature]*

Since my letter of January 30, 1954, [redacted]
[redacted] has become a regularly paid SI, and CS

[redacted] have become inactive CS's of this office and their symbol numbers have been discontinued. *ell*

The following are regularly paid SI's of this office: C

The following information is set forth regarding informant coverage of subversive organizations.

COMMUNIST PARTY - USA, DISTRICT 27

Headquarters City

1. No SI's hold office.

2. [redacted] due to diminishing CP activity in this territory since 1950, is not actively connected with the CP group, but considers himself as an inactive

JLP:JE
REGISTERED MAIL

Encl.(1)

RECORDED-127.

EX-122

ALG X

61 AUG 26 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

BH letter to Director

~~Confidential~~

member since he has never resigned from the CP, and feels that he will be reactivated when Party activities increase. He is in the status of an inactive member. [redacted] is not a member, but has contacts with some past and present members. *OK* *W*

b7D

Resident Agency Territories

There are no CP groups or organizations affiliated with the CP located in RA territories. Individual security subjects reside in the Anniston RA territory, and [redacted] contacts these subjects for information regarding their activities. There are no known CP members residing other RA territories, and no SI's are located in these RA territories. *W*

ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA KLAN'S

Headquarters City

1. [redacted] is [redacted]
[redacted] who resides [redacted] provides some coverage at Birmingham.

2. No SI's or rank and file members.

Resident Agency Territories

Anniston Resident Agency

1. [redacted] is [redacted]
[redacted] who resides [redacted] provides some coverage of Klan activities in [redacted] territory.

2. No SI's or rank and file members.

No groups this organization located other RA territories at present time. [redacted] provide coverage individual members in all RA territories.

Since January 30, 1954 this office has increased the number of regularly paid SI's by one individual, this *W*

CONFIDENTIAL

BH letter to Director

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

being [redacted] who, during this period, has been successfully steered back into the CP as an active member. Also, this informant's wife is developing as an active member of the CP, and after she has been firmly established and acquires the qualifications of a SI consideration will be given to obtaining approval of her as a regular SI of this office. (u)

With regard to informant coverage of the underground CP activities [redacted] through continued contact with two Security Index subjects at Ashland, Alabama, has obtained information which indicates these individuals may have underground status. This informant is being urged to follow up these developments and increase his coverage in the underground. (u)

b6
b7C
b7D

Under the interview program, this office has interviewed or, after due consideration, has decided against interviews with all except one of the Security Index subjects. This subject is [redacted] Upon completion of current investigation regarding this subject, consideration will be given to interviewing her to determine her potentialities as a CI.

During the past six months efforts were made to develop one individual as a PSI at Bessemer, Alabama within the Communist infiltrated IUMMSW. Efforts to develop him as a SI were unsuccessful; however, recommendation has been made to the Bureau that he be approved as a CS.

[redacted] who is now an active member of the CP, is in frequent contact and has developed the confidence of JOHN W. STANFORD, the leader of the CP in this territory, during the past few months. It is hoped that with continued progress of this informant he will identify individuals within the CP in this area who possibly can be developed as security informants. This, it seems, is the best present source of developing security informants in this territory. (u)

It is pointed out that the project of reviewing closed security files of this office for potential

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BH letter to Director

Confidential

informants has been thoroughly utilized during the past year, and at this time it does not appear possible to obtain PSI's in this manner. It is pointed out that more than forty cases were opened from subjects of closed security files, numerous individuals having been interviewed, and in no instance was a PSI developed. The main difficulty, of course, was due to the fact that the individuals' membership dated back several years, in most instances to around 1942 and 1943, and were no longer members of the CP and had no desire to reenter the Party or have anything further to do with it.

It is further pointed out that the group of members of the CP in this territory is limited in number and the field from which PSI's may be obtained is increasingly small. Repeated consideration is being given to the potential of each of these individuals and every effort is being made and will in the future be made to develop new informants. It has recently appeared of value to review lists of individuals who in the past were believed to be distributors of bundles of The Daily Worker in this territory. A number of these individuals were never subjects of Security Matter files and have not been contacted under the interview program. Consideration will be given to obtaining authority to interview them in the near future.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *JB*

DATE: August 24, 1954

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABK*SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INFORMANTS~~ ~~REPORTS~~

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

There have been several instances recently where former informants have indicated through public testimony that they furnished information to the FBI and when a check was made it was ascertained that we had a record of the receipt of such information in some cases while in other cases we did not have such a record. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107, under Security Informants, provides for the handling of written reports from informants and when an Agent receives an oral report he must dictate a memorandum as quickly as possible so that the information will be accurate and on record. It is believed that this matter should be called again to the attention of the field by an SAC Letter.

ACTION:

For approval, there is attached a letter to all SACs in line with the above matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 *me J C*

RECORDED - 15
INDEXED - 15

EX - 113

Attachments (2)
JDD:ejf:pjm

SAC [ALBANY]

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV (100-3-89)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pmc
mcJC

Reference is made to the Central Research Unit monograph "The Worker in the Soviet Union," which was transmitted to the field as an enclosure to SAC letter 64-37 dated July 20, 1954. In the preparation of this monograph considerable use was made of an article entitled "Elements of Soviet Labor Law," by Vladimir Gsovski, Chief, Foreign Law Section, Law Library, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., which originally appeared in the March and April, 1951, issues of "Monthly Labor Review."

Recently, this article was reprinted by the Government Printing Office in a twelve-page pamphlet which sells for 15 cents. This pamphlet is being brought to your attention since it graphically depicts the penalties to which the Soviet worker is subject in his job, largely through verbatim quotations of laws and other official pronouncements of the Soviet Union.

Each office receiving copies of this letter is authorized to purchase up to ten copies of this publication, if deemed advisable for use in connection with the captioned programs. These copies should be purchased directly from the Government Printing Office and should not be shipped to your office address. If additional copies are required by your office, the Bureau should be advised prior to their purchase.

2 cc: [Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland

Denver
Detroit
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Milwaukee
Minneapolis

Newark
New Haven
New York
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Portland

St. Louis
San Francisco
Seattle
Springfield
Washington Field

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc: Mr. J. D. Donohue

JFC:ocd

5 AUG 23 1954



CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFICATION

#99-289 7-27-81

SERIAL FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-13-84 BY 2542 JH/mc

July 29, 1954

R. R. Roach

[COMMUNIST PARTY, USA]
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

CLASSIFIED AND

EXEMPT

FROM

AUTOMATIC

DECLASSIFICATION

DATE

BY

[TOPLEV] (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

7-27-81

The Central Research Unit regularly brings to the attention of the field public source material which is of possible use in connection with the captioned programs.

Recently the Government Printing Office issued a twelve page pamphlet entitled "Elements of Soviet Labor Law," which sells for 15 cents. This pamphlet is a reprint of a series of articles which originally appeared in the March and April, 1951, issues of "Monthly Labor Review." The pamphlet depicts the penalties to which the Soviet worker is subject in his job by means of quotations of laws and other official pronouncements of the Soviet Union.

A letter authorizing the offices in which the captioned programs are in effect to purchase ten copies of this pamphlet, if deemed advisable, is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached yellow be approved and returned to the Central Research Unit, where the original duplicate is being retained. Upon approval the duplicate will be dated and arrangements completed for sending this letter to the field.

Attachment

JEC:oc

Boardman

Nichols

Belmont

Glavin

Harbo

Rosen

Tamm

Tracy

Mohr

Winterrowd

Tele. Room

Holloman

Miss Gandy

cc: Administrative Division
Mr. J. D. DeLoachALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 JH/mc

NOT RECORDED

126 AUG 13 1954

MAILING ON

CENTRAL FILE

SAC, Detroit [redacted] (9-835)

August 27, 1954

b7D

Director, FBI (66-2542)(9-21466)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 PWD
mjc

RECORDED-27

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reurlet dated August 17, 1954, captioned

[redacted] aka. [redacted]
Potential Security Informant."

b7D

Bureau's files reflect that one [redacted]

[redacted] is mentioned in the
report of Special Agent Stafford C. Foster dated at
Detroit, Michigan, December 5, 1951, in the case captioned
[redacted]
[redacted]

It is believed that the captioned individual is
identical with the [redacted] mentioned in the above
[redacted] case. In view of the immoral relations engaged in
by the above [redacted] as reflected in the above report,
authority to continue contacts with [redacted] to develop him
as a PSI is not granted.

b7D

Information voluntarily furnished by [redacted]
should be accepted by you but no encouragement should be
given to him along these lines.

In the event he does recontact your office, you
should use caution in your contacts with him to be certain
he is not a plant and you should advise him that although
he may furnish information to your office he is not to
consider himself a Bureau employee and that he must maintain
his relationship with your office in strict confidence.


NOTE ON YELLOW:

The [redacted] in [redacted] case has the same
residence address and the [redacted] file reflects that he
engaged in immoral relationships with both the subject and the
victim of the extortion case. He is not believed to be
suitable material for development as a PSI.

b7D

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RHH:eje



SEP 8

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-1111-11

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE August 17, 1954

FROM : SAC, Detroit [redacted]

b7D

SUBJECT: [redacted] aka.

POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANT

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DM

mc JC

The above-captioned individual has been contacted by Agents of this division relative to the activities of the World Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers Party, which organizations maintain their headquarters in the building located at 3000 Grand River, Detroit, Michigan. [redacted] is [redacted]

and, in addition, until [redacted]
and [redacted]

[redacted] the building in which the above organizations have their headquarters.

To date, [redacted] has been unable to furnish pertinent information relative to the activities of the WSP or SWP but has expressed a desire to cooperate with the Bureau in any way possible and voluntarily suggested that he may be able to obtain material of interest from the discarded trash of these two groups.

[redacted] in his position [redacted]

[redacted] resides [redacted]

[redacted] JOSEPH RICH, a real estate dealer who has offices on Linwood Avenue in Detroit. It is possible that JOSEPH RICH may be considered as a Subject in a case involving an FHA (FAG) violation and, therefore, no attempt has been made to contact him directly prior to contacting [redacted]

b7D

The Indices of the Detroit Division are negative pertaining to [redacted]. In addition, checks of the Merchants Credit Bureau and Michigan Merchants Credit Association failed to disclose any record pertaining to [redacted]

The records of the Detroit Police Department and Wayne County Sheriff's Office, as checked on March 30, 1954, contained no information which could be identified as being identical with KNIGHT.

JRN:JEP #5
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED-27

66-2542-3-

INDEXED-27

JUL 15 1954

Let to Detroit
8-27-54

0244

858
Due
5-20-54
hs

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 9-21166-1

Letter to Director, FBI

August 17, 1954

Re: [redacted] aka.
PSI


b7D

The records of the Police Department License Bureau revealed that [redacted] has [redacted] and was licensed to do so on [redacted]. This license was effective until [redacted] and was not subsequently renewed.

b7D

The following description of [redacted] was obtained from observation and conversation and an FD-9 requesting a name check in the Identification Division is being submitted:

Name
Also Known As
Sex
Race
Born
Residence
Height
Weight
Build
Hair
Eyes
Complexion
Occupation



In view of [redacted] desire to be of assistance to the Bureau, he has been advised that he must maintain any relationship with the Bureau on a confidential basis and that the Bureau in its interests in the field of internal security would be appreciative of any information relative to the activities of the WSP and SWP that he may furnish. [redacted] was also informed that any assistance he may give the Bureau would be considered assistance of a strictly voluntary nature.

b7D

In view of the above, Bureau authority is requested to re-contact [redacted] and maintain this contact in order to develop [redacted] potentiality either as a permanent trash cover or a basis of operation for future anonymous sources.

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: [redacted]

Supervisor _____

Room _____

R# _____

Date 8/20/57

Searcher _____

Initial 5-11

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

NA

[redacted]

NA

b7D

[redacted]

NA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12/27/87 BY 2842 pmd

mejc

[redacted]

NA

[redacted]

9-21466-2511H

*file
RHS*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: August 25, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - HANDLING OF REPORTS

DATE 1/27/81 BY 2842 pmo/mc

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

The question of proper handling of informants' reports in anticipation of possible future use in court has been the subject of review. Discussion on this problem has been had with the Training and Inspection Division and it has been learned that in some offices reports received personally from informants are accepted by the contacting Agent, who affixes his initials and the date of receipt on the front or back of the report. Some offices also follow the practice of placing the initials of the receiving Agent and the date on the front or back of informants' reports when they are received through a post office box. Other offices do not place anything on informants' reports and their receipt, personally or through post office boxes, is recorded by means of a covering memorandum, which explains the report briefly, date of receipt, by whom received, and this memorandum, if necessary, may also be used as a channelizing memorandum.

The question of proper handling of informants' reports should be resolved as informants' reports have been produced in court in Smith Act cases in Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Detroit, occasionally after an informant has testified. The defense has requested the court to force the Government to produce any report submitted by the informant, based upon his testimony in an attempt to test the credibility of an informant. When such has occurred, the judges have requested the prosecution to bring in the report for their perusal to determine if it contains anything which should be added to the case. In some instances, the judge has allowed the report to be placed in the record as an exhibit and on other occasions the report has been excluded by the judge as not pertinent material. Questions have been raised concerning notations such as initials and dates and up to this time there has been no unfavorable reaction.

Since these reports have been placed in record during court proceedings and it may be necessary in the future in identifying an Agent's report to show the circumstances of its receipt, it is believed a uniform practice should be established in the field whereby the Agent who receives a written report from an informant will affix his (the Agent's) initials and the date of receipt on the front of the report without obliterating in any way the contents of the report. This action should be taken whether the report is received in person or by means of a post office box.

Attachments (2)

RECORDED - 15

JDD:pjm

INDEXED - 15

EX - 113

857

ACTION:

For approval, there are attached an appropriate
SAC Letter and Manual Change.

File 4
1/8/27

MAN

W

August 24, 1954

**PROPOSED CHANGE IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS**

Section 107, Security Informants - *Yend*

Section 107-G - Developing and Maintaining Informants

Page five contains the following sentence:

Care should be taken in handling written reports and when an Agent receives an oral report he should dictate a memorandum as quickly as possible so that the information will be accurate and on record.

At this point, the following addition should be made in the Manual:

All information furnished by an informant must be made a matter of record, properly indexed, evaluated, and channelized.

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmw/mcjc

66-3000-3-1

NOT RECORDED

15 SEP 2 1954

66-3000-3-1
ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542)

DATE: 8/30/54

FROM : SAC, Cincinnati [] b7D

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
DATE BY

CLASSIFIED AND

EXEMPTED FROM

FOIA, b. 1

DATE 01/27/01

DECLASSIFICATION

EXEMPTION

FOIA

DATE 01/27/01

DECLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rebulet to Albany, 12/9/54. Remylet, 7/29/54.

There is set forth below the tabulation requested by the Bureau in rebulet:

1. Number of interviews conducted:

During Past
Thirty DaysTotal To
Date

14

2. Number of security informants developed under this program:

0

0

3. Number of confidential sources developed through this program:

0

0

Since mylet 7/29/54, one subject at Dayton, Ohio, has been interviewed with negative results. The remaining two subjects have been out of town during this period and are expected to return shortly. After their return, they will be interviewed.

Two agents, one in headquarters city and one resident agent in the Ohio Valley, work part-time on this program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDECLASSIFIED BY SP6 PJA/CPJ
ON 4-21-94

WLP:BL

RECORDED-19

EX. # 113

66-2542-3-859
11 SEP 7 1954REGISTERED MAILDECLASSIFIED BY SP6 PJA/CPJ
ON 7/27/94APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF 66-2542-3-859
DATE 10/6/81~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53 SEP 9 1954

SAC, Newark (134-00)

September 1, 1954

RECORDED-20 Director, FBI (66-2542-3) - 860

EX-117

SECURITY INFORMANT MATTERS
NEWARK DIVISION

Reurlet dated August 25, 1954.

The Bureau has no objection to your use of the procedure described in your letter for concealing the identities of your informants in memoranda reflecting their activities in subversive groups.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pm
meJC



GFM:pjm
Am

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

60 SEP 10 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/25/54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FROM: ^{DH}₁₆ SAC, NEWARK (134-00)SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT MATTERS

As the Bureau is aware, security informants who are unknown to each other frequently furnish information concerning the activities of other informants. This presents a problem in maintaining security in the preparation of copies of memos which reflect the information.

In one area of this division there are three informants whose reports frequently reflect the activity of the other two. The Agent preparing a memo on the information furnished by an informant must frequently designate copies for numerous files including one for the 134-file of any informant therein mentioned. Unless a special procedure is followed, this would result in the identification of any informant mentioned in a memo simply by reading the memo and checking it against the copies designated.

It has therefore been decided by this office that the matter can be conveniently and securely handled in the following manner. The memo will normally mention other informants by their true names without any reference to their informant status; a copy of the memo will be designated for that informant by name only without file number; and the 134 (administrative) file number will be placed opposite his name only on the copy going into his 134-file. *DLV*

This information is furnished to the Bureau for any pertinent observation.

134-00
EGB:EVL~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~~~DATE 7/27/81 BY SP4 J2 PWD~~~~ME JC~~~~EX-100~~DECLASSIFIED BY *SP4 J2 PWD*
ON 7/27/81
83-1343CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *SP4 J2 PWD*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *9-17-81*
*9-17-81*ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF *CE 044/7*
DATE *10/6/81*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542)

DATE: Sept. 3, 1954

FROM : SAC, Minneapolis [redacted]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION *General*

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DMC

b7D

The Bureau's request for reevaluation of various programs prompts me to offer two suggestions which may assist in developing informants under this program.

Suggestion 1.

PERMIT AND ENCOURAGE RECONTACTS WHERE INTERVIEWEE IS NOT HOSTILE. I am sure we all agree that one interview with an active Communist will not produce an informant unless we are fortunate enough to interview a Communist who has previously made up his mind to defect from the Party. *Q/W*

Individuals who will listen to our Agents, even though they give no indication of immediate cooperation, should be contacted again and again and in addition anonymously supplied with the excellent reading material the Bureau has prepared. However, in the following cases the Bureau has instructed that further contacts be terminated because recontacts have been unsuccessful in eliciting cooperation:

SubjectBufileMP file

100-387908 ✓	100-8080
100-401874 ✓	100-9294
100-86562 ✓	100-3238
98-423 ✓	100-1068
100-375591 ✓	100-7548
100-325159 ✓	100-5098
100-381519 ✓	100-7122

Since in cases of this type the contacts already made have not resulted in embarrassment to the Bureau and since the possibility exists that a security informant may be developed by further recontacts, I strongly urge that the Bureau encourage recontacts with individuals in this category.

Suggestion 2.

PERMIT RELIABLE THIRD PARTY APPROACHES PRIOR TO AGENT INTERVIEW. In our investigations of active Communists we have found, in many instances, relatives and friends who were extremely concerned about these activities. These relatives and friends have volunteered to take any action which might persuade the subject to cease CP activity and possibly cooperate with the government. However, in the following

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED-37

27 SEP 7 1954

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY QD 11/11/83

REASON FOR EXTENSION 287/39

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION 9-12-91

9-17-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

[redacted]

cases the Bureau has advised that a third-party approach through a friend or relative is undesirable because it eliminates the element of surprise and jeopardizes the chances of ever developing the subject into an effective informant: *SL*

Subject

Bufile

MP file

[redacted]

100-384505 ✓
100-407427 ✓
100-398799 ✓

100-7786
100-9091
100-5095

[initials]

b7D

I am aware that extreme care must be used in selecting friends and relatives for such an approach, but where these individuals volunteer and are motivated by a genuine concern over the interviewee's CP activity, I feel that there is merit in such an approach.

This program has been an extremely valuable investigative device, and I offer the above suggestions in order to possibly enhance its value.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, Minneapolis

September 17, 1954

Director, FBI

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pml/jc

Reurlet dated September 3, 1954.

The Bureau is in complete agreement with your suggestion that recontacts should be made under the Security Informant Program as long as it is felt that the subject can be persuaded to defect from the Communist Party and possibly be developed as a security informant. The Bureau is also of the opinion that various reading material furnished by the Bureau to your office should be utilized in connection with the Security Informant Program. Both of the above points were fully discussed at the Security Informant Program school held at the Bureau and attended by Agents from your office.

Recontacts with the individuals listed in relet were not authorized at the time due to the lack of cooperation shown by them at the time they were interviewed. Since the purpose of the Security Informant Program is to develop additional informant coverage in Communist groups as quickly as possible, it was not desired that your Agents be tied down to contacts with uncooperative individuals, but rather that they expend their efforts to attempt to develop others who had not been contacted as yet under the Security Informant Program.

You should constantly keep in mind recontacting subjects under the Security Informant Program in an effort to gain their cooperation and if you feel that your interviews under the Security Informant Program will now permit your qualified Agents to work on the cases involving previously uncooperative subjects, you should resubmit your requests for authority to recontact these subjects in accordance with the provisions of the Security Informant Program.

(See page 2 for Note on Yellow)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

DEC 13 1954

NOV 5 1954

OCT 4 1954

MAILED 5
SEP 18 1954
COMM-FBI

Your suggestion that, in certain cases, authorization be granted to have a third party approach the subject prior to the subject being interviewed by Bureau Agents has been previously considered by the Bureau. Experience has shown that Communists prefer to be approached directly by Bureau Agents. The use of a third party eliminates the element of surprise, gives the Communists opportunities to charge that the Bureau is using deceit and is sneaky in its methods, and above all, it discloses to outsiders the strictly confidential relationship that is to exist between the Bureau and the potential informant.

Due to the above, and due to the individual circumstances noted in Buletts to your office regarding the subjects listed in relet under Suggestion 2, authority was not granted to utilize a third party.

Indirect approaches have been and will be considered by the Bureau on an individual basis; however, no attempt should be made to utilize any person for an indirect approach without first advising the Bureau of the full facts in the matter and obtaining prior Bureau authority to utilize the indirect approach.

Your suggestions are appreciated by the Bureau and any additional observations you may have will be welcomed by the Bureau.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Review of cases listed under Suggestion 1 in relet reflects subjects were not sufficiently cooperative at the time to warrant further expenditure of valuable Agent time since it appeared it would be long-range program to obtain their cooperation. The files on subjects listed under Suggestion 2 reflect Minneapolis unsuccessfully interviewed one subject, Joyce Brown, and requested use of her parents as intermediaries, which was denied due to possible family dispute; Dr. Lorber case involved use of current confidential source, denied, due to danger of compromising this CS and suggested direct approach; in Gladys Dahlin case Bureau authorized direct approach, but since subject not readily available for interview away from home, Minneapolis requested authority to use subject's sister to attempt to effect an interview with subject. Dahlin now being considered for direct interview under regular interview with security subjects program.

DATE OF MAIL 8-31-54

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAWRENCE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 2436~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY..

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmc
mc JC

SUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 SEP 24 1954FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-862

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: August 6, 1954

FROM : MR. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
SEMIANNUAL REPORTS
SUGGESTIONSALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmdmc JC

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

It has been suggested that the semiannual report on security informants be submitted annually rather than semiannually as at present.

Briefly, the semiannual report furnishes the Bureau with a list of the paid informants and confidential sources being utilized by the Division submitting the report, together with memoranda on each unpaid security informant or confidential source having a symbol number. The purpose of the latter memoranda is to assure the Bureau of receiving information periodically of the assistance being rendered by such individuals. Also included in the semiannual report is an analysis of the offices' informant coverage geographically and by organizations being investigated. This part of the semiannual report is most helpful to Bureau officials and supervisors in analyzing the security informant coverage of any particular Division and in directing corrective action wherever delinquencies are noted.

It is realized that considerable effort goes into the preparation of a semiannual report, especially in the larger field offices where 50 or more security informants might be involved. It is felt, however, that the subject of security informant coverage is so important that no relaxation of the present requirement can be made without harming the quality of our supervision of informant matters. If we were to receive reports annually, considerable changes might occur in informant coverage in a particular Division which would not be detected in the absence of a complete review of the informant coverage of that Division, such as made for the semiannual report. It is further pointed out that the semiannual report is of much benefit to the individual field office inasmuch as it presents graphically the necessity for added security coverage in those places where such coverage is needed.

RECOMMENDATION

EX-128

RECORDED-29

INDEXED-29

It is recommended that we continue to receive the semiannual report on its present basis. If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division.

1 cc: Training and Inspection Division
GPMC:DE

5 SEP 24 1954 377

8 cc: Com [unclear]
9/10/54 [unclear]

Diagonal
[Signature]
2-15
100
5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 12, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 489-54

SECURITY INFORMANTS -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2862 dm

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

Suggestion number 489-54 would eliminate summaries furnished on a semiannual basis by each field office on each informant and confidential source having a symbol number and who are not paid a salary or expenses on a regular basis. According to the recommendation attached to the suggestion, an annual performance rating could be prepared instead of such summaries for each field division.

It is not believed the suggestion should be adopted for the following reasons:

- (1) The Seat of Government must maintain control over the work being performed by the field on security informants. The bulk of security informants are paid on a regular basis for salary or expenses and as justification for such payment periodic summaries are received, usually every three months. Informants and confidential sources having symbol numbers and who are not paid either salary or expenses on a regular basis must likewise be justified and the submission of a summary on such individuals twice a year is essential to proper supervision by the Seat of Government to the work in the field. By the submission of these memoranda, the Bureau is assured of receiving information periodically concerning the assistance being rendered by such individuals.
- (2) The information now submitted in the summaries is not available unless it is transmitted to the Seat of Government by the field and a review of an informant's file by the Seat of Government would not disclose any such current information.
- (3) In lieu of summaries, it was recommended that an annual performance rating be prepared for each individual informant but there is no indication as to whether such rating would be prepared in the field or at the Seat of Government. If such a rating is prepared in the field and if the Bureau did not have any summaries from the field, the Seat of Government would have no control over such rating. If such performance rating is prepared at the Seat of Government without current information such as is now received in summaries, such performance ratings could not logically be prepared.

JDD:BJ SEP 24 1954

277

RECORDED-29

INDEXED-29

SEP 22 1954

EX-128

ACTION:

It is recommended that this suggestion not be followed and that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for attention.

L. Ban

W. W.

W. W.
R

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

DATE: 9/15/54
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 DMJ/mcjc

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #516-54
MADE BY PHILADELPHIA OFFICE
REVISION PROPOSED IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36(Q), 7/13/54, which requested the field to submit their thoughts relative to ways of further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following suggestion was made:

SUGGESTION

That Manual of Instructions, Section 107-T, be amended to make it optional to obtain background information on Confidential Sources who have already been developed and approved.

BACKGROUND

A Confidential Source is an individual who furnishes information on a confidential basis, said information being available to him through past activities on his part or his present position. Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, former Communist Party members who are no longer in contact with the party and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau, but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them.

PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS

If a Confidential Source is to be contacted for assistance in Communist or related investigations, Bureau clearance must be obtained; however, Bureau clearance is not required for contacts with Confidential Sources being contacted in connection with Criminal matters.

Manual of Instructions, Section 107-T(5) stipulates the letter to the Bureau requesting authority to contact a subject as a Confidential Source should clearly set out the following information:

- Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and criminal record, and service record, if any.
- Brief history of subject's affiliation in Communist Party or other organizations.

cc-Messrs. Sizoo and Harbo.
dmg

RECORDED-29

13 SEP 21 1954

INDEXED-29

EX. - 109

F 378
55 OCT 5 1954

66-2542-3-865

2-M

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

- c) Results of interview with subject, including reason for cooperation, if known.
- d) Statement to effect subject is being considered as Confidential Source and he will be advised he is not a Bureau employee and of confidential nature of his relationship with the Bureau. In addition, statement should be made that the field office will be alert to be certain the subject is not a plant and if he is connected with a labor union, that he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

The suggester states, in view of the above-listed instructions, it would naturally follow that this information should appear in the Confidential Source's file. However, there is no mention in the Manual of Confidential Sources who have already been approved. The suggester states in certain instances, it would appear to be wasted effort to obtain additional background, such as a credit check, on a source who has proved to be reliable and who has furnished information for a number of years. The suggesting employee believes this would clarify the necessary contents of the Confidential Source File and would eliminate additional investigation of a Confidential Source of proven reliability.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

By his very nature a Security Confidential Source is an individual on whom the FBI has generally conducted investigation and now this individual is cooperating with the Bureau as a Confidential Source. Therefore, background information is generally available in the investigative and can be readily set forth in the letter to the Bureau requesting to use him as a Confidential Source. Mr. A. H. Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, states if such background information is not available, it should be obtained as a field office should not be using an individual on whom complete background information has not previously been obtained.

Mr. Belmont is opposed to any change in present requirements that background information should be furnished to the Bureau whenever authority is requested to utilize an individual as a Security Confidential Source. Inspector E. D. Mason, Training and Inspection Division, agrees with this view.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION 9/15/54 EDM:mew

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/15/54 were Messrs. Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich, Boardman, Rosen, McGuire, Holloman and Mason. The Conference unanimously recommended no change in the current regulations.

ms
1/June

STREAMLINING

1. Suggestion

Addition to Section 107-T of the Manual of Instruction making it optimal to obtain background information on confidential sources who have already been developed and approved.

2. Present Procedure

Section 107-T (5) at present stipulates the background information necessary in requesting Bureau authority to contact an individual as a confidential source. It would naturally follow then, that this information should appear in the confidential source's file. However, there is no mention of confidential sources who have already been approved. In certain instances it would appear to be wasted effort to obtain additional background, such as a credit check, on a source who has proved to be reliable and who has furnished information for a number of years.

3. Advantages of the Suggestion

Clarification of necessary contents of confidential source file.
Elimination of additional investigation of a confidential source of proven reliability.

4. Disadvantages of the Suggestion

None

5. Recommendation

That this be done.

Given to [unclear] 9/15/54 [unclear]
COPIES DESTROYED
9 08 JUL 19 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542pm DMC/JC

100-42-4-105

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: September 9, 1954

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: Confidential Fund
and Informant Report
July, 1954

Tolson

Boardman

Belmont

Clegg

Glavin

Ladd

Nichols

Rosen

Tracy

Harbo

Mohr

Tele. Room

Holloman

Nease

Gandy

Pursuant to your instructions that a report be submitted monthly, there is attached a list reflecting payments to confidential informants and confidential sources, miscellaneous expenditures and the total confidential disbursements for July, 1954.

For your information, the total disbursements for the month of June were [redacted] as compared to [redacted] for the month of July. This reflects a decrease of [redacted] or [redacted] per cent. of this amount, payments to criminal informants and sources decreased [redacted] or [redacted] per cent, security informants and sources decreased [redacted] or [redacted] per cent and miscellaneous expenditures decreased [redacted] or [redacted] per cent. As compared to the average monthly disbursements of [redacted] for the preceding fiscal year 1954, the July disbursements of [redacted] represent a decrease of [redacted] or [redacted] per cent.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Donohue, Room 1243
Mr. Green, Room 5720

JPM:JSJ/clc

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

SEP 12 4 21 PM '54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 7/27/91 BY 2843 mld
mjc

This shows what was done when there is close supervision.

NOT RECORDED

126 SEP 20 1954
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

26 10 23 11 24

26 13 23 11 24

26 3 2 03 PM '54

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

RECEIVED - GOVERNMENT

GOSEP 21

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FUND AND INFORMANT REPORT
JULY, 1954

FIELD DIVISION	PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS	PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES	TOTAL PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS & SOURCES	MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURES
----------------	--	-------------------------------------	---	-------------------------------

<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Security</u>	<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Security</u>	
-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	--

b7E

Albany
Albuquerque
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
El Paso
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Knoxville
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Mobile
Newark
New Haven

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FUND AND INFORMANT REPORT (Continued)
JULY, 1954

FIELD DIVISION	PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS	PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES	TOTAL PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS & SOURCES	MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURES
----------------	--	-------------------------------------	---	-------------------------------

<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Security</u>	<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Security</u>
-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------

b7E

New Orleans	
New York City	
Norfolk	
Oklahoma City	
Omaha	
Philadelphia	
Phoenix	
Pittsburgh	
Portland	
Richmond	
Saint Louis	
Salt Lake City	
San Antonio	
San Diego	
San Francisco	
San Juan	
Savannah	
Seattle	
Springfield	
Washington Field	

J. J. McGuire	
M. A. Jones	
C.C.O. TT-1 & TT-1A	

TOTALS

GRAND TOTAL - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EXPENDITURES, JULY, 1954 --

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pm/mc

(1) THE SUGGESTION

That blanket informant coverage be curtailed.

(2) THE PRESENT PROCEDURE

At present we have a number of requests from various offices requesting that our informants be contacted. The Davidian case is an example of a continuing blanket coverage.

(3) ADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION

I feel that informant coverage should be on a very selective basis, inasmuch as;

- (a) Majority of our informants are restricted in their scope and a blanket coverage is to no avail.
- (b) Coverage on a shotgun basis usually secures shotgun results. When put on a selective basis with due emphasis results are commensurate with such attention.
- (c) With continued blanket type coverage I do not feel that informants can be continuously impressed with the need for cooperation with the Bureau.

(4) DISADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION

The main disadvantage of course is that with curtailment of coverage we might possibly thereby pass up an informant who could be of assistance. It is felt, however, this possibility is too remote for serious consideration.

(5) RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that so-called blanket coverage of informants be seriously curtailed and in every instance on a very selective basis. I might even suggest that prior to institution of informant coverage, as requested by another office, clearance must first be obtained through the Bureau. At any rate, I do believe that a revision should be made of the present Bureau policy of a fairly unrestricted right to request informant coverage.

SEP. 29, 1954

141

NOT RECORDED

87 SEP 29 1954

ENCLOSURE

GCB:ahf

319

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-1153

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 12, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Bauer

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 507-54
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PROGRAMS

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gandy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

It has been suggested that the administrative handling and checking of the informant programs, both security and criminal, be carefully considered for eliminating as many of the technical requirements as possible with resultant simplification. With regard to security informants, the Manual of Instructions and the Inspector's Manual, as well as instructions issued in connection with the special programs known as Toplev and Security Informant Program, have been carefully reviewed, and it is believed that the requirements in effect are all necessary to the proper operation and supervision of our informant work in the security field.

The Seat of Government is continually on the alert for any possible simplification of procedure which can be placed in effect without causing any slackening of necessary close control and supervision which must be maintained at all times by the Seat of Government in this field of Bureau work. The Security Informant Desk will continue to carefully watch the progress of our security informant work to be certain that all regulations and requirements are absolutely necessary to the efficient handling of the work in the security informant field.

ACTION:

It is not recommended that any changes be made in the instructions now in force and effect with regard to security informant work and it is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for attention.

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2510 [signature]
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 12/2/86

NOT RECORDED
45 SEP 27 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 9-17-81 BY SP7MAC

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

JDD:pjm

1 OCT 1 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE August 13, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmw

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 576-54
SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES516-54
IN 708 m H NTC - 1/21/54

It has been suggested that an addition be made to Section 107-T of the Manual of Instructions making it optional to obtain background information on confidential sources who have already been developed and approved. By way of explanation, it is pointed out in this suggestion that the Manual stipulates certain background information must be furnished to the Bureau in requesting Bureau authority to contact an individual as a confidential source. The Manual does not mention confidential sources who have already been approved and it is stated in the suggestion that in some instances it would appear to be wasted effort to obtain additional background on someone who has proved to be reliable and who has furnished information for a number of years.

The designation confidential source was established in March, 1950, and it is necessary to obtain Bureau clearance to utilize such an individual on Communist or related work. In requesting such authority, Section 107-T of the Manual of Instructions provides that specific data should be furnished to the Bureau and, if the request is approved, a stamped notation will be placed on a copy of the field request and returned to the field as authorization to proceed. One of the requirements is background information. There is no requirement that additional investigation is necessary but, if there is previous investigation on an individual who has proved to be reliable and is cooperating, his background should be in the file and can very readily then be set forth in the request to the Bureau to utilize him as a confidential source. If such background information is not available, it should certainly be obtained as the field should not be utilizing an individual on whom complete background information has not previously been obtained. It is not felt any change should be made in the present requirements that background information should be furnished to the Bureau whenever authority is requested to utilize an individual as a security confidential source.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this suggestion not be adopted and that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for attention.

RECORDED-29

13 SEP 22 1954

INDEXED-29

EX - 109

JDD:pjm

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gandy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

Sugg. # 664-54

New York, N. Y.
7/30/54

ELIMINATION OF SEPARATE LETTER ON INTERVIEWS
UNDER SI PROGRAM

It is suggested that instead of writing a separate letter on Security Informant Program interviews, that the information be included on the administrative page of the report.

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

PRESENT PROCEDURE

A cover letter is submitted setting forth circumstances of approach, attitude of subject, administrative data, availability of subject as witness or informant and opinions and recommendations of Agent.

ADVANTAGES

Would eliminate any restatement of substance of interview and thereby save certain stenographic time and paper.

From January through June, 1954, an average of 55 interviews were conducted each month at NYO. There are 85 such interviews pending at this time.

DISADVANTAGES

Bureau statistics regarding interviews would be obtainable only from administrative pages.

If administrative page contained numerous names of other subjects mentioned by interviewee, some administrative difficulties in indexing and dissemination of information on administrative page would result at SOG.

RECOMMENDATION

Favorable.

RECORDED-59
INDEXED-59

66-2572-3-867

35 DEC 18 1954

Referred to Mem. Intelligence
for review 8/13/54
Exec Conf memo
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DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 DMJ/MW
me JC

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SECURITY INFORMATION IS - 6-1-11

*CONTACTS OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

It is recommended that it be left to the discretion of the office as to the frequency that a Confidential Security Informant should be contacted. The frequency of contact should not be an over-all blanket rule, but should be designated in accordance with the potential productivity of the informant.

At the present time it is necessary to contact a Security Informant every forty-five days.

In some instances required contact every fourteen days of Security Informant results in filling the informant file with a number of negative reports, and it is felt that leaving the frequency of contact to the discretion of the office, subject to the approval of the Bureau, would not only save agent and clerical time, the unnecessary filing of non-pertinent information, but would not effect the productivity of the informant.

It is recommended that the suggestion as set forth in the first paragraph be adopted.

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mesc

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EX-122
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Referred to Rom
Int. Sec. for
views 8/12/54 -
atn

Exec Conf memo 9/8/54

2 DM, cs

Memo of J Baumgardner

7 OCT 18 1954
8/16/54 GFM:ajm

MZ

1. SUGGESTION

651-57

It is suggested that a ~~rubber~~ stamp be approved by the Bureau in the following form:

"The attached report received from Security
Informants - GENERAL on _____
by _____."

The Agent who receives the report would insert in the blanks the name of the informant, the date he receives it and his own initials.

2. THE PRESENT PROCEDURE

The present procedure requires the Agent to note on the informant's report in longhand the informant's symbol number, the day he receives it and the Agent's initials. The advantage of the suggestion is that it would eliminate the necessity of considerable writing.

4. DISADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION

I see no disadvantages to the above suggestion.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that it be adopted.

INDEXED - 26

RECORDED - 26

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66-2542-3-869
OCT 1 1954
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Referred to Room Int

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Exec Comp memo
9/28/54 E.D.M.:mew.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmd me/c

50007-13-55

OK Belmont 8/25/54 - JDO: jgm:af

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE August 16, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 632-54

CONTACTS WITH SECURITY INFORMANTS

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Gearty _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____
 Miss Gandy _____

The suggestion has been made that it be left to the discretion of the field office as to the frequency that a security informant should be contacted. It is to be noted that the suggestion states that at the present time it is necessary to contact a security informant every 45 days. This is incorrect. The Manual of Instructions requires contacts with security informants at least every two weeks unless Bureau approval is given to less frequent contacts.

The suggestion points out that contacting security informants every 14 days results in filling the informant's file with a number of negative reports. It is further pointed out in the suggestion that leaving the frequency of contact to the discretion of the field office would not only save Agent and clerical time but would not effect the productivity of the informant.

The purpose of the two-week contact rule was not to increase the productivity of our security informants. The purpose was to insure that the Bureau was obtaining all information being received by these individuals. The field office was instructed to discuss written reports received from the informants during these two-week contacts to be certain that the informant had reported everything learned. Most of our security informants are very active and it is felt that the two-week contacts are advisable. It is pointed out moreover that Bureau approval may be obtained and has been obtained in a number of cases to contact informants on other than a two-week basis, such as every 30 days. It is felt, therefore, that the present procedure is preferable to that suggested concerning contacts with security informants.

RECOMMENDATION:
 RECORDED-16
 INDEXED-16

66-2542-3-870

It is recommended that we continue in effect the rule of contacting active security informants at least every two weeks unless Bureau approval is obtained in the case of individual informants.

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DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 dph

OCT 6 1954

mcjc

DATE OF MAIL

9-28-54

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMHERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1706~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 pmd/mcjc

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY

⁴³⁹⁰
59 OCT 12 1954

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-871

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

FROM : Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 507-54
MADE BY PHILADELPHIA OFFICE
INFORMANT PROGRAMS

DATE: 9/17/54

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 p.m. m.c. TC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE 7/27/81
BY 2781

In accordance with SAC Letter #54-36 (C) dated 7/13/54, requesting the field to submit their thoughts relative to further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following was received:

SUGGESTION:

Curtail the formal administrative requirements in handling of the informant programs; such as, requiring 45-day contacts, statistical analyses of Agent time spent on the programs, monthly letters to the Bureau, etc.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

The suggester points out the Manual of Rules and Regulations contains eleven pages regarding Criminal Informants and fifteen pages on Security Informants, the bulk of which outlines technical rules for administrative handling. The Inspectors' Manual contains four pages of synopsis instructions relative to checking on Security Informants and three and one-half pages for checking the effectiveness of Criminal Informant program. These instructions require a considerable amount of time and attention during the course of an office inspection, with the result that it appears this phase of our operations achieves an inordinately large and disproportionate prominence in comparison with many other phases of FBI work.

ADVANTAGES:

Saving of Supervisory, Agent, and clerical time, without any great loss in the effectiveness of the over-all programs.

DISADVANTAGES:

Would result in less attention being given to the program and some less value received.

OBSERVATIONS:

Mr. A. Rosen, Investigative Division, points out that

cc: Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Harbo

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

BOARDMAN

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

time saving, the objective of this suggestion, could be achieved by applying the same suggestion to any phase of the Bureau's work. He states the present administrative requirements in connection with the Criminal Informant program are constantly scrutinized and whenever it is felt certain requirements can be eliminated it will be so recommended.

Mr. A. H. Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, states the Manual of Instructions and Inspectors' Manual, as well as instructions issued in connection with the special programs known as Toplev and Security Informant Program, have been carefully reviewed and it is believed that the requirements in effect are all necessary to the proper operation and supervision of our informant work in the security field. He states the Seat of Government is continually on the alert for any possible simplification of procedure which can be placed in effect without causing any slackening of necessary close control and supervision which must be maintained at all times by the SOG in this field of Bureau work. The Security Informant Desk will continue to carefully watch the progress of our Security Informant work to be certain that all regulations and requirements are absolutely necessary to the efficient handling of the work in the Security Informant field.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

EDM:mew

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/16/54 were Messrs. Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, Boardman, Rosen, McGuire, Holloman and Mason. The Conference unanimously recommended no change in current procedures.

✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STREAMLINING

1. The Suggestion

#507-57

Greatly curtail the formal administrative requirements in handling of the confidential informant programs, such as that requiring 45-day contacts, statistical analyses of agent time spent on the programs, monthly letters to the Bureau, etc.

2. Present Procedure

The Manual of Rules and Regulations contains eleven pages re criminal informants and fifteen pages of instructions re security informants, the bulk of which outline technical rules for administrative handling. The Inspectors' Manual contains four pages of synopsized instructions relative to checking upon security informants and three and a half pages of such instructions for checking the effectiveness of the criminal informant program. These instructions require a very considerable amount of time and attention in the course of an office inspection, with the result that it appears this phase of our operations achieves an inordinately large and disproportionate prominence in comparison with many other phases of FBI work.

3. Advantages of the Suggestion

Much supervisory, agent and clerical time would be saved without, I feel, any great loss in the effectiveness of the over-all informant programs.

4. Disadvantages of the Suggestion

Curtailling of the many technical operational rules and a diminishing of the present tremendous emphasis on this program would undoubtedly result in less attention being given it and some less value received from it.

5. Recommendation

That the administrative handling and checking of the informant programs be carefully considered with a view toward eliminating as many of the technical requirements as possible with resultant simplification.

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm Dmc JC

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. F. J. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 570-54
STREAMLINING
(STATUS OF REPORTS IN SECURITY CASES)

DATE: August 16, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 JMC
mcsc

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Tele. Room
Holloman
Nease
Gandy

The attached suggestion proposes that in the preparation of "status reports" in security cases where security informants have been previously contacted regarding the subject, the existing requirement for recontacting such informants be eliminated unless specific reasons exist for such a recontact with any or all informants. The suggestion would provide that the reports will merely contain a statement that informants, familiar with the activities of the Communist Party who are contacted frequently, have reported no information concerning the subject of the report.

OBSERVATIONS:

By "status reports" the Detroit Office has reference to the yearly investigative reports submitted concerning Security Index subjects one year from the date of the initial summary report. The purpose of such reports is to bring the subject's activities up to date, in light of his activities to reconsider the justification for his inclusion in the Security Index and to consider whether the subject should be interviewed.

The attached suggestion appears to indicate that all security informants of a particular office should be contacted specifically regarding the subject of the yearly report whether or not these informants have previously furnished information regarding the subject or are in a position to furnish such information concerning him. In security investigations the field is not required to contact all of its informants regarding a particular subject. These contacts are limited to those informants who are logically in a position to furnish pertinent information concerning a subject. In those instances, for the purpose of the yearly report, each informant who has previously furnished information concerning a subject should be contacted to determine the subject's present activities. It would be unwise to assume that each informant has furnished all information known to him concerning every subject of whose activities he may be aware. It is a false assumption to rely on the contents of the field office files with respect to the completeness of information furnished by informants concerning subversive activities known to them. Adoption of the suggestion, particularly as it would

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relate to those informants who previously have furnished pertinent information concerning a subject, would provide for the elimination of specific contacts regarding individual subjects with logical informants. The adoption of such a procedure would place far too much reliance on the memory of the informant as well as his judgment as to what information is deemed pertinent concerning all individuals known to him to be active in subversive affairs.

It is believed by the Internal Security Section that each informant who has furnished information concerning a particular subject and each informant who is logically in a position to furnish subsequent information, should be contacted specifically concerning individual subjects for the purpose of yearly reports. Through such contacts the specific activity of the subject, which may or may not have been previously reported by informants, will be confirmed and where the individual has not been active the logical informant who is acquainted with the subject can make a positive statement regarding the subject's inactivity.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of this suggestion.

W. J. [unclear]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *JWS*

FROM : Executives Conference

DATE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pm J

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #536-54
MADE BY CHICAGO OFFICE
MISCELLANEOUS SUGGESTIONS
CONCERNING HANDLING OF SECURITY INFORMANTS *Gen*

JWS

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36 (Q) dated 7/13/54, requesting the field to submit their thoughts relative to further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following was received.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. It is suggested that some criteria for payments to informants be devised which can be used by Agents, Supervisors, and SACs as a guide.
2. It is suggested that Bureau letters to field offices stress necessity of evaluating payments to informants but eliminate the indication of personal liability in case of overpayment by Agents.
3. It is suggested that more Agents be commended and rewarded for developing valuable informants.
4. It is suggested that the inspection approach to the informant field be positive rather than negative with respect to action which has been incorrectly taken and that written-ups on inspections not be made unless there are gross substantive errors.

OBSERVATIONS:

The following observations are made by Mr. Belmont of the Domestic Intelligence Division in connection with the foregoing suggestions. Each observation bears the same number as the suggestion above.

1. The field is aware of the necessity to obtain full value for any money spent for information. In handling informants and the information received from informants, through experience the field is aware of the value and relation to investigative time that any such efforts of an informant should be given. It is difficult to set up a norm or criterion upon which to base payments as it is known information

cc: Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Harbo
RDG:mew

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is provided gratis on some occasions when the same information would be the subject of payment to another informant. The question of setting up some standards in this matter has been considered before and it has been decided to permit the field, based upon local conditions, to place an evaluation on the services rendered by an informant and the information he produces, but the SAC must be assured that he is receiving full value for any money expended in this regard. It is not believed necessary to establish any criteria for payments.

2. The Security Informant Desk is aware of the necessity to properly guide the field in evaluating payments so that the Bureau obtains full value and, in individual letters to the field, such is emphasized. We do not stress personal liability unless there is a specific reason to do so. However, there is an SAC Letter 54-33 issued June 29, 1954, which points out to the field the necessity to be most careful with expenditures and, if an expenditure is not proper, it may result in the Government's requiring reimbursement from the SAC or Agent. We see no reason to change this.

3. The Seat of Government is continually alert to recommend commendation and meritorious increases of salary for exemplary work conducted in this field. The SACs are also alert to this possibility and do not lose any opportunity to reward outstanding work.

4. It is our feeling that informant matters, the same as any other phase of Bureau operation, should be subject to inspection and errors should be called to the attention of the field.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: EDM:mew

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/28/54 were Messrs. Belmont, Parsons, Nichols, Mohr, Sizoo, Rosen, Hennrich, Tamm, and Mason. The Conference unanimously felt there should be no change in present procedure.

OK
V.
Jed
X

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 28, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 536-54
SECURITY INFORMANTSALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842

INETS - GEN'L

The following suggestions are set out as itemized in
Suggestion Number 536-54 and will be treated in order:

1a. It is suggested that FD-209's be used only when an informant furnishes negative information. Where positive information is obtained from informants, it is suggested that such be reflected in the file through channelizing memoranda if information is received orally, and if received by means of written reports, by means of cover sheets.

The Form FD-209 is an approved form used by the field for recording contacts with informants. When the use of this form was considered prior to its approval, it was decided that it should remain exactly what it is, a record of contacts, and any positive information should be set out in a memorandum. The Form FD-209 is placed in the informant's administrative file and is a ready check on contacts with informants, which is the purpose for which the form was devised. Positive information which is placed in memoranda is filed in the informant's Sub A file with the informant's reports. It is not believed any change should be made in present requirements and all contacts with informants should be reflected by FD-209's in the informant's administrative file.

1b. It is suggested that Form FD-235 (request for funds for payment to informant) be revised to include data such as time and place of payment and by whom made.

This form was recently approved by the Administrative Division and is used by an Agent to request funds from the SAC for payment to informants. The form provides space for the Agent to state the reason for the payment, symbol of informant, period of payment, etc. The form is used before payment is made and, therefore, the suggestion does not apply. It is not believed that this suggestion can be followed as it does not apply to Form FD-235.

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2a. It is suggested that some criteria for payments to informants and potential informants be devised which can be used by Agents, supervisors, and SACs as a guide.

① The field is aware of the necessity to obtain full value for any money spent for information. In handling informants and the information received from informants, through experience the field is aware of the value and relation to investigative time that any such efforts of an informant should be given. It is difficult to set up a norm or criterion upon which to base payments as it is known information is provided gratis on some occasions when the same information would be the subject of payment to another informant. The question of setting up some standards in this matter has been considered before and it has been decided to permit the field, based upon local conditions, to place an evaluation on the services rendered by an informant and the information he produces, but the SAC must be assured that he is receiving full value for any money expended in this regard. It is not believed necessary to establish any criteria for payments.

2b. It is suggested that the Bureau letters to the field stress necessity of evaluating payments to informants but eliminate the indication of personal liability in cases of overpayment by Agents.

② The Security Informant Desk is aware of the necessity to properly guide the field in evaluating payments so that the Bureau obtains full value and, in individual letters to the field, such is emphasized. We do not stress personal liability unless there is a specific reason to do so. However, there is a SAC Letter 54-33 issued June 29, 1954, which points out to the field the necessity to be most careful with expenditures and, if an expenditure is not proper, it may result in the Government's requiring reimbursement from the SAC or Agent. We see no reason to change this.

3a. It is suggested that more Agents be commended and rewarded for developing valuable informants.

③ The Seat of Government is continually alert to recommend commendation and meritorious increases of salary for exemplary work conducted in this field. The SACs are also alert to this possibility and do not lose any opportunity to reward outstanding work.

3b. It is suggested that the inspection approach to the informant field be positive rather than negative with respect to action which has been incorrectly taken and that write-ups on inspections not be made unless there are gross substantive errors..

④ It is our feeling that informant matters, the same as any other phase of Bureau operation, should be subject to inspection and errors should be called to the attention of the field.

ACTION:

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division in order that our comments can be noted.

fy

R

CHICAGO DIVISION
STREAMLINING (SAC Letter No. 34-36
dated 7/13/54)

SECURITY INFORMANTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm
mcjc

SUGGESTIONS

534-7-1

1. Streamline the handling of paper work connected with security informants in the following manner:
 - a. Use FD-209's only where an informant furnishes negative information. Where positive information is obtained let this be reflected in the file through channelizing memoranda on oral information and through the cover sheets to written reports. Permit each of the above items to be posted.
 - b. Revise form FD-235 (Request for Funds for Payment to Informant) to include space to incorporate information concerning the time and place of payment and by whom the payment was made, which could also be posted.
2. Improve the evaluating of payments to informants by:
 - a. Setting up some criteria for payments to qualified informants and incentive payments to potential security informants which can be used by agents, supervisors, and Special Agents in Charge as a guide.
 - b. Stress in letters from the Bureau the necessity of properly evaluating payments to informants but eliminate the indication of personal liability in case of over-payment since this causes agents to become over-cautious in the handling of informants and potential informants.
3. Increase the incentive for the development of informants by:
 - a. Increasing the positive approach to the development by commending and rewarding more agents who develop valuable informants such as Communist Party members.
 - b. By making the inspection approach to the informant field one of positive suggestions of specific action which could be taken rather than one of the negative approach with respect to action which has been incorrectly taken. Reduce the numerous write-ups of informants

Exec Conf memo
9/20/54 - E.Dm: new

on inspections unless there are gross substantive errors. It is noted in this regard that the handling of informants is such a complex matter that minor errors are likely to occur unless an agent spends an undue amount of his time in handling an informant.

PRESENT PROCEDURE

The present procedure in the handling and developing of informants is such that on each contact with a security informant an FD-209 must be submitted and each such informant must be contacted every two weeks. The information on the FD-209 in instances where positive information is obtained is also included in channelizing memoranda, and if the information is obtained in written report form it is also included in the report as submitted to the A)134 file by cover sheet.

It is necessary that meticulous care be taken in order to obtain all of the background and other information required in the development of a security informant. The check of a file to determine whether such information is available requires tedious, concentrated effort. This has recently been relieved to some extent through FD-238.

In connection with inspections, it has been noted that there has been a tendency to write-up as substantive errors items which could be very easily and immediately corrected during the inspection. Many of these are in effect form errors rather than substantive errors.

There has been during the past year numerous letters both of a general nature pertaining to informants and in specific informant files stressing the necessity of properly evaluating payments to informants and indicating personal liability for any over-payments. The difficulty, as developed in informants, is a paramount problem and while it is observed that over-payments should not be made, it is also important that under-payments not be made and that informants be obtained.

The present procedure is not one to encourage agents to seek the development of informants because they are so time consuming and so fraught with the possibilities of small substantive errors due to paper work, payments, number of items which must be carefully covered, and the unusual amount of time necessary to properly handle such informants.

ADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTIONS

The suggestions made would increase the efficiency of the informant development program for the Bureau, would reduce the amount of time necessary to

administratively and investigatively handle informants and in so doing would improve the morale of the agents. Some clerical time would also be eliminated.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTIONS

The posting from channelizing memoranda where only oral information was obtained from an informant may result in the informant's file not always reflecting the last contact.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is my recommendation that the above suggestions be adopted.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 23, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 535-54
SECURITY INFORMANTSALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/81 BY 2842 J
pm/mc/jc

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

This suggestion is broken down into several items, each of which will be discussed individually. The individual who submitted this suggestion, however, has also set forth introductory comments in which it is stated that, before progress can be made in the field of security informants, we must be realistic, consider the facts, examine our errors, and attempt to set down a program which will enable us to recover the initiative in the informant field. It is stated that the Bureau has the highest caliber personnel with the ability to produce informants but such cannot be done under existing Bureau instructions except in rare instances. The present Bureau policy, with its numerous restrictions and responsibilities imposed on the field, has destroyed Agent initiative and a realistic and flexible policy should be undertaken. According to the suggestor, the Bureau is reluctant to recognize the problems, difficulties, and needs of the field, and to assume calculated risks in support of the field.

A careful analysis of these preliminary remarks indicates that the individual making this suggestion is not completely aware of the setup at the Seat Of Government (SOG) and why the present rules, regulations and policy are necessary. It would appear that he has not thought through the result which would flow from his suggestions if they were adopted. The instructions, etc., now in effect in the informant field have all been carefully considered and are meant to get the job done but, at the same time, protect the Bureau from ridicule and embarrassment in this most delicate field. The SOG is aware of the necessity for realism in handling security informants and does assume calculated risks where the intelligence to be gained warrants positive action.

The suggestion in certain instances is not entirely clear and inasmuch as general statements have been made, it is difficult to evaluate.

Each suggested change, as enumerated in the suggestion, is discussed individually as follows:

Item I

It is suggested that a capable chief for the Security Informant Program be selected at the SOG who should thoroughly understand Communism; be experienced in informant development in the security field; has a thorough understanding of human nature; is amenable to suggestions from the field, and has sufficient authority to make decisions to accomplish his objective -- the development of security informants.

JDD:pjm

ALD

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The direction and supervision of security informants is not a one-man operation. It is a joint enterprise of the staff at the SOG, utilizing the knowledge, experience, etc., of many individuals, all of whom are working toward one goal -- the development of good security informants. In attempting to achieve this objective, the necessity to maintain control of our informants is a paramount consideration. Decisions are made with the above in mind and such decisions are the results of cumulative effort on the part of many individuals at the SOG.

Item II

It has been suggested that we re-evaluate informant requirements. According to the suggestion, it is now necessary to obtain detailed information on the private life of an informant, which is a waste of time as the field is well qualified to determine when, how, and to what extent, background information should be developed, frequency of contact, etc. It was suggested that we should "get out of the private lives of these people."

Experience has shown that we must obtain considerable background information on individuals, such as informants, with whom we are dealing on a daily basis. We should be more familiar with informants than with subjects. Informants are performing a service for the Bureau and, even though they are not employees, their actions reflect upon the Bureau and we should know as much about them as possible. The informant requirements are adequate and should not be changed.

Item III

It is suggested that the present personnel is inadequate for effective operation of the informant program when taking into consideration the amount of work involved. The suggestion enumerates in detail the work which must be performed with regard to informants, such as research and preparation for interview, actual interviews developed, opening files, dictating memoranda, security background data, etc.

The assignment of personnel is one of the responsibilities of an SAC and in the event an SAC feels that additional personnel should be assigned to the handling of informants, appropriate steps should be taken in that regard. If the SAC does not have sufficient personnel to alleviate any situation afore-mentioned, he should request assistance from the Bureau.

Item IV

It is stated that the Bureau accepts no responsibility to informants. It is suggested that the Bureau should assist informants whose positions have been jeopardized by their cooperation with the Bureau.

The field has been instructed that any time they have a particular problem in connection with an informant, they should furnish the facts to the Bureau in order to determine what can be done. On numerous occasions, the Bureau has gone out of its way to assist informants who, due to circumstances which may or may not be under our control, have resulted in some jeopardy to the informant. It appears that this suggestion applies for the most part to defectees and it is a known fact that as an investigative agency the Bureau is limited in what it can do to assist a defectee. The Bureau does assist and will continue to assist in every way possible defectees and informants consistent with the Bureau's position as a fact-finding investigative agency.

Item V

It is stated in this suggestion that liaison in our informant work appears to be negative and the field is frequently confronted with obstacles in the path of informant development which affect other Government agencies.

The Bureau has established excellent liaison with every Government agency and we are able through this liaison to handle any problems which the field may present. Since no specific examples are set out in this suggestion, no further answer can be given to this suggestion other than the fact that the SOG on a daily basis is constantly, through liaison, handling situations involving informants.

In conclusion, it is suggested, to correct the existing situation, that Bureau personnel be trained in the development and handling of informants. In this regard, the field, according to the suggestion, should be required to supply all instructors.

Training has been given to the field in the developing and handling of informants by the SOG. This activity is a delicate operation and should be handled by the Supervisory staff at the SOG. Field Agents do not have the over-all knowledge of the problems involved, particularly with regard to control, which is so vital in this work. Training of carefully selected personnel is a specialized job and requires the services of many individuals at the SOG who, due to their centralized position, are in possession of material, experiences, facts, and basic policy, all of which must be carefully weighed and presented in training programs.

Whenever Agents are called in from the field for training they are instructed to bring with them suggestions and when they are present during these schools such suggestions from the field are thoroughly discussed as well as experiences by the field relative to informants.

ACTION:

It is not recommended that any of the items contained in Suggestion Number 535-54 be followed and that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for attention.



✓

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *ju*

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #632-54
MADE BY OMAHA OFFICE
CONTACTS WITH SECURITY INFORMANTS

DATE: 9/28/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 DMJ
mcjc

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Vineyard
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36(Q), requesting the field to submit their views as to ways of further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following suggestion was made:

SUGGESTION

GENERAL

That the frequency of contact with a Confidential Security Informant not be covered by an over-all, blanket rule, but that this be left to the discretion of the field office and contacts be designated in accordance with the potential productivity of the informant.

PRESENT REQUIREMENT

Manual of Instructions requires contacts with Security Informants at least every two weeks unless Bureau approval is given for less frequent contacts.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

SAC, Omaha points out that present requirements result in a number of negative reports filling the informant file and the proposed procedure would eliminate unnecessary filing of non-pertinent information. This would also result in savings in Agent and clerical time in preparing such memoranda, but would not in any way affect the productivity of the informant.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

None noted by suggester.

13 OCT 4 1954

RECORDED - 66-2542-3-875

INDEXED - 10

Mrs. Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends continuance of the present rule of contacting active Security Informants at least every two weeks, unless Bureau approval is obtained in the case of individual informants. He states the purpose of the two-week contact rule was not to increase the productivity of Security Informants, but to insure the Bureau was

cc-Messrs. Sizoo

Harbo

6 OCT 11 1954

BOARDMAN

Bryant

2-N

copy filed in 66-2554

Baumgardner
Daggett

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

obtaining all information received by these individuals. The field was instructed during these two-week contacts to be certain the informant had reported everything learned. Most of the Bureau's Security Informants are very active and it is felt that two-week contacts are advisable. Furthermore, Bureau approval may be obtained and has been granted in a number of instances for contacts to be made with Security Informants with less frequency, such as every 30 days. Mr. Belmont believes the present procedure is preferable to the suggested procedure.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

EDM:cs

The Conference of 9/27/54, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich, Belmont, Rosen, Nichols and Mason, recommends unanimously unfavorable.

A handwritten signature, possibly reading "L. J. S.", is written over a horizontal line.

664
665

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont
FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: August 17, 1954
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 pm

Tolson
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Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBERS 664-54, 665-54
STREAMLINING INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY SUBJECTS

The attached suggestions propose the elimination of the requirement that a cover letter to a report setting forth the results of an interview with a security subject and the data now required to be set forth in the letter be included on the administrative page of the report.

OBSERVATIONS:

These suggestions point out that the adoption of the proposal would eliminate the restatement in the cover letter of the substance of the interview, which is included in the attached report. Existing Manual instructions (87-C, Manual of Instructions, page 27e) provide that the cover letter to the report setting forth the results of an interview with a security subject shall include a definite statement concerning the subject's cooperativeness; a statement which indicates that the information furnished by the subject coincides substantially with the results of prior investigation; the availability of the subject as a witness and an evaluation of his potential as an informant or confidential source. The letter likewise will indicate whether or not future contacts are contemplated with the subject and will include the recommendation of the field with respect to the subject's inclusion, removal or continuance in the Security Index. The Manual instructions do not require that a cover memorandum restate the substance of the interview. In this respect, SAC Letter 53-48 dated July 14, 1953, specifically provided, "It will not be necessary to summarize information furnished by the subject which is included in the report."

The information now required in the cover memorandum frequently will require independent subsequent action by the Bureau with respect to the subject, particularly as it relates to the individual's development as an informant and where action is necessary with respect to his Security Index status. It would be most undesirable to include information on administrative pages which would require Bureau action.

Attachment
cc - Training and Inspection Division
JIM:nnv

RECORDED-89
INDEXED-89
EX-103

66-1541-3-876
29 OCT 6, 1954

77 OCT 12 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2435-1

The suggestions point out that the adoption of their proposal would result in savings of stenographic time and in paper. It should be noted that stenographic time would be consumed in the preparation of the necessary administrative data and with respect to the use of paper additional paper would be necessary because of the greater number of copies of reports which are submitted in excess of the original and one copy of the cover memorandum which is forwarded to the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of the attached suggestions.

✓

WHL
JHL

New York, N. Y.
7/30/54

ELIMINATION OF SEPARATE LETTER ON INTERVIEWS
UNDER SI PROGRAM

It is suggested that instead of writing a separate letter on Security Informant Program interviews, that the information be included on the administrative page of the report.

PRESENT PROCEDURE

A cover letter is submitted setting forth circumstances of approach, attitude of subject, administrative data, availability of subject as witness or informant and opinions and recommendations of Agent.

ADVANTAGES

Would eliminate any restatement of substance of interview and thereby save certain stenographic time and paper.

From January through June, 1954, an average of 55 interviews were conducted each month at NYO. There are 85 such interviews pending at this time.

DISADVANTAGES

Bureau statistics regarding interviews would be obtainable only from administrative pages.

If administrative page contained numerous names of other subjects mentioned by interviewee, some administrative difficulties in indexing and dissemination of information on administrative page would result at SOG.

RECOMMENDATION

Favorable.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY SP4200JmeJTC

ENCLOSURE

7-conf mems
28m/28 7/27/54

Supp. # 664-208

66-1547-876

New York, N. Y.
7/30/54

ELIMINATION OF COVER LETTER REFLECTING
INTERVIEWS IN SM CASES

It is suggested that the cover letter to report reflecting interview in SM cases be eliminated and that the administrative page of report be utilized for this purpose.

PRESENT PROCEDURE

Cover letter required by page 27E, Section 87, Manual of Instructions, now contains:

1. Information reflecting circumstances of approach to subject not included in report.
2. Certain statements made to subjects such as our interest in labor unions.
3. Information as to hostility of subject shown by expressions on face, etc.
4. Information as to extent of cooperation - whether available as witness or potential informant.
5. Opinions and recommendations of Agent as to disposition of case.
6. In some cases the substance of the interview is restated.

ADVANTAGES

If administrative page is utilized restatement of substance of interview will be avoided. Certain savings in steno time, paper, etc. will result. For example: on 4/12/54 NY had about 300 outstanding SM interviews; on 5/10, 6/10 and 7/12/54 about 250. About 38 interviews are being conducted each week and a report subsequently submitted.

DISADVANTAGES

Bureau statistics regarding interviews reported only from administrative pages.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 DM
mejc

ENCLOSURE

to each memo
Sample 7/27/54

50 pp # 1.15-54

66-10010-116

RE: ELIMINATION OF COVER LETTER REFLECTING INTERVIEWS IN SM CASES

If administrative page contained numerous names of other subjects mentioned by interviewee, some administrative difficulties in indexing and dissemination of information on administrative page would result at Seat of Government.

RECOMMENDATION

Favorable.

54 79# 665-54

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

DATE: 9/29/54

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTIONS #664-54 and #665-54
MADE BY NEW YORK OFFICE
REPORTING THE RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
SECURITY MATTER CASES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/27/81 BY SP4/DJG

Security Informants - 664-54

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36(Q), requesting the field to submit their views as to ways of further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following suggestions were made.

SUGGESTIONS

- #664-54 Instead of writing a separate letter on Security Informant Program interviews, the information be included on the Administrative Page of the report.
- #665-54 Cover letters reflecting interviews in Security Matter cases be eliminated and instead the Administrative Page be used for this purpose.

PRESENT REQUIREMENTS

(The field may request authority to interview a Security subject who is now an active Communist. The only way they can interview such an individual is under the Informant Program. When the interview has been conducted and the individual proves to be cooperative information should be reported as though it were a regular interview under the Informant Program, so the same rules would apply to writing of memoranda where the subject interviewed is actually a Security subject.)

Manual of Instructions Section 87 C, page 27e, states reports should be prepared promptly following the interview and submitted to the Bureau as enclosures to a cover memorandum. Each memorandum should include a definite statement or conclusion of the interviewing Agents as to the cooperativeness of the subject and whether the information furnished by the subject coincides substantially with the information developed against him. Reasons for the conclusions should be set out briefly. This memorandum should indicate whether the subject would be available as a witness in the prosecution of any of the individuals mentioned by him and should contain an evaluation of the subject's potential as an informant or confidential source. If further contacts are contemplated, the Bureau should be so informed.

SAC Letter 53-48, 7/14/53, specifically provides that it will not be necessary to summarize information furnished by the

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-453

RECORDED-89 INDEXED-89

53 OCT 13 1954

cc-Messrs. Sizoo and Harbo

EX-103

BOARD

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

subject, which is included in the report.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTIONS

The suggester feels adoption of the suggestions set out above would effect savings in stenographic time and in paper costs. He points out 55 interviews were conducted each month in the New York Office and there are 85 such interviews pending at this time under the Security Informant Program.

In connection with interviews in Security Matter cases, SAC, New York advised on 4/12/54, New York had about 300 outstanding Security Matter interviews; on 5/10, 6/10 and 7/12/54 there were about 250 outstanding Security Matter interviews, and about 38 interviews are being conducted per week on which reports and cover memoranda are subsequently submitted.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTIONS

SAC, New York states Bureau statistics regarding these interviews would be obtainable only from Administrative Pages of reports. If the Administrative Page contained numerous names of other subjects mentioned by the interviewee, some administrative difficulties in indexing and dissemination of information might result at the Seat of Government.

Mr. A. H. Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, does not favor adoption of the above suggestions. He points out that information now required in the cover memorandum frequently will require independent subsequent action by the Bureau with respect to the subject, particularly as it relates to the individual's development as an informant and where action is necessary with respect to his Security Index status. It would be most undesirable to include information on Administrative Pages which would require Bureau action.

Mr. Belmont also states that stenographic time saved in elimination of cover memoranda would be offset by the necessity of having to prepare Administrative Pages of reports. Because a greater number of copies of reports are submitted, in excess of the original and one copy of the cover memorandum, paper costs would also be increased.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: EDM:cs

The Conference of 9/27/54, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich, Belmont, Rosen, Nichols and Mason, recommends unanimously that present procedure be continued.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : Executives Conference

DATE: 9/28/54

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 570-54
MADE BY DETROIT OFFICE
STATUS REPORTS IN SECURITY CASES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmj
mcj

Tolson
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Nichols
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36 (Q) dated 7/13/54, requesting the field to submit their thoughts on further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following was received.

SUGGESTION:

That in the preparation of "status reports" in security cases where security informants have been previously contacted regarding the subject, the existing requirement for recontacting such informants be eliminated unless specific reasons exist for such a recontact with any or all informants. It is felt that the reports could merely contain a statement that informants familiar with activities of the Communist Party, who are contacted frequently, have reported no information concerning the subject of the report.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Manual of Instructions, Section 87C, page 18, paragraph II states, "If no subversive information is available, the fact that appropriate confidential informants have been contacted with negative results should be submitted in report form....."

ADVANTAGES:

Would eliminate unnecessary Agent time spent in preparation of informant contact requests, contact of informants, and advising the Agent making the request the results of the contact. It is also felt that recontacts are unnecessary since the informant would have furnished all information in his possession. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107C, page 4, paragraph 2, states, ".....during each contact the informant's activities since the previous contact should be carefully reviewed and a statement elicited from the informant that he has furnished in report form or verbally all information and data which he has obtained during that time."

DISADVANTAGES:

None noted by suggester.

OBSERVATIONS:

cc: Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Ladd, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, Harbo
attn

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

opposed to the suggestion. He states by "status reports" the suggester refers to the yearly investigative reports submitted concerning Security Index subjects one year from the date of the initial summary report. The purpose of such reports is to bring the subject's activities up to date, to reconsider the justification for his inclusion in the Security Index, and to consider whether the subject should be interviewed.

Mr. Belmont states the suggestion appears to indicate that all security informants of a particular office should be contacted specifically regarding the subject of the yearly report, whether or not these informants have previously furnished information concerning him. However, the field is not required to contact all its informants regarding a particular subject in security investigations; these contacts are limited to those informants who are logically in a position to furnish pertinent information concerning a subject. For the purpose of the yearly report, each informant who has previously furnished information concerning a subject should be contacted to determine the subject's present activities.

Mr. Belmont feels adoption of the suggestion, particularly as it would relate to those informants who previously have furnished pertinent information concerning a subject, would provide for the elimination of specific contacts regarding individual subjects with logical informants. Adoption of such a procedure would place far too much reliance on the memory of the informant, as well as his judgment as to what information is deemed pertinent concerning all individuals known to him to be active in subversive affairs.

The Internal Security Section believes that each informant who has furnished information concerning a particular subject, and each informant who is logically in a position to furnish subsequent information should be contacted specifically concerning individual subjects for the purpose of the yearly reports. Through such contacts, the specific activity of the subject will be confirmed, and where the individual has not been active, the logical informant who is acquainted with the subject can make a positive statement regarding the subject's inactivity.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: EDH:cs

The Conference of 9/27/54, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich, Belmont, Rosen, Nichols and Mason, recommends unanimously that the present procedure be continued.

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

October 1, 1954

SLIP(S) OF
DATE 10/1/54

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pm
mcjc

TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY
INFORMANTS - 65-1343

Re Bureau airtel September 8, 1954, and your
replies wherein you furnished the names of Special Agents
working full or part time on the development of security
informants.

This is to advise that on October 25 and 26,
1954, a two-day training session will be held in the
New York Office for the Agents named in your communications
with the following exceptions: Special Agent Troy Coleman,
who is a full-time Security Supervisor in Newark; Special
Agents John Stolzenthaller and Paul Blasco of New York, who
are full-time on the Defector Program.

This training session will be conducted by
Assistant Director A. H. Belmont and instructors from the
Seat of Government. All designated Agents should report
to the New York Office at 8:30 A.M., October 25, 1954, and
be prepared to remain in New York for this training, which
will conclude at 7:30 P.M., October 26, 1954.

Sufficient copies of the Agenda for this training
session are attached for each Agent, who should carefully
review the Agenda and prepare himself to participate
individually in the discussion of all matters set forth
in the Agenda. In addition, all Agents should bring to
the session any ideas, suggestions or recommendations not
included in the Agenda, which in the opinion of the
particular Agent warrant consideration.

Enclosure

COMM - FBI
OCT 1 1954
MAILED 30

RECORDED - 69

EX - 113

66-2542-3878

- 2 cc - Albany (W Enclosure)
- 2 cc - Boston (W Enclosure)
- 2 cc - Buffalo (W Enclosure)
- 2 cc - Newark (W Enclosure)
- 2 cc - New Haven (W Enclosure)

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Tracy
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

OCT 14 1954

JDD:gmf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP-6
REASON: 25X.1
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-91

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The urgency of the development of confidential informants is apparent, particularly at this time when the CP is giving more and more evidence of going underground. It is essential that we direct our attention to the development of informants in the underground. This session will consider all phases of this situation in order that our efforts may be directed to obtaining informants on all levels of both the open and underground CP. *[Signature]*

As in all informant matters, the maximum benefit from our efforts can only be achieved through the wholehearted participation and enthusiasm of individual participants and the Agents who have been chosen for this training should keep these thoughts in mind in preparing themselves for this two-day session.

In a separate communication the New York Office will be furnished instructions concerning the preparation of an appropriate room wherein this session will be held.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, Washington Field

October 6, 1954

Director, FBI

TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmt

mejc

By separate memorandum you have been advised that the Bureau plans to hold training sessions in the Washington Field Office on October 28 and 29, 1954, concerning the development of security informants.

You should arrange an appropriate classroom with seating accommodations for 19 Agents from the field and three instructors from the Seat of Government for these two sessions.

Your receptionist should be aware of the location of this classroom in order to direct the visiting Agents and representatives from the Seat of Government to the classroom after they are properly identified and have signed the appropriate registers.

RECORDED 13

EX-117

66-2542-3-879

2 OCT 8 1954

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COMM - FBI
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RECEIVED - NOV 11 1954

21 OCT 13 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *for*

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #651-54
MADE BY ST. LOUIS OFFICE
RUBBER STAMPS FOR INFORMANT REPORTS

DATE: 9/28/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmi
mcjc

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In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36(0), 7/13/54, which requested the field to submit their thoughts relative to ways of further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following suggestion was made:

SUGGESTION

Prepare and issue rubber stamps to be used to reflect receipt and necessary notations on informant reports. The proposed stamp is:

"The attached report received from Security Informants GENERAL
_____ on _____ by _____."

PRESENT PROCEDURE

Agent makes necessary notation in longhand.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

Eliminate necessity of considerable writing.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

None apparent.

OBSERVATIONS

Mr. Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, is opposed. A large number of stamps would be involved and the saving of time would be negligible.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION EDM:new

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/28/54 were Messrs. Belmont, Parsons, Nichols, Mohr, Sizoo, Rosen, Hennrich, Tamm and Mason. The Conference unanimously felt there should be no change in present procedure.
cc-Messrs. Sizoo and Harbo
RDG:dmg

71 OCT 14 1954

1. SUGGESTION

It is suggested that a rubber stamp be approved by the Bureau in the following form:

"The attached report received from Security
informant _____ on _____
by _____."

The Agent who receives the report would insert in the blanks the name of the informant, the date he receives it and his own initials.

2. THE PRESENT PROCEDURE

The present procedure requires the Agent to note on the informant's report in longhand the informant's symbol number, the day he receives it and the Agent's initials. The advantage of the suggestion is that it would eliminate the necessity of considerable writing.

4. DISADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION

I see no disadvantages to the above suggestion.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that it be adopted.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 PWD
mejc

Rec'd Confidential
9/28/54
P.D. McInerney

66-2042-3-880

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 25, 1954

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 651-54

SECURITY INFORMANTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81

BY 2842 PM

mcjc

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Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
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Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

It has been suggested that a rubber stamp be approved in handling informants' reports which would require the Agent who receives the reports to insert in blank spaces the name of the informant, the date the Agent receives it, and the Agent's initials.

According to the suggestion, at the present time when an Agent receives an informant's report, he notes on the report in longhand the informant's symbol number, the day he receives it, and the Agent's initials. A rubber stamp would eliminate considerable writing.

The Manual of Instructions at the present time does not require such notations on the report of an informant and some offices prepare a cover memorandum explaining the report, date of receipt, and by whom received. Other offices make notations as indicated in the suggestion. To establish a uniform procedure, an SAC Letter has been prepared to require Agents upon receiving informants' reports, either in person or through post office boxes, to affix the initials of the Agent and the date on the front of the report without obliterating in any way the contents of the report itself. It is not believed that a rubber stamp should be used for this purpose as many Agents will be involved and, therefore, would require perhaps a number of rubber stamps in each office. In addition, the time saved by the use of a rubber stamp would be negligible.

At the present time, the name of the informant is never utilized in connection with reports or material which he furnishes as all informants identify their reports by cover names or symbols and this method of covering the identity of an informant should still be continued. The name of an informant should not be placed on a report or any material furnished by him.

ACTION:

RECORDED-74

INDEXED-74

7 OCT 6 1954

It is not recommended that this suggestion be followed and this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for attention.

55 OCT 14 1954

JDD:pjm:sfd

Director, FBI

August 23, 1954

SAC, Chicago (66-4468)

SECURITY INFO.

SUGGESTION - FD-235 AND FD-221
(Informant Security)

There are being transmitted herewith an original and two copies of a suggestion submitted by SA W. RULON PAXMAN.

This suggestion has been carefully examined and the following comments are offered:

1. It would appear that the suggestion would afford additional security to the informants without diminishing the information necessary for the maintenance of the confidential fund.
2. The suggestion appears to be consistent with existing instructions pertaining to the security of the identity of informants.

It is recommended that the suggestion submitted be adopted by the

Bureau.

WGB/gls

Encl. (1)

1 - CG 67-

(SA W. Rulon Paxman)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/27/81 BY 2542pmD

me J E

166-2642-1
NOT RECORDED
98 SEP 2-1954

INVESTIGATIVE NO. 5711111

58 DEC 9 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-4468-2036

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *See S*

DATE: 9/28/54

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #758-54
MADE BY THE HOUSTON OFFICE
CURTAILMENT OF BLANKET INFORMANT COVERAGE

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
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Tamm _____
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Holloman _____
Gandy _____

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36(Q), 7/13/54, requesting the field to submit views relative to ways of further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following suggestion was made:

SUGGESTION

That the practice whereby a field office requests blanket informant coverage by another field office be curtailed and made more selective. This might be achieved by requiring Bureau clearance before instituting such informant coverage.

PRESENT PROCEDURE

A field office in connection with any investigation might request another field office to contact confidential informants when such a lead appears logical and reasonable.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

Most informants are restricted in the scope of the information they can provide and blanket coverage avails nothing; reduces chance of informant's losing interest; "shotgun" informant coverage usually results in "shotgun" results.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-81 BY 2842

Curtailment of coverage might possibly result in overlooking or bypassing an informant who could be of assistance.

OBSERVATIONS

Mr. Rosen, Investigative Division, observed that contacting informants constitutes an investigative lead; that an SAC should not have leads covered if they are not logical and reasonable steps in the investigation; and that no need for instructing the field along these lines exists at this time. *000* *la*

cc-Messrs. Sizoo
Harbo

RECORDED-74
INDEXED-74

1 OCT. 7/1984

DEF: dmo

65 OCT 19 1934

EX-125

BA

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

EDM:new

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/28/54 were Messrs. Belmont, Parsons, Nichols, Mohr, Sizoo, Rosen, Hennrich, Tamm and Mason. The Conference unanimously felt there should be no change in present procedure.

OK
J. Jones

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson, *for S*

FROM : Executives Conference
SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS #546-54 & #536-54
MADE BY CHICAGO & NEW ORLEANS OFFICE
~~FILING OF INFORMANT CONTACT RECORD~~
~~FORM FD-209~~

DATE: 9/28/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 28422

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

In accordance with SAC Letter 54-36 (Q) dated 7/13/54, requesting the field to submit their thoughts relative to further streamlining the Bureau's work, the following was received.

SUGGESTION:

Form FD-209 is used by the field to reflect the results of contacts with informants. Where an informant has been contacted and has furnished only negative information, New Orleans suggests that FD-209 not be filed in substantive case files maintained on subjects concerning whom informant had no information. Chicago suggests the exact opposite procedure, recommending that FD-209 be filed in pertinent substantive case files as a record that informant had no information concerning a particular subject.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

A copy of FD-209 is attached for information. The form was designed to facilitate the recording of contacts with informants. The form is to be filed in the informant's administrative file only and was not designed to be filed in substantive case files.

OBSERVATIONS:

Mr. Belmont of the Domestic Intelligence Division advises that Form FD-209 is an approved form used by the field for recording contacts with informants. When the use of this form was considered prior to its approval, it was decided that it should remain exactly what it is, a record of contacts, and any positive information should be set out in a memorandum. The Form FD-209 is placed in the informant's administrative file and is a ready check on contacts with informants, which is the purpose for which the form was devised. Positive information which is placed in memoranda is filed in the informant's Sub A file with the informant's reports. It is not believed any change should be made in present requirements and all contacts with informants should be reflected by FD-209's in the informant's administrative file.

cc: Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Harbo

RDG:mew

RECORDED - 10

INDEXED - 10

29 OCT 2 1954

EX - 107

BOARD

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OCT 20 1954

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

EDM:new

Present at the Executives Conference of 9/28/54 were Messrs. Belmont, Parsons, Nichols, Mohr, Sizoo, Rosen, Hennrich, Tamm and Mason. The Conference unanimously felt there should be no change in present procedure.

OK
EJW

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC

DATE:

FROM : SA

SUBJECT:

C.I. _____ P.C.I. _____ S.I. _____ P.S.I. _____

DATES OF CONTACT:

TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED:

PURPOSE AND RESULTS OF CONTACT:

Negative: _____ Positive: _____

PERSONAL DATA:

RATING _____

COVERAGE _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 pmj
mcjc

66-2542-3-883

ENCLOSURE

1- _____

1- _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

OCTOBER 22, 1954

AIRTEL

Transmit the following message to: SAC, CHICAGO

RECORDED-37

RE: TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SECURITY INFORMANTS. REURAIRTEL OCTOBER 19, 1954.
APPROVAL IS GIVEN TO THE ADDITION OF SPECIAL AGENTS
ROBERT J. WILSON AND JOSEPH V. ROYER TO PERSONNEL
SELECTED FROM YOUR OFFICE FOR ATTENDANCE AT TWO-DAY
TRAINING SESSION ON SECURITY INFORMANTS TO BE HELD IN
THE CHICAGO OFFICE NOVEMBER 1 AND 2, 1954. SA ROYER
MAY ALSO BE UTILIZED FULL TIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SECURITY INFORMANTS. SAS WILSON AND ROYER SHOULD
CAREFULLY REVIEW COPIES OF THE AGENDA PREVIOUSLY
TRANSMITTED AND BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DISCUSSION OF ALL MATTERS SET FORTH IN THE AGENDA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmw/mjc

HOOVER

JDD:DE

NOV 13 1954

NOV 15 1954

COMM - FBI

OCT 22 1954

MAILED 20

SENT VIA

Per

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED2/27/81 BY 28542 pm me JC
Transmit the following teletype message to:

FBI, CHICAGO

10/19/54

b7D

DIRECTOR, FBI (AM, REGISTERED)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS.

SA ROBERT J. WILSON, WHO HAS BEEN THE SUPERVISOR IN THE CG OFFICE OF SQUAD 8, SECURITY - MAJOR GROUPS, IS BEING RECOMMENDED BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATION TO THE BUREAU FOR THE POSITION OF COORDINATING SECURITY SUPERVISOR IN THE CG DIVISION. IN HIS NEW POSITION HE WILL HAVE THE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPERVISING THE DEVELOPMENT AND HANDLING OF SECURITY INFORMANTS AND POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS IN THIS OFFICE. SA WILSON HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED INFORMANT SCHOOLS AND TOPIEV SCHOOLS AT THE BUREAU. HE HAS ALSO ATTENDED ONE OF THE BUREAU SECURITY SCHOOLS. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE FORTH-COMING INFORMANT SCHOOL IS TO BE HELD IN CG ON NOVEMBER 1 AND 2, 1954, BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR SUPERVISOR WILSON TO ATTEND THIS SCHOOL.

SA JOSEPH V. ROYER, BOD 10/15/51, IS IN GS-10. HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK SINCE NOVEMBER, 1952, AND DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD HAS PERFORMED HIS DUTIES CAPABLY. HE IS AN ENTHUSIASTIC, ENERGETIC AGENT AND A GOOD INTERVIEWER. IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT SA ROYER WILL BE REASSIGNED TO FULL-TIME INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT IN THIS OFFICE SINCE HE HAS A DEFINITE

COPIES DESTROYED

WRP/gls

9 08 JUL 19 1961

2 - BUREAU (EXTRA)

1 - CG PERSONNEL FILE SA R. J. WILSON

1 - CG PERSONNEL FILE SA J. V. ROYER

RECORDED-37

29 OCT 28 1954

r. Belmont

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE TWO

INTEREST IN THIS WORK AND APPEARS TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO PROPERLY DEVELOP AND HANDLE INFORMANTS. BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO UTILIZE SA ROYER IN THE FULL-TIME DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS. BUREAU AUTHORITY IS ALSO REQUESTED FOR SA ROYER TO ATTEND THE INFORMANT SCHOOL BEING HELD BY THE BUREAU IN CG ON NOVEMBER 1 AND 2, 1954.

BANISTER

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 11/23/54

FROM : Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 781-54
MADE BY SA W. RULON PAXMAN
CHICAGO OFFICE
SUGGESTION NO. 789-54
MADE BY SA NORBERT F. DONAHUE
BUTTE OFFICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 28422

FORM FD-235 (REQUEST FOR FUNDS FOR
PAYMENT TO INFORMANT)
FORM FD-221 (RECEIPT)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

pmc me JC

Two Agents in two different offices suggested that the second line of the body of Form FD-235 (Request for Funds for Payment to Informant) be changed to read "Informant's Name or Symbol Number" instead of "Informant's Name and Symbol Number," so that in those instances where an Informant has been assigned a symbol number it will not be necessary to also use the Informant's name. (Copies attached)

One of the Agents also suggested that if a symbol number is available it be used on Form FD-221 (Receipt used in conjunction with payments to Informants) in lieu of Informant's name and symbol number, as present instructions require. Purpose of both suggestions is to afford greater security to Informants.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Form FD-235 is a request form completed by the Agent in order to obtain money from the SAC to pay the Informant. Form FD-221 is then executed by the Agent as a receipt to the SAC for the money furnished to the Agent. Although the use of both forms was suggested by the General Accounting Office, and both forms receive close and limited handling in field offices, the identity of Informants is not fully protected when both the name and symbol number appear on the same form.

Attachments

BCB:mjs

(5)

cc: Mr. Harbo
Mr. Sizoo

Let to Mr. Paxman
cc: Mr. Sizoo
12/1/54 BCB/mjs
Let to Donahue
12/1/54 BCB/mjs

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170 DEC 8 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

33 DEC 10 1954

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION SUGGESTION:

The Administrative Division suggested that a modified form (FD-221A - Confidential Fund Receipt) be used in lieu of the present Form FD-235 and that Form FD-235 be deleted from the Form Book. FD-221A would be prepared on 8 x 10 1/2 paper and would contain exactly the same information formerly included on Form FD-235, but would not require both the name and symbol number of the Informant; symbol number alone would suffice where one existed. This form would be used solely by the field office and would be retained by the SAC as a tickler until the voucher was prepared, at which time the form would be completed and filed in the Informant's file. Form FD-221, together with the Informant's receipt, will be attached to the blue slip (Form FD-37) and forwarded to the Bureau by voucher.

Proposed Form FD-221A and proposed procedure have the approval of the Domestic Intelligence and Investigative Divisions and the Washington Field Office.

Copies of present and proposed forms attached.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) If the revised Form FD-221 and the new Form FD-221A are approved, Mr. Mohr recommended that the attached SAC Letter be issued notifying the field of the changes. In addition, Mr. Mohr feels the following items should be brought to the attention of the field: (a) Lack of receipts to support blue slips; (b) Failure to properly explain lack of receipt; (c) Blue slip must show to whom payment was actually made and city where made; (d) Receipt signed by the Informant should reflect the name of the person actually making payment and any departure from this should be fully explained on the blue slip; (e) In the future where a symbol number has been assigned to the Informant, only the symbol number shall be reflected on Forms FD-221 and FD-221A; however, the name of the Informant shall be reflected on the blue slip.

(2) If recommendation #1 is approved, it is recommended a supply of Forms FD-221 and FD-221A be prepared for stock and a supply be furnished to each field office.

(3) If the above recommendations are approved, Form FD-235 should be deleted from the FBI Form Book and replaced by Form FD-221A. Present Form FD-221 should be replaced by revised Form FD-221.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: RTH:cs

The Conference of 11/23/54, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Nichols, Mohr, Conrad, Sizoo, Belmont, Tamm, Rosen and Harbo, unanimously concurred in the foregoing recommendations. If approved, the attached SAC Letter should be sent to the field.

V PL J

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT
 FROM : MR. F. J. GARDNER
 SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 781-54
 SUGGESTION NO. 789-54
 SECURITY INFORMANTS

DATE October 5, 1954

Tolson
 Boardman
 Nichols
 Belmont
 Harbo
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Sizoo
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/81 BY 2892 pmj

No. 781-54. It is pointed out that Form FD-235, which is a request from a Special Agent to the SAC for funds to pay an informant, now requires an insertion on the form of informant's name and symbol number. For security reasons it was suggested that this form require insertion of informant's name OR symbol number.

It was also suggested that a change be made in Form FD-221, which is a receipt used in conjunction with payments to informants by Special Agents. Present instructions would appear to require that the name and symbol number of the informant be listed on this form and it was suggested for security reasons that if a symbol number is available that it be used on this form and the name of the informant not be set out.

No. 789-54. It is suggested that on Form FD-235 instead of inserting the informant's name and symbol number that the requirements be changed so that the form contain, "Payee's name or informant's symbol."

OBSERVATIONS

Forms FD-235 and FD-221 are now used in the field in conjunction with the payment of money to informants. Form FD-235 is filled out by the Special Agent handling the informant and the form is then turned in to the SAC. Based upon this form a blue slip is prepared for transmittal to the Bureau in order that the SAC will be reimbursed for the money paid to the informant. Form FD-235 does not come into the Bureau but is filed in the Field Office in duplicate. It is believed that it is not necessary for both the informant's symbol and true name to be set out on this form and for security reasons it should be required that only

Attachment
 Recd: Training and Inspection Division
 FBI

NOT RECORDED
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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

55 DEC 10 1954

Let's to Post Section
 12/11/54 BCS/m

DEC 10 1954

112

the informant's symbol be inserted on Form FD-235.

Form FD-221 is a receipt which the Special Agent signs and gives to the SAC when the Agent receives the money from the SAC to pay an informant. The form does not specifically require the name of the informant, but it would appear the name of the informant should be set out and the use of this form has been suggested to the Bureau by the General Accounting Office. After this form is completed and signed it is attached to the blue slip and the receipt from the informant himself, all of which are then transmitted to the Bureau. The informant signs his true name to the receipt which he gives to the Agent when he gets his money. Therefore, it can be seen that FD-221 if it contains the true name of the informant coincides with the actual receipt signed by the informant himself by his true name.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. It is recommended that Form FD-235 be changed to require the insertion of only the informant's symbol number and not informant's true name.

2. It is recommended that instructions be issued to provide for the insertion of informant's true name on Form FD-221 but not his symbol number. This form is transmitted with the blue slip and the receipt from the informant himself to the Bureau where it is filed under the supervision of the Administrative Division.

ACTION:

If approved, it is recommended the attached suggestions be routed to the Training and Inspection Division and recommendations 1 and 2 above set out be placed in effect.

/ BAC

SAC, 14112 854 67

11-23-54

S 1 1 0

Part (2) Security Informants - general

(C) SECURITY COVERAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO THE SUPREME COURT DECISION BANNING SEGREGATION IN SCHOOLS -- In view of the recent Supreme Court decision banning segregation in schools, it can be anticipated that certain nationalist-type organizations, such as the Klu Klux Klan, will take steps, particularly in the South, to prevent integration.

It is imperative that each office be on the alert for the creation of anti-integration organizations and be prepared to maintain adequate coverage of these organizations through the use of security informants and panel sources.

Each office having organizations of this type must take steps to increase its security informants and panel sources so that the Bureau can be fully apprised in advance of any activities by these organizations which would come within the purview of Executive Order 10450 or civil rights violations.

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 rhome JC

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46 DEC 2 1954

DEC 6 1954

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-04-12133

CONFIDENTIAL

A. H. Belmont

November 4, 1954

R. R. Roach

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV (100-3-9)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

General

The Central Research Unit regularly brings to the attention of the field material suitable for use in connection with the captioned programs. The attached list of quotations which sets forth the true Communist viewpoint on religion is being forwarded at this time, in view of the recent widespread publicity which the Communist Party, USA, has given the claim that it is not opposed to religion.

The duplimats are being retained in the Central Research Unit.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That the attached letter and enclosure be approved for transmittal to the field. Upon approval the letter will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding it and the attachment to the field.

JFC:bpk:osc

Attachment

cc - J. D. Donohue

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DATE 7/2/01 BY 2842 DM/ME JC

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED

2842 DM/ME JC

DECLASSIFICATION

7-27-91
7-27-81

166-2542-3 - V

NOT RECORDED
80 NOV 12 1954

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Harbo
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Sizoo
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

DEC 13 1954

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CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC Albany

DATE: November 8, 1954

FROM: *JTH* Director, FBI

SUBJECT:

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA *6(u)***TOPLEV(100-3-99)****SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)**

During the past six months the Communist Party, USA has given widespread publicity to its program for "Jobs, Peace, Equal Rights and Democracy," both in its original draft issued in March, 1954 and in the final form in which it was "unanimously" adopted, with a few minor changes, in August, 1954.

Since both the original and final drafts of this program claim that the Communist Party, USA, "seeks no conflict with any church or any American's religious belief," the attached list of quotations has been prepared for the assistance of agents who are conducting interviews under the captioned programs. These quotations, all of which were taken from authoritative public sources, disclose the true Communist viewpoint on religion, and explain why all religions have been ruthlessly suppressed in every nation in which the Communists have seized power.

This claim of the Communist Party, USA, is also belied by the barrage of antireligious propaganda in the Soviet Union which has been intensified in recent months to the point where, at present, it is assuming the proportions of a major antireligious campaign.

Enclosures (2)

cc All Continental Offices (With Enclosures - 2)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *284220mdm*
IN
FCIM
DATE
DECLASSIFICATION

7-27-91

7-27-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *7/27/81* BY *284220mdm*
mcjc

33 DEC 13 1954

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-99-1857

QUOTATIONS FROM MARX, ENGELS, LENIN AND STALIN

"It is not religion that creates man, but man who creates religion... Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature... It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion, as an illusory happiness of the people, is a requisite of their real happiness."

Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 16

"...the criticism of religion is the basis of all criticism."

Ibid., p. 11

"All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces...."

Engels, Anti-Duhring, (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 344

"... Religion is the opium of the people. Religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent human life."

Lenin, Selected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1943), vol. XI, p. 658.

"... Every religious idea, every idea of god, even every flirtation with the idea of god, is unutterable vileness... vileness of the most dangerous kind, 'contagion' of the most abominable kind...."

Ibid., pp. 675, 676

"... We must combat religion - this is the A.B.C. of all materialism, and consequently of Marxism...."

Lenin, Religion, (New York: International Publishers, 1933), Little Lenin Library, vol. VII, p. 14

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/22/81 BY 2842 pmjmc/jc

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3 - ✓

"... The Marxist must be a materialist, i. e., an enemy of religion. . . ."

Ibid., p. 16

"The party cannot be neutral towards religion and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice. . . ."

Stalin, Leninism, Moscow, 1934,
vol. I, p. 386

QUOTATIONS FROM THE CURRENT SOVIET PRESS

"Religion has always been and remains, a reactionary ideology, and an implacable fight must be carried on against religion and religious practices."

Young Communist, No. 1, 1954

"... religion was and is a weapon of exploiter classes. Like a harmful narcotic, religion poisons the mind of man with fictions about 'another world.' It teaches that suffering, grief and poverty are blessings, that man should submissively bear oppression, coercion and force, zealously kow-tow before the rich and not dream of freedom, happiness or a prosperous life on earth."

Young Communist Truth, August 8, 1954

"It is essential first and foremost to know how to use the teaching of academic subjects at school for purposes of the anti-religious upbringing of pupils. . . ."

"The school cannot confine itself to scientific-atheistic propaganda only among the pupils. Scientific-atheistic propaganda must be carried on among parents as well. . . ."

"In no way can such a situation be tolerated whereby the teacher himself exercises a religious influence on his pupils. . . . A man who has chosen the profession of teacher must serve as an example to pupils: . . . must bring them up in the spirit of militant materialism."

Teacher's Gazette, August 18, 1954

QUOTATIONS FROM LEADING AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

"Among the elementary measures the American Soviet government will adopt to further the cultural revolution are the following. . . . The studies will be revolutionized, being cleansed of religious, patriotic and other features of the bourgeois ideology. . . .

"... Religious schools will be abolished and organized religious training for minors prohibited. Freedom will be established for anti-religious propaganda.

"... God will be banished from the laboratories as well as from the schools."

William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet America, pp. 316, 317

"The Communist Party takes the position that the social function of religion and religious institutions is to act as an opiate to keep the lower classes passive, to make them accept the bad conditions under which they have to live in the hope of a reward after death. From this estimate of the social role of religion it is quite clear that the Communist Party is the enemy of religion."

Earl Browder, Communism in the United States, p. 334

"... We would not want to give the slightest indication that there is any prospect of a rapprochement between Communism and religion as such."

Ibid., p. 337

"... Many centuries ago religion completely lost to science whatever indispensable function it may once have had in the simple societies of primitive man, and it has long since become a drag on human progress. . . ."

William Z. Foster, The Twilight of World Capitalism, pp. 98, 99

"... I find that the dialectical materialist viewpoint fully satisfies me in meeting the everyday problems of life, as well as in confronting the perspective of eventual natural dissolution by death. In my outlook on life there is no place for religion."

William Z. Foster, "Reply to a Priest's Letter," Political Affairs, October, 1954, p. 45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY: L. V. BOARDMAN
REASON FOR EXTENSION

FROM: MR. A. H. BELMONT
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION: 7-27-91

SUBJECT: TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

DATE: October 21, 1954

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY: 2842 dmj
REASON FOR EXTENSION: 2
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

A 2-day training session for selected Agents in the development of security informants has been approved for November 1 and 2, 1954. This session will be held in the Chicago Office for Agents from the Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Louisville, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Omaha, St. Louis, and Springfield Divisions. All of the Agents recommended by the respective SACs have been approved for the training session. In the attached airtel from Chicago dated October 19, 1954, SAC Banister has requested authority for the attendance at this session of SAs Robert J. Wilson and Joseph V. Royer. SA Wilson has been the Supervisor in Chicago on security work and is being recommended separately for the position of Coordinating Security Supervisor in Chicago, in which position he will have the direct responsibility of supervising the development and handling of security informants and potential informants. SA Wilson has previously attended special informant training sessions, including Toplev.

SA Royer, according to SAC Banister, has been assigned to security work since November, 1952, and is an enthusiastic, energetic Agent and a good interviewer. In addition to requesting authorization for the attendance of SA Royer at this training session, SAC Banister also requested authority to use SA Royer in the full-time development of security informants.

The personnel files of SA Wilson and Royer have been reviewed and they are qualified from an adaptability and administrative standpoint to attend the training session on November 1 and 2, 1954. The Administrative Division concurs.

These training sessions have been set up for the Agents actually contacting individuals in order to develop informants and we have not stressed the attendance of any supervisors. In view of SA Wilson's previous training in this work, however, and the fact that he will have directed supervision of informant development in Chicago, it is believed that he could obtain considerable benefit from this session.

ACTION:

For approval there is attached an appropriate airtel to Chicago authorizing the attendance of SAs Wilson and Royer at the training session on security informants to be held in Chicago on November 1 and 2, 1954. SAC Banister is authorized to attend.

Training & Inspection Div.
Administrative Div.

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-12-88 BY SP-1 MAC/CL

66-2542-3-885

CONFIDENTIAL
NO
P. H. HALL

DECLASSIFIED BY: 66-2542-3-885
ON: 9-12-88

SECURITY INFORMANTS - Contd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

utilize Special Agent Royer full time on the development of security informants.

*File
10-22*

[Signature]
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[Signature]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

AIRTEL

OCTOBER 21, 1954

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

RECORDED-37 100-2542-3-886
TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SECURITY INFORMANTS. REURAIRTEL OCTOBER 19, LAST.
APPROVAL IS GIVEN TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF SPECIAL
AGENTS PHILIP H. WILSON AND RICHARD B. LAVIN IN PLACE
OF SPECIAL AGENTS NEWPHER AND CONE FOR THE TWO-DAY
TRAINING SESSION ON SECURITY INFORMANTS TO BE HELD
IN THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE OCTOBER 28 AND 29, 1954.
SPECIAL AGENTS WILSON AND LAVIN SHOULD CAREFULLY
REVIEW COPIES OF THE AGENDA PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED
AND BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION OF ALL
MATTERS SET FORTH IN THE AGENDA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

HOOVER

JDD:DE

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 Dhw/mc JC

COMM - FBI

OCT 21 1954

MAILED 30

53 DEC 1

58 NOV 12 1954

SENT VIA

M

Per

5/1/54
5/1/54
5/1/54

AIRTEL

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

FBI WASH FIELD

10/19/54

DIRECTOR SECURITY INFORMANTS - 200K

TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMATION.

REBUSET OCTOBER 6 LAST. INASMUCH AS SAs JAMES O. NEWHER AND WALTON O. COLE ARE ASSIGNED TO INFORMANT MATTERS IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM, SAs PHILIP H. WILSON AND RICHARD B. LAVIN, WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO COMMUNIST MATTERS IN THIS OFFICE, WILL ATTEND INFORMANT SCHOOL SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 28 AND 29 NEXT, UACB.

LAUGHLIN

LMRO:af
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 P/LPS
ON 4-27-94
83-13213

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/22/88 BY 2842pm/mme JCB

Memorandum
Boardman 10-20
Airtel WFO 10-21
WFO

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP-6 P/LPS
REASON FOR EXTENSION 3
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF NEXT
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-81

66-25423-886

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF 10/16/81
DATE 10/16/81

RECORDED-37

EX-124

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 20,
1954

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN USE OF
OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

SECURITY INFORMATION

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 201 MAR 30
EXEMPT FROM EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 9-17-81
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-81

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Belmont	
Harbo	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Sizoo	
Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

A 2-day training session for selected Agents in the development of security informants has been approved for October 28 and 29, 1954. This session will be held in the Washington Field Office for Agents from the Washington Field Division, and from the Baltimore, Charlotte, Knoxville, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Richmond Divisions. All of the Agents recommended by the respective SACs have been approved for the training session.

In the attached airtel dated October 19, 1954, SAC Laughlin of the Washington Field Division has advised that two of the approved Agents for this school, Special Agents James O. Newpher and Walton O. Cone are assigned to informant matters in the Soviet and Satellite Intensification Program and since this training session is concerned more with Communist matters, two other Agents, namely, SAs Philip H. Wilson and Richard B. Lavin, who are assigned to Communist matters in Washington, will attend.

The personnel files of SAs Wilson and Lavin, who are in GS-12 and GS-11, respectively, have been reviewed, and they are qualified from an adaptability and administrative standpoint to attend as substitutes for SAs Newpher and Cone. The Administrative Division concurs.

ACTION

For approval there is attached an appropriate airtel to Washington Field, authorizing the substitution of SAs Wilson and Lavin for SAs Newpher and Cone at the 2-day training session on security informants to be held in the Washington Field Office October 28 and 29, 1954.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISEAttachment
JDD:DEcc - Training & Inspection Div.
Administrative Div.
Movement

RECORDED-37

INDEXED-37

EX-124

55 DEC 13 1954

58 NOV 12 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED

Nov 5 11:44 AM '54

INTERNAL SECURITY
FBI

RECEIVED - BOTTS

OCT 21 9 11 AM '54

RECEIVED - MOHR
FBI

Nov 10 12 13 PM '54

OCT 20

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Nov 10

2 54 PM '54

REC'D BELMONT
FBI - JUSTICE

OCT 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC'D PERSONNEL SECTION

REC'D - TOLSON'S OFFICE

OCT 21 12 34 PM '54

F. b. i.

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S) OF
DATE 10/6/54

RECEIVED CIV. CLK. OFF

F. B. I.

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Nov 10 11 42 AM '54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. OCTOBER 22, 1954

URGENT

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, NEW YORK

42000

TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SECURITY INFORMANTS. RE YOUR TELEPHONE CALL
THIS DATE. APPROVAL GIVEN SUBSTITUTION SA CHARLES S.
HARDING, JR., IN PLACE OF SA MC CORMY FOR TRAINING
SESSION ON SECURITY INFORMANTS TO BE HELD ON
OCTOBER 25 AND 26, 1954. SA HARDING SHOULD REVIEW
COPY OF AGENDA PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED YOUR OFFICE.

JDD:DE

HOOVER

NOTE ON YELLOW: In view of fact training session is scheduled
for Monday and Tuesday 10/25 and 26, teletype
necessary.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842ph Dmc Jc

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

COPIES DESTROYED

9 08 JUL 19 1966

RECEIVED READING ROOM
OCT 22 5 15 PM '54

DEC 18 1954

33 NOV 19 1954
SENT VIA

Per _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *JH*DATE: October 22,
1954FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB* (4)SUBJECT: TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTSSECURITY INFORMANTS. GENERAL

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

A two-day training session for selected Agents in the development of security informants has been approved for October 25 and 26, 1954. This session will be held in the New York Office for Agents from the New York, New Haven, Boston, Albany, Buffalo, and Newark Divisions. All of the Agents recommended by the respective SACs have been approved for the training session.

On October 22, 1954, ASAC Marchessault telephonically advised that SA Joseph F. McCorry is assuming supervisory duties in the New York Office and as a substitute for this training session it was recommended that SA Charles S. Harding, Jr. attend.

The personnel file of SA Harding, GS-12, reveals that he is working full time on the Security Informant Program in the New York Office and he is qualified from an adaptability and administrative standpoint to attend in place of SA McCorry. The Administrative Division concurs.

ACTION:

For approval there is attached a teletype to New York authorizing the attendance of SA Harding at the two-day training session for selected Agents concerning the development of security informants, which will be held in the New York Office on October 25 and 26, 1954.

Attachment
cc - Training & Inspection Div.
Administrative Div.
Movement

JDD:DE

RECORDED - 120

66-25423-888

29 OCT 13 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/81 BY SP5/ADP
mcjc

65 DEC 13 1954

58 NOV 12 1954

PHOTO FILES
ml

McG
JP
Q

DATE OF MAIL 10-29-54

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAURENCE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmv
mctc

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

59 NOV 17 1954

REMOVED BY _____

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-889

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DATE OF MAIL 10-29-54

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMPHERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmd me JC

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

FE
REMOVED BY 56 NOV 17 1954

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-890

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI
Att: Crime Records Section

11/30/54

SAC, New York (134-0)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 Pm Dms DC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-94
7-27-81

"BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953

Rebulet to Baltimore dated 11/22/54 and captioned as
above, in which it was requested that offices receiving copies
of relet furnish the Bureau with any information they possess
concerning the effects of the captioned article or similar types
of articles in their work in the Communist field.

In accordance with these instructions, an immediate
survey was conducted among Special Agent personnel involved in
security work in an effort to determine if such articles had
made any impression on those individuals whom they contacted.
Set out below are the results of this survey: OK

During the course of the initial contact with [redacted]
(before development) on 11/3/53, the informant expressed his
interest in reading the article by the Director "published in the
NY Herald Tribune magazine section of 11/1/53." The informant
stated that he had always been concerned over becoming known as
a "rat" or "informer". It was immediately pointed out
to [redacted] that Director HOOVER'S article specifically repudiated
these terms as applying to citizens furnishing information on
Communist activities to their government. OK

The following day, 11/4/53, the informant made known
his belief that he was practically convinced that the CP sought
violent overthrow of the US Govt. and expressed renewed interest
in similar literature left with him on the preceding day. Shortly
thereafter, the informant advised of his decision to cooperate with
the Bureau.

On 10/27/54, during the course of a regular contact,
SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON was advised in general terms by NY-694-S
that past newspaper and magazine articles by the Director on the
subject of Communism had done much to advance the cause of democracy. OK

RM

VJS:LS

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S)
DATE 10/6/81

170 DEC 10 1954

Letter to Director
NY 134-0

in this country, at the same time planting the seeds of rebellion in the minds of many Party members. It is interesting to note that a somewhat similar statement was voiced by [redacted] on 9/8/54 (C) b7D to SA RICHARD H. BLASSER. According to this informant, "the public statements directed to all Communists by the Attorney General to come forward and testify should do much to bring about the defection of a large number of CP members." The informant stated at this time that a wider circulation of such articles should be made, especially in newspapers and periodicals believed read by Party members. (U)

(U) [redacted] further advised that it was an article by the Director "published in the magazine section of the 'NY Herald Tribune' or 'Times' sometime in 1950" that did more than anything else to overcome his own doubts and was responsible for his contacting the Bureau. (U)

[redacted] on an occasion of a contact by SA SPURGEON J. PETERSON, advised that during the period he was attempting to orientate his thinking on the problem of coming to the FBI, there were several factors which needed to be resolved in his own mind. He stated that the first was in being able to overcome the years of CP teaching which sought to establish that Communism was the right and only way, while capitalism and the US Govt. were the wrong ways. Secondly, that the FBI was his enemy and was an unfair and ruthless organization. Thirdly, a fear for his personal and financial welfare, which could result in arrest, prosecution and loss of ability to earn a living due to his becoming exposed as a government informer. Finally, the effect the revelation of his Communist background would have upon his family. The informant stated that midway in the month of September, 1954, he read in the 'NY Times' statements made by the Director of the FBI and Attorney General BROWNELL in which Communists were urged to come to the government with information they had concerning CP activities. He commented favorably upon the Director's statement, finding it warm and reassuring to himself. (U)

[redacted] further advised SA PETERSON that during his period of indecision, the only factor which prevented him from coming to the Bureau was the fear the effect of his decision would have upon his family and the treatment they would receive at the hands of the government. In this connection, the informant stated (U)

Letter to Director
NY 134-0

that the Director's statement might have contained some re-assurance that not only would he be protected from Federal prosecution, but also that his family might likewise be shielded from exposure and prosecution. [] advised that in his opinion such action would reach those Communists who are presently holding back because they continue to entertain doubts as to the effect their decision to cooperate would have upon members of their family. (u)

b7D

On 1/6/54, [] former [] advised agents of the NYO of the existence of strained relations between himself and the Justice Dept. [] employed as a consultant and witness, expressed the opinion that ex-Communists were not being properly treated by the Dept. after coming forward and admitting their affiliations. He said that unless the Department's attitude changed in this respect, he would refuse further cooperation. [] advised that he saw a ray of hope when he read Director HOOVER'S article in "This Week" magazine, in which an appeal was made to ex-Communists to come to the aid of their government. He stated he felt the Dept. did not share the Director's attitude in its treatment of people who have renounced Communism. (u)

b7D

The agents assigned to Toplev interviews in the NYO express the unanimous opinion that the captioned article is one of the best of its type ever published. A pamphlet incorporating this article is used extensively by these agents in their contacts with Communists. Both [] and NY-694-S have reported that although Communists are prohibited from reading such articles and from possessing literature of this type, the rule is regularly violated. It is the belief of the Toplev agents that articles of this nature, when used in conjunction with Toplev interviews, have both immediate and long range effects on Party members. (u)

b7D

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS, SECTION 107 G

In Section 107 G, Page 5, Paragraph 2, the sentence: "For administrative purposes more than one copy of the report should be made by the informant if he is able to do so in order that one copy may be placed in the informant's file and the other in the applicable case file," should be eliminated and the following sentence substituted:

"Informants should be told to submit one copy only of reports in order to eliminate any temptation to the informant to maintain a copy."

GMc:de

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 pmb/mcjc

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NOV 10 5 26 PM '81

RECEIVED - INHBP

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-891

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *ABK*DATE: November 9, 1954 *212*FROM : MR. BAUMGARDNER *BG-1*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT
REPORTSALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DMW
mcjc

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Rosen	
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Sizoo	
Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

Section 107 G of the Manual of Instructions on Developing and Maintaining Security Informants states on page 5 that "For administrative purposes more than one copy of the (informant's) report should be made by the informant if he is able to do so in order that one copy may be placed in the informant's file and the other in the applicable case file."

During the specialized Security Informant Development Training Sessions which were recently held in New York and the Washington Field Office, the suggestion was brought up by several Agents from the Field that this provision is of no benefit any more inasmuch as informants' reports invariably must be channeled to more than one applicable case file. It was further pointed out that this is undoubtedly a temptation to the informant to keep a copy of his reports if he makes copies in accordance with this Manual section, and such practice is, of course, very undesirable. It was suggested that this part of the Manual be eliminated.

It is felt that this suggestion has merit and that the requirement for duplicate copies of reports from informants should be eliminated.

RECOMMENDATION

There is attached an appropriate change for the Manual of Instructions, Section 107 G. If you approve, this should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division.

Attachment

cc: Training and Inspection Division

RECORDED - 54
INDEXED - 54

NOV 15 1954

55 DEC 13 1954

Manual of Instructions
55 NOV 10 1954
Revised
faw66-1934-7184
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

5401 54-62

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5 1, E-13

1, E-13

(I) ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS; DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM; FULL EXPLOITATION OF ALL KNOWN CONTACTS OF SOVIET/SATELLITE PERSONNEL AND ESTABLISHMENTS -- SAC Letter 54-26(U) states: "If no reason to the contrary exists, the contact (of Soviet or satellite personnel or establishments) may, with Bureau approval, be interviewed to determine his reason for making the contact and to determine if he should be placed on the Security Index or if advisable to explore the possibility of securing his cooperation as an informant or double agent."

A memorandum shall be submitted requesting Bureau authority for such an interview. In each instance the memorandum must contain the following information, if available:

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 DMJ/DC
EXEMPTED BY 2/3
FORM 1
DATE OF REVIEW 7-27-81
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-81

DECLASSIFIED BY 866-ajp/psj
ON 4-8-84
83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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NOT RECORDED
46 DEC 13 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-1-2136

DEC 15 1954

I. Residence address, occupation, employment, date and place of birth and citizenship status of the subject. **CONFIDENTIAL**

II. Marital status.

If married, the occupation and employment of the spouse.

III. Circumstances regarding the contact or contacts with Soviet or satellite establishments or personnel. *CE*

IV. Past and present subversive activities or connections of the subject.

V. Past or present subversive activities or connections of subject's spouse or relatives.

VI. Informant or double-agent potentialities. *Sly*

VII. Any other factor which might have bearing on desirability or undesirability of interview.

VIII. What is expected to be gained by the interview?

In each memorandum pertinent information, if available, regarding the eight items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number, but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

In addition to furnishing the itemized information relating to the above-listed items, unless you are recommending a special manner of procedure for conducting the interview, the last paragraph of each memorandum should contain the following statements: "Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. Care will be exercised to protect the original source in this matter. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities, but a separate communication will be directed to the Bureau setting forth the results of the interview and requesting authority to re-contact the subject as a potential security informant or double agent." *Y*

Upon receipt of a request for interview the Bureau will advise whether or not authorization to conduct the interview is granted. In those instances when it is not necessary for the Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve requests to interview contacts of Soviet or satellite establishments or personnel by placing an appropriate rubber stamp impression on a carbon copy of the request which will be returned to the field by routing slip. *CE*

(J) SECURITY INFORMANTS - TRAINING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL -- (A series of five two-day regional training sessions in the field on the development of security informants was recently completed. These sessions were held in the New York, Washington Field, Chicago, San Francisco, and New Orleans Offices, with 136 selected Special Agents from all continental offices participating.) Special Agents in Charge, Assistant Special Agents in Charge, and Supervisors of the offices where the meetings were held attended part time as their duties permitted and when present they participated in the discussions.

(The purpose of these conferences was: (1) to train Special Agents in the development of security informants under the Security Informant Program in the continental offices where this program had not previously been instituted; (2) to devise methods of getting live informants into the Communist underground apparatus; (3) to explore ways to improve our approaches to Communists in our efforts to develop them as informants.)

(During these sessions the current status of the Communist Party, open and underground, and our coverage therein, was thoroughly discussed, with particular emphasis on the localities represented by the participants.) It was pointed out that the development of informants, while most important, is but one phase of the Bureau's general concerted attack on the Communist Party, USA, and other subversive groups and, even though the need to develop live informants is vital and urgent, the participants of the conference were reminded that our general attack on the Party includes prosecutions under the Smith Act and penetration of the Communist underground as well as our general interview programs.

The representatives from the field were well prepared for these conferences and had thoroughly reviewed the agenda previously transmitted to all continental offices. Ideas and suggestions as to how our objective could be accomplished in specific field divisions were thoroughly explored, and many helpful suggestions were elicited which may be utilized in obtaining vitally needed coverage. (Actual interviews with Communists, both productive and unproductive, were

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 JAL/BJ
ON 08-13-85

66-04-2136
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p. 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

presented for discussion and, by means of detailed analysis of the manner in which such interviews were conducted, it is believed the Agents participating will be able to utilize the knowledge gained by these conferences to good advantage in making approaches to Communists in the future.)

One of the primary reasons for these conferences was to crystallize the thinking of Agents concerned with the development of informants to the need for live informant coverage in the underground. Such coverage can be obtained by placing a currently active informant in the underground or by developing an underground Communist into a security informant. Both methods should be considered by all offices in our attempts to penetrate the underground apparatus. Whenever possible, consistent with the position of a current informant in the Party, efforts should be made to place him in the underground. (S)(u)

With regard to selecting an underground Communist for interview as a possible informant, care should be exercised so that an underground operation from which we are already securing information is not prematurely revealed or jeopardized. It is essential, therefore, that in all offices close coordination be maintained between the underground squads and Agents who will conduct interviews with Communists. It should be kept in mind, however, that penetration of the underground by live informants is necessary as we must obtain witnesses who can testify in the future against Communists engaged in underground activity. (S)(u)

Live informant coverage in the underground is also needed so that we will be apprised on a day-to-day basis of the activities of the Party which in most sections of the country is being operated by the underground leadership. (S)(u)

At these conferences a thorough review of the Security Informant Program was conducted and for the assistance and guidance of all continental offices, the procedure to be followed under the program is set forth. Offices which have been handling the program will note certain changes which it is felt will be helpful in conducting these interviews with Communists.

12/7/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-68

-12-
P 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Security Informant Program:

Until now 23 continental offices have been interviewing active Communists under the Security Informant Program. Effective immediately all continental offices are included under this program. The Agents who recently participated in the afore-mentioned conferences were instructed to review all material on Communism previously transmitted by the Bureau in order that they will have a thorough background in all aspects of Marxist Scientific Socialism and be able to discuss the subject where necessary during interviews with Communists. For the assistance of the field in this regard, an index is being prepared by the Central Research Desk of all data of this type previously transmitted by the Bureau to the field. This index will be transmitted to all offices as soon as it is completed. From time to time additional material will be transmitted to the field which should be carefully digested and analyzed by all Agents who have received training under the Security Informant Program and Toplev Program. (S)(u)

Certain of the Agents who participated in these sessions are already engaged on a full-time or part-time basis in the development of informants and it is believed advisable to give careful consideration to the use of these specially trained Agents for the purpose of conducting interviews with active Communists to the exclusion of other work. The names of any Agents who are assigned to the development of informants exclusively should be furnished to the Bureau. (S)(u)

Selection of Subjects:

Subjects selected should be active in the open or underground Communist Party or similar subversive group. In determining who should be interviewed; however, there should be close coordination with underground squads so that interviews are not arranged which could jeopardize any active underground investigation being conducted. Good judgment should prevail in selecting subjects, keeping in mind the primary purpose of the program is to develop informants through interviews with individuals who are active in the Communist Party. Due to lack of coverage, it may not be possible in some instances to definitely determine the current status of a Communist and if all indications point to the fact that the subject, due to his past Communist activity and based upon available information is underground, consideration should be given to an interview with the subject. (S)(u)

12/7/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-68

- 19 -
p. 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Individuals under indictment or scheduled for prosecution in the near future or subjects of LMRA cases should not be considered for interview in the absence of unusual circumstances.

Investigation:

Investigation preparatory to interview should be conducted wherever possible by the Agent to whom the case is regularly assigned and an up-to-date report submitted by that Agent where necessary. The case should be thoroughly reviewed by the Agent to whom the case is assigned and an Agent trained under the Security Informant or Toplev Program. When this review has been completed, a letter should be directed to the Bureau requesting authority to contact the subject. It has been found that this review of the subject's background is most essential to success under this program. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that before any approach is made to a subject, the Agent or Agents participating in the interview must be thoroughly and completely versed in the background of the individual being contacted. *[Handwritten initials]*

Letter Requesting Authority To Interview:

Requests for authority to interview subjects under this program should have a dual caption:

JOHN DOE
SECURITY MATTER -- C

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
DIVISION

These requests should contain:

Background:

1. Date and place of birth
2. Marital status
3. Race and citizenship
4. Education, if known
5. Present and recent employment
6. Present residence

12/7/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-68

- 14 -
p. 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Communist Party Activity:

A brief history of Communist Party activity on the part of the subject, including (a) positions held in Communist Party or front groups, (b) activity on part of subject in journalistic or union fields, (c) current status of subject in Communist Party, (d) whether or not subject is included in the Security Index.

Plan of Approach:

Complete details should be set forth as to where, when and how the subjects will be contacted.

Requests For Bureau Authority to Contact:

The last paragraph of the letter should contain the request for Bureau authority to contact the subject in accordance with existing Bureau instructions relating to the Security Informant Program. In addition, if the subject is active in labor union activities, it should be indicated that the Bureau's policy on labor matters will be explained to the subject during the initial stages of the interview.

If at all possible, the approach should be planned for some secure location other than the subject's residence or place of employment. It is realized that certain subjects, such as housewives, self-employed businessmen and, in some instances, people employed in industry, are not susceptible to approach in the above manner. Therefore, in those instances where a reasonable effort has been made to set up an approach away from residence or place of business, and such is not feasible or practical, the circumstances should be set out and authority requested to make the contact either at home or at place of business, whichever is more desirable, not for the purpose of trying to develop the subject as a security informant, but to interview him regarding his own Communist activity in the manner of a Security Matter - C interview. The letter should also contain the statement that if the subject proves cooperative, arrangements will be made for another interview at a secure place away from the residence or employment in order to develop him as an informant and specific authority to conduct that interview should be requested.

Requests for authority to interview which are approved:

12/7/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-68

- 35 -

P.S.

by the Bureau will be stamped "Approved" and the duplicate copy will be returned to you indicating this approval. Those cases which are not approved by the Bureau will be made the subject of correspondence and any such instructions relating to an interview will also be forwarded to your office by letter.

Contact:

Contact must be made under secure conditions and with prior Bureau authority. Careful thought should be given to the contact and every effort made to open the conversation in a friendly manner so that the subject will continue the interview for the longest possible time. Contact should not be made under circumstances where the subject will misinterpret the approach of the Agents, such as on a dark street late at night. At least two Agents must participate in each contact. However, the actual approach need not be made by both Agents at the same time and one Agent may observe from a secure distance. The background of the subject and individual circumstances will determine exactly how the approach should be handled in each case. The Agent or Agents who approach the subject should identify themselves during the interview as Special Agents of the FBI by either credentials or badge.

Recontacts:

After authority has been received to make an initial contact with a subject recontacts may be made in the same manner as the original authorization whenever such recontacts are considered feasible. There is no limitation on the number of recontacts or the time when they are to be made, but good judgment should prevail, keeping in mind the individual circumstances in each case. The Bureau should be advised of the original contact and each recontact. Specific authority should be obtained from the Bureau to make recontacts in those cases where circumstances indicate a delicate situation exists and a greater than usual risk is involved, such as with individuals employed in the newspaper field, educational field, radio and television industry, religious field, publishing houses, labor leaders, and the like. In any event, after each recontact the Bureau should be advised. (This paragraph also applies to Toplev interviews)

[Handwritten initials: JH, A(W)]

Files:

Control file on program should be opened in each office and it should contain copies of pertinent correspondence, instructions,

12/7/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-68

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

et cetera. Bureau control file is 66-2542-3; letters regarding individual interviews with subjects should not be designated for Bureau control file, but instead should be designated for main Bureau file on the subject. Bureau control file is used for general instructions only and for monthly reports. Whenever Bureau authority is received to interview subject under this program, the main file on that subject should be opened, if in a closed status, and kept open until the matter of subject's cooperation with the Bureau is resolved.

Monthly Report:

Monthly reports submitted in connection with the above program should be set out as shown below:

	<u>During Past</u> <u>30 days</u>	<u>Total to</u> <u>Date</u>
1. Number of interviews conducted:		
2. Number of security informants developed under this program:		
3. Number of confidential sources developed through this program:		

There should also be set forth a brief analysis of the progress being made and the number of Special Agents being utilized full time and part time in conducting interviews under the program.

SAC, Letter # 54-68
12-7-54

Section M - Part 1

- General

(M) SECURITY INFORMANTS - FORM PD-238 -- When this form is next printed it will contain an additional space thereon for the insertion of the name of the alternate Agent handling the informant.

In the meantime you should include on the forms now being used in each informant's file the words "Name of Alternate Agent" and set out the name. You should also indicate the appropriate serial where the information is contained, designating such alternate Agent.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 Jme
JC

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04-2136

OK

116-2542-3 - ✓
NOT RECORDED
46 DEC 13 1954

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CONFIDENTIAL
18557

SAC, Baltimore

November 22, 1954

Director, FBI

"BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 2842 m.v. m.c. TC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91

This Week Magazine in its issue of November 1, 1953, carried an article by me entitled "Breaking the Communist Spell." One of the purposes of this article was to encourage the many individuals who have broken with Communism to furnish the Bureau information. This would refer both to individuals still in the Party and afraid to break openly and others who had drifted away but not yet taken any active steps to furnish information.

Offices receiving copies of this letter are requested to furnish the Bureau any information they possess concerning the effects of this article, or similar types of articles, in their work in the Communist field. Agents conducting Toplev and other Communist interviews should be asked concerning what reactions, if any, the appeal had on Communist members. This applies not only to any immediate situation but also its long-range effects.

Your reply should be forwarded within one week of the receipt of this letter and marked "Attention, Crime Records Section."

66-2542-3-891K

- cc - Boston
- cc - Chicago
- cc - Cincinnati
- cc - Cleveland
- cc - Detroit
- cc - Los Angeles
- cc - Minneapolis
- cc - Newark
- cc - New Haven
- cc - New York
- cc - Philadelphia
- cc - Pittsburgh
- cc - St. Louis
- cc - Seattle
- cc - Washington field office

RECORDED - 32

INDEXED 32

NOV 24 1954

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DATE 11-27-01 BY 60322

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-01 BY 60322

MAILED 8
NOV 22 1954
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-17-81 BY SP7 mdc/so

CONFIDENTIAL

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Barbo
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Nease
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

OCT 2 - 1955

NOTE: This information is desired in the preparation of an article in the Crime Records Section.

66-2542-3-892

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-26-3505X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmd me TCJAN 31 1955Nler

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CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, New York

November 22, 1954

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

- 2 - Orig. and copy
- 1 - Yellow file copy
- 1 - CC Bufile 100-8-99
- 1 - Sect. Tickler
- 1 - J. F. Condon

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

G. ...

ReBuletts 11/18/53 and 12/16/53, and your letters of 12/9/53 and 12/29/53 captioned as above.

You should recontact the Jewish Labor Committee, 25 East Seventy-eighth Street, New York, New York, and attempt to obtain 100 additional copies of the pamphlet "Communist Anti-Semitism."

If the copies of this publication are still available, they should be forwarded to the Bureau marked for the attention of the Central Research Section.

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED

2842 pmdmc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmdmc JC

DECLASSIFIED 7-27-91

JFC:mjh (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmdmc JC

Relets reflect previous correspondence between the Bureau and the New York office in securing copies of the requested publication, which has been used in connection with the Toplev and Security Informant Programs. By letter dated 11/19/54, the Boston office requested that the Bureau furnish material which would be of assistance in connection with the interviews with individuals of the Jewish Faith.

RECORDED 66-2542-3-894

COMM - FBI
NOV 30 1954
MAILED 24

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- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

DEC 3 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-3-77-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 2, 1954

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - FORM FD-238

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm

Tolson	
Boardman	
Nichols	
Belmont	
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Tele. Room	
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The training sessions on the development of security informants recently held in the field recommended that Form FD-238, which is a top serial maintained in each informant's administrative file, be amended to make a place thereon for the name of the alternate Agent who handles the informant.

The current Form FD-238 contains a space only for the name of the contacting Agent.

This recommendation was concurred in by the Domestic Intelligence Division. Approval was given to the recommendation that when this form is next printed, a space be designated thereon for the name of the alternate Agent.

The Training Division has advised that such action will be taken. In the meantime it was suggested that the field be advised of this action and granted authority to add on to the forms which are now in use in each informant's file one more space for the insertion of the name of the alternate Agent.

ACTION

In line with the above, there is attached for approval an appropriate letter to all SACs.

Attachment:

cc: L. V. Boardman
A. H. Belmont
F. J. Baumgardner
J. D. Donohue

JDD:DE (5)

RECORDED - 32

EX-112

DEC 7 1954

55 DEC 13 1954

66-347-2157
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
100-347-2157

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATT: CRIME RECORDS SECTION DATE: Dec. 3, 1954

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (80-0-359)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ~~BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL~~
~~THIS WEEK MAGAZINE~~
NOVEMBER 1, 1953.

ReBulet to Baltimore dated Nov. 22, 1954.

In accordance with the request of the Bureau in referenced letter, Agents handling Toplev and other Communist interviews were canvassed concerning any reactions which they may have observed in their work concerning the effects of articles issued to various news and magazine services by the Bureau.

Two cases in this Division were directly traceable to the captioned article. Bureau's attention is directed to the case entitled, "MARGARET GARDINER, wa; SM - C (Bufile 100-407829) and to Bulet to Mr. ALAN F. WESTIN, Dept. of Government, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass., signed by Miss GANDY and dated Nov. 6, 1953.

There are no other known instances where this or any other article has been mentioned by members of the CP. However, many complaints of nonspecific nature have been received from time to time as a result of appeals to the public from the Director.

VGM:RW
REG. MAIL

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 28540 maw
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7-27-81 BY SP7 maw

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 28540 maw
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-81

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12 DEC 6 1954

EX-112
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 9-7-81 BY SP7 maw

68 DEC 13 1954

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12/3/54

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES [REDACTED] b7D

SUBJECT: "BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
"THIS WEEK" MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

ATTENTION: CRIME RECORDS SECTION

A survey of all agent personnel of the Los Angeles Office and informants developed during the past year reflects the following concerning persons who had read the above-captioned article and who have contacted the Los Angeles Office:

[REDACTED] appeared at the Los Angeles Office on 11/13/53 stating that his voluntary appearance was the direct result of having read the Director's article. [REDACTED] was a member of [REDACTED] until [REDACTED] at which time he was [REDACTED] both by his own statements and those of informants of this office, has not been identified as a member of the CP. b6 b7C

There is no other information indicating any other person had come forward as a result of said article.

WJN:DRU
Registered

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm/vmc/JC

RECORDED-31

EX-112

66-2542-3-897

12-8
27 DEC 7 1954

55 DEC 13 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: December 2, 1954

b7D

TO:

Director, FBI

FROM:

SAC, Chicago []

ATTN: CRIME RECORDS SECTION

SUBJECT:

"BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE, 11/1/53SECURITY INFORMATION - GENERAL

Rebulet November 22, 1954.

Agents assigned to the Toplev and Security Informant Programs have been questioned with regard to the captioned article appearing in "This Week Magazine," and all have advised that they have not encountered during their interviews any reference to it. They will be alert in the future to any reference made to it at which time the Bureau will be advised. Agents participating in the General Interview Program of the Bureau have likewise been advised of the existence of this article and to be on the alert for any reference made to it so that the Bureau can be appropriately advised.

This matter will be given close attention in the future and should any reference be made to the article the Bureau will be appropriately advised.

RJW/gls
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 JRM/mc JC

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
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DECLASSIFIED BY 8862/BP
ON 4-21-94
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EX-112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: Nov. 30, 1954

FROM : SAC, Detroit (80-26)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-8 JF/2
ON 12-1-94

SUBJECT: "BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"

THIS WEEK MAGAZINE

NOVEMBER 1, 1953

SECURITY INFORMANTS - GENERAL

ATTENTION: CRIME RECORDS SECTION

Rebulet November 22, 1954, captioned as above, instructing that the Bureau be furnished with any information concerning the effects of the article, or similar types of articles, upon the work in the Communist field.

This matter has been discussed with the agents handling Toplev and Midlev interviews and with a number of the agents conducting the interviews under the Bureau authorized interview program. In recent months none of these agents have had any indication of what effect this article, or similar types of articles, may have had, inasmuch as the existence of these articles has not been referred to or dwelt upon by any of the persons interviewed. We have nothing on record which would reflect that any individual who might have come into the office to furnish information concerning Communists or Communist activity may have been influenced to break openly with the Party or to take any active steps to furnish information as a result of these articles.

The matter will be closely watched on a long range basis, however, and the Bureau advised of any instance which might occur along the above lines.

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FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
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CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ATTENTION: CRIME RECORDS SECTION

DATE: December 6, 1954

FROM : SAC, CLEVELAND (66-4754)

SUBJECT: *Look* "ERAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2802/Amme,rc*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *7-27-91*
7-27-81

Rebulet to Baltimore, 11-22-54.

Captioned article, which is addressed primarily to the Ex-Communist, is known to have been effective in one specific instance in inducing an Ex-Communist to cooperate with the FBI. That is the case of [redacted] (Bufile 100-57615), former [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] who is now considered a Potential Security Informant. [redacted] felt that the article accurately states her motives for supporting the CP and also crystallized her thinking on what course of action she should follow, after having drifted away from the Party. *(u)*

Reprints of the article have been mailed anonymous to a number of CP members in the Cleveland area but it has not been possible to accurately evaluate the effect it had. It is not known to have been responsible for the defection of any active CP member.

Since the Party relies to a large extent upon the use of mailed propaganda to persons in all walks of life and varying degrees of relationship to the Party, and is apparently successful in influencing a percentage of those whom the Party wishes to use or recruit, it would appear that counter-propaganda used in a similar manner would also be effective over a period of time.

In speaking to persons close to the Party who become confidential sources of PSI's it is evident that television and radio programs such as the PHILBRICK TV program are the most effective mediums, since comments upon programs presented through these mediums are frequently made, whereas, newspaper and magazine articles are rarely commented upon.

It is thought that an article similar to captioned article, but addressed to the active Communist and presenting material contained in "The CP, A Manual on Organization" by J. PETERS outlining the actual aims and purposes of the CP as contrasted with the propaganda aims of the CP, might be effective in countering Communist propaganda in the mind of the active Communist.

RECORDED-31

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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66-4754
cc: [redacted]

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APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 ATTN: CRIME RECORDS SECTION
 FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh (100-11112)

DATE: 12-1-54

SUBJECT: ~~BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL~~
 THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
 NOVEMBER 1, 1953

Rebulet to Baltimore, 11-22-54.

This office has not received any information concerning the effects of captioned article or similar types of articles in connection with work in the Communist field.

Agents conducting interviews with active Communists on all levels of the Communist Party have frequently mentioned this and similar type articles to the various subjects interviewed. However, there has, to date, been no indication that any Communist within this division has been effected by this type article.

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 JEM: EXTENDED TO 20720A
 REASON FOR EXTENSION
 FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE OF REVIEW FOR
 DECLASSIFICATION: 9-17-81
 EX-112

DECLASSIFIED BY.....
 ON.....

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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm
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APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
 AND FIELD OFFICES
 ADVISED BY ROUTING
 SLIP(S) OF
 DATE 10/6/81

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CONFIDENTIAL

SAC Albuquerque

December 8,

1954 42007

Director FBI

- 2 - Orig. & 1 copy
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- 1 - Mr. Condon
- 1 - Sec. Tickler
- 2 - Each of 24 field o

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

INTERNAL SECURITY - C


SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

RECORDED-9266-2542-3-902

There are transmitted herewith in the quantity indicated copies of the following publications for possible use in connection with the captioned program:

- Facts About Communism - Labor (3 copies)
- You Can't Win (19 copies)
- The Deadly Parallel (1 copy)
- Slave Labor in the Soviet World (2 copies)
- What America Means to Me (10 copies)
- Forced Labor in the Soviet Union (1 copy)
- Where Are They Now? (1 copy)
- Proof of Guilt (4 copies)
- For a Lasting Peace (5 copies)
- The Phantom American Negro (1 copy)
- Democracy Versus Communism (10 copies)
- Who Is the Imperialist? (1 copy)
- Marx on the Truman Doctrine (4 copies)
- Proof of Soviet Slave Labor (4 copies)
- The Negro in American Life (1 copy)
- American Labor Unions (1 copy)

EX-1



Copies of these publications have already been furnished the offices in which the Toplev and Security Informant programs were previously in effect and they have been found to be of considerable assistance in developing Enclosure

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 - Atlanta (With Enclosures) | 1 - Miami (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Birmingham (With Enclosures) | 1 - Mobile (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Butte (With Enclosures) | 1 - New Orleans (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Charlotte (With Enclosures) | 1 - Norfolk (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Dallas (With Enclosures) | 1 - Oklahoma City (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - El Paso (With Enclosures) | 1 - Omaha (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Houston (With Enclosures) | 1 - Phoenix (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Kansas City (With Enclosures) | 1 - Richmond (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Knoxville (With Enclosures) | 1 - Salt Lake City (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Little Rock (With Enclosures) | 1 - San Antonio (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Louisville (With Enclosures) | 1 - San Diego (With Enclosures) |
| 1 - Memphis (With Enclosures) | 1 - Savannah (With Enclosures) |

JFC:car
(59)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

additional security informants under these programs. They contain a large amount of varied material suitable for discussion during interviews and, in addition, may be given to the subject being interviewed for perusal later at his leisure. *cf. (u)*

Requests for additional copies of these publications should be forwarded to the Bureau marked for the attention of the Central Research Section.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont *ABH*

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

DATE: December 6, 1954

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2842-2-27-81*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2-27-81*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *2-27-81*

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Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

During the past year the Central Research Section has forwarded to the field a number of pamphlets for possible use in connection with the captioned program. This distribution, however, was limited to those offices in which the Toplev and the captioned programs were in effect. *W.C.S.*

Since a number of favorable comments regarding their effectiveness have been received from the field and since the Security Informant program has now been extended to all continental offices, there is attached a letter transmitting copies of these publications to those offices which have not as yet been furnished them.

Copies of these publications have not been attached in view of their bulk and since authorization for their distribution to the field has already been granted in each instance.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached yellow of a diplomat letter transmitting copies of these publications to the field be approved. Upon approval the original diplomat, which is being maintained in the Central Research Section, will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding these publications to the field.

JFC:sar
(5) *WCS*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Original

- 1 - J. D. Donohue
- 1 - A. H. Belmont
- 1 - J. F. Condon
- Section Ticker

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2842-2-27-81*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2-27-81*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *2-27-81*

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *9-17-81* BY *222 mjt*

RECORDED-92
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13 DEC 9 1954

Central Research

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-3-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. ~~Belmont~~ BELMONTDATE: December 2,
1954

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NO. 1060-54
SECURITY INFORMANTS - FORM FD-209

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

The attached suggestion from ASAC H. K. Moss, St. Louis, recommends that Form FD-209 be amended to omit the caption: "Titles and File Numbers on Which Contacted" and merely state: "File Numbers on Which Contacted."

Form FD-209 is a record maintained in the administrative file on an informant of each contact with an informant. By means of this form there is maintained in a convenient manner the identities of the cases concerning which a specific informant is in a position to offer positive testimony.

The form requires that the titles and file numbers of each case on which the informant is contacted must be set out. It is believed that the title is necessary as the file number does not readily identify the case and merely indicates the classification number. If the file numbers only are set forth, it would be necessary to pull those files to determine the titles, and cause more work than is now required to set out the title and the file number.

ACTION

It is recommended that the attached suggestion and this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division and that this suggestion not be adopted.

Attachment

cc: Training and Inspection Division
cc: Mr. Boardman
cc: Mr. Belmont
cc: Mr. Baumgardner
cc: Mr. Donohue

JDD:DE (6)

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JAN 4 1955

58 JAN -4 1955

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66-12542-3-✓
NOT RECORDED
78 DEC 23 1954

TWO

VK/B

PER 11/18

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #1060-57

Date 11-18-54

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

From: ASAC H. K. MOSS

Field Office or Division ST. LOUIS

SUGGESTION:

Reference Bureau Form FD-209. That this form be amended to omit the caption "TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED", but state "FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 Pmd

Its advantages are: If the suggestion is adopted, it will obviate the necessity for the Special Agent writing out the title of the file. It would appear that the file number should suffice.

It should save at least \$ -- annually. It is not possible to estimate accurately saving in SA time effected by this suggestion, if adopted.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Attachment-10

Heberox K. Moss
(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

It appears that the suggestion made by Mr. MOSS has some merit. It will save time on the part of the Agents without impairing the efficiency of the office. I recommend that the suggestion be adopted.

[Signature]
(Signature)

Special Agent in Charge

(Title)

ENCLOSURE
1 66-2542-3-V
NOT RECORDED
70 DEC 23 1954

ORIGINAL COPIES FILED IN
66-342-2747

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (134-0)

FROM : SAC, ST. LOUIS (134-0)

SUBJECT: ~~BREAKING THE COMMUNIST~~This Week Magazine
November 1, 1953Attention: Crime Records Section

Rebulet to Baltimore 11/22/54.

This office has received no information as a result of the Taplev program and other Communist interviews by which the immediate or long range effects on CP members of the above captioned articles, or similar articles, can be gauged. Any information developed relating to this matter will be communicated immediately to the Crime Records Section.

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED BY 2892-200-1035

REASON FOR EXTENSION

SECTION 11, 1

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

7-27-81

DATE: 11/20/54

2892-200-1035

EXTENSION 2

7-27-91

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-12-81 BY SP4 mat

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2892-200-1035
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION

2

27-91

7-27-81

RECORDED - 54

INDEXED - 54

DECLASSIFIED BY 2892-200-1035

ON 7-27-81

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08 DEC 13 1954

RE: "BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

practice the religion of his choice. (u)

The agents who developed this informant believe that because the informant had read articles by the Director on communism before he was approached, his mind was ripe for his further acceptance, without too much effort on his part, of the need for him to redeem himself by giving complete cooperation to the FBI. He accepted the offer and is now making a conscientious effort to develop himself in the Communist Party so that he can render effective service to the Government.

In the case of potential CP informant [redacted] he related that he had read articles for and against communism. In the initial interview with him, he stated that he thought that the United States was the best country in the world and each citizen owing allegiance should therefore do all in his power to keep it that way. It was evident during this interview that [redacted] had in his mind some doubts about the real objectives of the Communist Party, which doubts in all probability had been created by articles which he read. (u) b7D

The agents who have worked on the Toplev and Security Informant Program believe that magazine articles by the Director dealing with communism are of great value as these articles are read not only by the communists but by the general public as well. The communists and the general public through these articles are put on notice as to the Bureau's interest in the Communist problem; they are informed as to how they can help and what they are to do; and they are alerted to the Bureau's policy of handling this problem in a real American manner. (u)

These articles help in the interview program. The agents who have worked on the Toplev and Security Informant Program would like to see more articles by the Director appearing in magazines and other publications on communism and related subjects. Such articles furnish accurate source material for interested citizens to use at meetings and in general conversation, thereby keeping the citizens alerted to the Communist menace. (u)

These articles do a wonderful selling job for the Bureau and make field approaches to Communists and the general public easier for the reason that they establish beforehand confidence in the American manner in which the Bureau operates. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE: 11-30-54
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

FROM : SAC, CINCINNATI [REDACTED]

b7D

SUBJECT: "BREAKING THE COMMUNIST SPELL"
THIS WEEK MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 1, 1953

ReBulet to Baltimore, 11-22-54.

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY... 2-242-DMJ/mc JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2...
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION... 7-27-81

A review of the files of this office reflects a total of 43 pieces of literature, authorized by the Bureau for distribution to subjects, including 9 copies of "Breaking The Communist Spell," have been distributed. In most instances the literature was addressed to "Mr. and Mrs.," and as a result was received in households having in them a total of 41 security subjects, 38 of whom are on the Security Index.

The distribution has varied, from only one piece of literature being directed to a particular household to a total of 8 items being directed to one subject. This person being [REDACTED]

b7D

In no instance has a subject to whom literature was directed voluntarily contacted this office to furnish information.

Of the 38 Security Index card subjects by whom literature has been received, 18 have been interviewed, and of these, 13 were interviewed prior to the time the literature was sent to them, in some instances the interview being conducted more than two years prior to that time. Five Security Index card subjects were interviewed subsequent to the time the literature was directed to them, the interview taking place two and one-half to six months after the literature was sent them. None of the 18 interviewed was cooperative or indicated any reaction to the receipt of the literature by them.

In only one instance has an informant reported a subject's reaction to the receipt of literature, this being [REDACTED] previously mentioned. [REDACTED] has advised that at a Communist Party meeting on 1-31-54, [REDACTED] advised the others present that he had received anonymously certain literature which he exhibited to those present. It was agreed by all present that the literature had been sent [REDACTED] by the FBI, and that it was Capitalist propaganda. It is noted that literature was mailed to [REDACTED] on 1-4-54 and on 1-21-54, which dates, of course, are prior to the CP meeting on 1-31-54. Literature was also mailed to [REDACTED] on 4-16-54; however, informants have reported no reaction on the part of [REDACTED] with respect to this literature.

b7D

RCD:CVM

RECORDED - 19.

REGISTERED MAIL

COPIES DESTROYED INDEXED-19

9-08 JUL 19 1961

1 authorized made JFW

66-2548-3-905
6 DEC 8 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to the Director;
Cincinnati [redacted]
November 30, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL b7D

It is not felt that the results in this office offer much from which to reach a conclusion as to the worth of this program. With respect to the Security Index card subjects to whom the literature was directed, as was pointed out, only five of these subjects were interviewed after the receipt of the literature. The fact that no subject has voluntarily appeared after receiving the literature to furnish information is also not felt to be in any way conclusive as to the worth of this program. It is rather felt that possibly the timing on the distribution of the literature and the interviewing of the subject has lost some of the salutary effect the literature might have had. As was pointed out, some of the interviews occurred as early as 1951, and, of course, the distribution of this type of literature to subjects was not begun until a much later date.

It is the consensus of opinion of the agents working security matters in this office, as well as the agents directly involved in the security informant interview program, that the program of sending literature such as "Breaking the Communist Spell" is an important step in creating doubt in the minds of subjects as to the ideology and the methods of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. These subjects have for the most part been saturated with Communist propaganda, and probably have had no prior contact with counter propaganda of an authoritative nature. As you are aware, subjects who have maintained their allegiance to the Communist Party to this time represent primarily the hard core of the Party, and also those subjects who are not presently active but have been active over many years prior to the past few years, can not easily be swayed in their former allegiance to the Party. It is felt that an isolated mailing of counter propaganda to these subjects will have little effect, but that a stepped-up program of periodic mailing of counter propaganda to these people on a long-range basis may reach a particular doubt which has existed, in a dormant fashion, in their minds. The experience of this office, of course, has not been extensive enough, nor the reaction received through informants evident enough, as to whether the subject to whom literature has been directed by this office have in fact read the literature, or whether it is discarded without reading.

I think it is worthy of note that [redacted] retained the literature from the time of the first mailing to him on 1-4-54 until the date of the CP meeting, at least, on 1-31-54. It would appear that in the interim he must have examined some of the literature mailed to him. (S)(u)

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to the Director;
Cincinnati [redacted]
November 30, 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
b7D

On a long-range basis, it is felt by agents working security matters in this office that "Breaking the Communist Spell" and a similar type of literature periodically mailed to subjects can not help but have an effect on their thinking, and will probably cause them to see the fallacies in the Communist ideology and to reach a new understanding of this ideology. It is felt that with a stepped-up program of mailing this type of literature on a long-range basis, our experience will be that subjects will be affected by the literature and will either voluntarily or on contact be more receptive to cooperating with the Bureau.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, New York

12-15-54

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 AMJ
me JC

~~POSTING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO
CONTACT INFORMANTS...~~
INSPECTION MATTER

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

During a recent Administrative School held at the Seat of Government, the view was expressed by some members of the class that permission should be granted to the field to post unsuccessful attempts by Agents to contact informants. This proposal was based upon the view of some members of the class that where there have been legitimate but unsuccessful attempts to contact informants, this should be sufficient to remove the delinquency of that informant file.

On the other hand, the view was expressed that the granting of such permission would result in a needless administrative procedure; would still not alter the basic question of whether the informant is producing; would require additional work for the sole purpose of presenting a more favorable paper record without any real accomplishment.

The Bureau would like to have your personal views as to this proposal, along with supporting facts to justify whatever views you may express.

Your reply, captioned as above, should be marked for the attention of the Training and Inspection Division and should reach the Bureau by December 29.

cc: Baltimore
Washington Field
Richmond
Pittsburgh

RECORDED-125
INDEXED-125

66-2542-906

EDM:jaw
(8 copies)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

NOTE: Recommended unanimously favorable by Executives Conference 12-14-54. Present at Conference were Messrs. Tolson, Callahan, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, Boardman, Nichols, Rosen, and Mason.

COMM-FBI
MAILED 20

Copy:ew

MR. TOLSON

THE DIRECTOR

SUGGESTION: 100-54

MADE BY: HERBERT K. MOSS

ST. DIVISION

FD-209 - SECURITY INFORMANTS

12/13/54
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 p/mc
JC

SUGGESTION:

That Form FD-209 be amended to omit the caption "TITLES AND FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED," but state "FILE #s ON WHICH CONTACTED." (FD-209 is memorandum for recording contacts with Criminal and Security Informants.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Form FD-9 requires that the titles and file numbers of each case on which the informant is contacted must be set out.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION:

ASAC MOSS feels that the suggestion, if adopted, will obviate the necessity for the Special Agent writing out the titles and file numbers of each case on which the informant is contacted. He pointed out it would appear the file number should suffice.

SAC J. E. Milnes commented he felt this suggestion has some merit; that it will save time on the part of Agents without impairing the efficiency of the office; and recommended it be adopted.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION:

Mr. Hennrich of the Domestic Intelligence Division advised it is believed the title of the case is necessary as the file number does not readily identify the case and merely indicates the classification number; that if the file numbers only are set forth it will be necessary to pull the files to determine the titles, causing more work than is now required to set out the title and the file number. He recommended that the suggestion not be adopted.

/mfs
(5 copies)

cc: Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Harbo

100-244-3-3
NOT RECORDED
76 DEC 23 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Mr. Rosen of the Investigative Division pointed out that this suggestion had been considered on a previous occasion and it was felt file numbers do not sufficiently identify the cases for efficient and economical review of the informant file; and that there exists the possibility of typographical error in typing file numbers which would place information in wrong substantive case file.

Mr. Mason of the Training and Inspection Division indicated he felt the title as well as the file number should be set forth; that the Agent would have both readily available; and that frequently employees, including the SAC, are familiar with the titles of cases but not the file numbers. He further pointed out that it would save time in reviewing the form by eliminating any necessity for further checking to identify the cases in question; that figures are easily transposed; and that if the title of the case is set forth there can be no question as to the identity at a later date. Mr. Mason stated he thinks it is well worth the time to write out the title and have it on the form. His recommendation, therefore, was unfavorable.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: RTH:cs

The Conference of 12/13/54, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Callahan, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Rosen, Holloman, McGuire, Belmont, Boardman and Harbo, recommends unanimously unfavorable for the reasons indicated herein.

DATE OF MAIL 11-30-54

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAURENCE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmj
mcjc

SUBJECT JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 DEC 13 1954FILE NUMBER 66-2542-4-214
66-2542-3-907

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: December 22, 1954

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH

SUBJECT: POSTING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS
TO CONTACT INFORMANTS
INSPECTION MATTER

SECURITY INFORMATION

ReBulet dated 12-15-54 directed to New York Division,
with copies to Baltimore, Washington Field, Richmond, and Pitts-
burgh.

I do not believe that the proposal that permission be
granted to the field to post unsuccessful attempts by agents to
contact informants should be adopted for the following reasons:

1. Posting unsuccessful attempts to contact informants
would add nothing to the actual development of an informant.

2. Such posting would necessitate additional memoranda
and additional clerical work on the part of clerical employees.

3. To permit posting of unsuccessful attempts to contact
informants might tend to create a tendency on the part of a few
agents to wait an additional 45 days to renew efforts to contact in-
formants, particularly potential criminal informants.

4. When agents fail to contact informants within the
required time, they can when necessary be required to submit a short
memorandum of explanation for the file. (This procedure is follow-
ed in this office in some instances at the present time and such
memoranda are not posted.) In a few rare instances it is understood
that an informant cannot be contacted every 45 days and to adopt
the recommended procedure would require periodic memoranda to keep
the case administratively current, which would require additional
clerical work.

FH/MMJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 JPM/MS

RECORDED-89

EX-130

64 JAN 14 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 1/6/55

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: ~~POSTING OF UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS
TO CONTACT INFORMANTS~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

During recent Administrative School held at the Seat of Government, some members of class expressed view that field should be permitted to post on assignment cards unsuccessful attempts by Agents to contact informants on ground that bona fide but unsuccessful attempts should be sufficient to remove informant file from delinquency status. Some members opposed the idea on grounds that it would be needless administrative procedure, that it would not indicate whether the informant is producing, and would merely present a more favorable paper record.

At present, field can post only an actual contact by an Agent with an informant.

VIEWS OF FIELD:

Five field divisions to which this question was put replied as follows: In favor: New York and Richmond. Opposed: Pittsburgh, Baltimore and Washington Field. Those in favor considered that a conscientious but unsuccessful attempt to contact an informant justified posting and that if an Agent is penalized for a delinquency brought about through no fault of his own his enthusiasm might be lessened. Excessive travel entailed in several unsuccessful efforts to contact was also noted as an objection to the present rule. Those in favor of present rule consider that it accomplishes the purpose intended by the Bureau and does not reduce the contact to a mere paper transaction.

Inspector Mason, Training and Inspection Division, favors the present rule.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

Present at the Executives Conference of 1/6/55 were Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Nichols, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, Rosen, Holloman and Harbo. The Conference is unanimously opposed to any change in the current procedures.

cc: Mr. Harbo
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71
EX-128

12-3-909

JAN 10 1955

BOARDMAN

THREE

BCB:mew

64 JAN 14 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 Attn: Training & Inspection Division
 FROM : SAC, New York (137-00)
 SUBJECT: POSTING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS
 TO CONTACT INFORMANTS
 INSPECTION MATTER

DATE: 12/28/54
 42006

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmw meo
 JC

Rebulet to New York, 12/15/54.

In the opinion of the NYO, where there have been conscientious but unsuccessful attempts to contact an informant, permission should be granted to post these attempts. This belief is based on the fact that agent hours are being expended to make contact with an informant which, as in the location of a fugitive or subject in any other Bureau case, is not always successful. Many times good informants, at the outset of their development in particular, are prone to avoid being contacted, although they are actually cooperative when frequently contacted and developed. Only constant and tactful contacts, which do at times necessitate many attempts-to-contact, can overcome a reluctance to cooperate on the part of some informants. Experience in the NYO has shown that the most productive symbol informants, who are most closely connected with the hoodlum element were, during the initial stages of development, the most difficult to contact.

Furthermore, if the agent is penalized with a delinquency and realizes that in all probability he will in the future also be charged with additional delinquencies due to no fault of his own but merely because the potential informant is afraid or hesitant about being contacted by an agent, the agent's enthusiasm for attempting to develop a CI will be considerably lessened.

A recent survey conducted in the NYO covering a two month period revealed that less than 8% of the monthly postings on informant cases were postings of attempts-to-contact. Therefore, to post such attempts-to-contact actually result in a very small additional administrative procedure. While it is true that the basic question of whether the informant is producing would not be altered, the fact remains that while production is basic, valuable agent hours expended should also be considered, not only in rating the informant but also in gauging the efforts of the agent.

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

EX-128

JEZ:PMK/EMG

Exec. Com. Major
 1/6/55 B.C.P. memo

64 JAN 14 1955

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC, Baltimore (134-00)

January 3, 1955

Director, FBI

2-orig. and copy
 1-yellow file copy
 1-Bufile 66-2542-3
 1-Mr. Nichols
 1-Mr. Belmont
 1-Sect. Tickler
 1-JF Condon

TOPELY (100-999)
 SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

EX-110

Reurlet 12/20/54, captioned as above, requesting additional copies of the Director's article, "The Communists Are After Our Minds," for use in connection with the captioned programs.

Arrangements are being made to prepare copies of this article on plain bond paper, and copies will be furnished to your office in the near future.

JFC:dje
 (8)

CLASSIFIED AND
 EXTENDED BY *206 Jm mers*
 REASON *2*
 FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE 7-27-91
 DECLASSIFICATION *7-27-81*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/91 BY *206 Jm mers*
me J C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/91 BY *206 Jm mers*
me J C

DECLASSIFIED BY *806 Jm mers*
 DATE *4-21-98*
83-1343

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22 719

JAN 11 1955

YELLOW
 DUPLICATE
 JAN 3 1954
 MAILED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Nichols

December 23,
1954

M. A. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-27-81 BY 2842 QM

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM -
TOPLEV

By letter dated December 20, 1954, the Baltimore Office has requested reprints on plain paper without Bureau letterhead of the Director's article, "The Communists Are After Our Minds" which appeared in the October, 1954, issue of the American Magazine. Baltimore desired these copies for anonymous transmission to selected Communist Party members.

In November, 1953, the recommendation to furnish such reprints of the Director's article, "Freaking the Communist Spell" was approved by the Bureau and plain paper copies were prepared by the Crime Records Section and furnished by the Domestic Intelligence Division to the twenty-three offices then handling Toplev matters. The reprints did not bear the Bureau letterhead and had the following credit line at the bottom of the first page: (Article by J. Edgar Hoover, reprint from This Week Magazine, November 1, 1953). (100-3-99-1735)

At present, all divisions participate in captioned program and it appears that plain paper reprints of the article "The Communists Are After Our Minds" will be useful to the field.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That this memorandum be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for consideration of distribution of plain paper reprints of "The Communists Are After Our Minds" to the field in connection with captioned program.

2. If favorably considered, the Domestic Intelligence Division should furnish to the Crime Records Section the number of copies to be distributed to each field office.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Attachment

cc - Mr. Belmont

W.H.J.M.

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED 2842 QM

NOT RECORDED

JAN 6 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-27-81 BY 2842 QM

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DATE OF MAIL 1-4-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMBERT TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 m d m c j c

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY

59 JAN 27 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-911

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

DATE: 1/19/55

CONFIDENTIAL
b7D

Re SAC Letter 54-68.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE

MONTHLY REPORT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pch
mcjc

1. Number of interviews conducted:
2. Number of security informants developed under this program:
3. Number of confidential sources developed through this program:

During Past
30 daysTotal to
date

None

None

None

None

None

None

There is one agent assigned part-time to this program in the San Antonio Division. One active subject possibly engaged in the underground has been contacted twice under the SM-C program and another interview is planned for January 20, 1955. The interviews have been conducted in such manner that future interviews could and probably should be conducted under the SIP. This will be the subject of a separate letter to the Bureau. There are few Communist Party members in the San Antonio Division, and a small number of those are active. Of those that are active, interviews at this time, particularly in headquarters city, would possibly jeopardize another informant that we are attempting to further develop at this time. A total of three interviews are being considered at this time and will be the subject of separate letters to the Bureau.

Reflet did not set forth the date on which monthly reports are due at the Bureau. UACB this office will submit such reports by the 5th day of the following month until the program is completed.

LVD/bjs

AMSD
REGISTERED

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 601 MAR 1965
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-17-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

55 JAN 19 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

12/20/54

SAC, BALTIMORE (134-OC)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM -
TOPLEV *[initials]*

Re the Director's article "The Communists are After Our Minds."

This office recently received five copies of the above described article which was a reprint from the American magazine October issue 1954.

The material contained therein is excellent for anonymous transmission to selected Communist Party members. It is therefore respectfully requested that reprints be made of this article on plain bond paper without the Bureau's letterhead for such distribution and that at least ten copies be furnished to the Baltimore office.

JOM:pap

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/84 BY 2842 *[initials]* meoc~~

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *2842 [initials]*
EXEMPT FROM
FOIA
DATE FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *7-27-81*
7-27-81

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-27-81 BY *[initials]*~~

83-1343
4-11-94
83-1343

116-42-3
NOT RECORDED
76 JAN 6 1955

REGISTERED MAIL

9442

JAN 28 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)

DATE: 1-19-55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

b7D

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM
MONTHLY REPORT
DECEMBER, 1954CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 phd mwc
REASON
FCIM, 1-2.4.2 FOR
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91
7-27-81

Re SAC Letter 54-68, Section J.

During Past
30 DaysTotal to
Date

1. Number of interviews conducted

0

1

2. Number of Security Informants
developed under this program

0

0

3. Number of Confidential Sources
developed through this program

0

0

One subject previous interviewed, uncooperative.

One interview pending.

No Agents being utilized full time.

Three Agents used part time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 phd mwc

RET:GTC

REGISTERED MAILALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISERECORDED-16
EX-103

10 JAN 27 1955

55 JAN 28 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC: MR. V. BOARDMAN
MR. H. BELMONT
MR. J. D. DONOHUE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

January 12, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
ON COMMUNIST MATTERS

There is attached for your information
a copy of an editorial which appeared in the
"Buffalo Evening News," Buffalo, New York, on
January 5, 1955, concerning the risks incurred by
informants and the value of their services in the
investigation of the Communist conspiracy in this
country.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pld/mjc

Enclosure - 1

1 cc: Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General (with enclosure - 1)

1 cc: Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins (with enclosure - 1)

JDD:DE (8)

RECORDED - 33

INDEXED - 33

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



COPY

HEROES, SUB ROSA

Through all the noisy hullabaloo over "McCarthyism," and the right way vs. the wrong way of combatting subversion, the quiet work of exposing the machinations of the Communist apparatus in America has been going forward. It is largely with thanks to a phantom group of mostly unknown home-front heroes that it can go forward. We refer to those undercover agents for the FBI who work sub rosa until, one by one, their usefulness is lost through discovery or their testimony in open court is needed for prosecution of criminal cases.

Followers of the "I Led Three Lives" series on WBBM-TV have obtained a pretty fair picture of what it must be like to be a secret Communist for the FBI. Most of us don't know any, or wouldn't know that this was what they were if we did. Some of them may never be revealed. But whenever one does come to the surface, for one reason or another, it is a good time to give, through him, an appreciative word of thanks for all his unknown colleagues in the ranks.

One such agent bobbed up at the final hearing of the McCarthy committee this week. [redacted] had worked b7D
for the FBI as an undercover agent in the Communist Party [redacted]

[redacted] before her reports were intercepted and she was expelled from the party. That was [redacted] years ago, but she testified that she is still living under Communist threat to "get" her in time--the threat to turn her expulsion into an eventual "death sentence." She named several workers in the [redacted] area as Communists, and her list both confirmed and extended another the committee received from a former Communist.

Last week, two other former FBI undercover agents testified before the Senate Internal Security Committee, about a closely co-ordinated Communist Party plan for colonizing the steel industry. These two [redacted] had been working b7D
for the FBI as hidden Communists for [redacted] years, until they came out into the open as surprise witnesses to name more than 200 recent or present Communists in a [redacted] trial last year.

The risk of entering into the kind of service these three performed is obvious; so is the prospect that there will be little in the way of compensating rewards--except for the knowledge that they have served their country well, in an extremely delicate, dangerous and vital work.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 p/mcjc

COPY

Heroes, Sub Rosa

Through all the noisy hullabaloo over "McCarthyism," and the right way vs. the wrong way of combatting subversion, the quiet work of exposing the machinations of the Communist apparatus in America has been going forward. It is largely with thanks to a phantom group of mostly unknown home-front heroes that it can go forward. We refer to those undercover agents for the FBI who work sub rosa until, one by one, their usefulness is lost through discovery or their testimony in open court is needed for prosecution of criminal cases.

Followers of the "I Led Three Lives" series on WBENTV have obtained a pretty fair picture of what it must be like to be a secret Communist for the FBI. Most of us don't know any, or wouldn't know that this was what they were if we did. Some of them may never be revealed. But whenever one does come to the surface, for one reason or another, it is a good time to give, through him, an appreciative word of thanks for all his unknown colleagues in the ranks.

One such agent bobbed up at the final hearing of the McCarthy committee this week. Miss Mary Spella Beynon, 31, had worked for the FBI as an undercover agent in the Communist Party in Pittsburgh for 15 months before her reports were intercepted and she was expelled from the party. That was seven years ago, but she testified that she is still living under Communist threat to "get" her in time—the threat to turn her expulsion into an eventual "death sentence." She named several workers in the Pittsburgh area as Communists, and her list both confirmed and extended another the committee received from a former Communist.

Last week, two other former FBI undercover agents testified before the Senate Internal Security Committee, about a closely co-ordinated Communist Party plan for colonizing the steel industry. These two—Herman E. Thomas and Ralph K. Hellstinger—had been working for the FBI as hidden Communists for ten years, until they came out into the open as surprise witnesses to name more than 200 recent or present Communists in a Philadelphia trial last year.

The risk of entering into the kind of service these three performed is obvious; so is the prospect that there will be little in the way of compensating rewards—except for the knowledge that they have served their country well. It is extremely delicate, dangerous and vital work.

Mr. Tolson ☒
 Mr. Boardman ☒
 Mr. Nichols ☒
 Mr. Belmont ☒
 Mr. Harbo ☒
 Mr. Mohr ☒
 Mr. Parsons ☒
 Mr. Rosen ☒
 Mr. Tamm ☒
 Mr. Sizoo ☒
 Mr. Winterrowd ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Mr. Holloman ☒
 Miss Gandy ☒

Barth

DeLoach

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842pm
 mcjc

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-914

JAN 27 1955

Editorial
 Buffalo Evening News
 Buffalo, New York
 Date: 1-5-55

Memo Mr. Rogers
 & Tompkins
 1-12-55

RECORDED 33
 EX-128
 Send copy
 W. G. & Rogers
 H.

(3)

Boardman

1 - Mr. Harbo (Train. &
1 - Mr. Belmont (Insp. Div.)
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Baumgardner

January 17, 1955

1 - Mr. Thornton

**PROPOSED CHANGE IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
SECTION 87 D**

There is set forth a new addition to Subsection 3 of Section 87 D of the Manual of Instructions. This addition consists of a new sentence to be inserted in the ninth paragraph on page 47b as follows:

Your plans for and progress in the development of the panel should also be set forth, as well as the total number of panel sources who are active, the names of the organizations being covered and the fact that these sources are being contacted on a regular basis. You should also include the total number and identities of all individuals who have been redesignated from panel sources to security informants or potential security informants by your office since the institution of this program. The six-month progress letters and other administrative correspondence on this program should be captioned: "Panel Source Program."

WCT:bas

(9)

ON YELLOW:

SAC letter and manual change are predicated upon information set forth in memorandum from Belmont to Boardman dated 1-17-55 and captioned "Panel Source Program, Internal Security - C." This memorandum indicates that on many occasions panel sources have progressed to a point where they have been redesignated as security informants or potential security informants. In order that this program may be better evaluated the field is being instructed to include in their six-month progress letters the total numbers and identities of the individuals who have been so redesignated.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 JMD
mc JC

66-254

arg

LB

After

WCT

55 JAN 21 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. *W* *W*

DATE: 1/25/55

FROM : H. C. VAN *W*SUBJECT: *Security Info. B...*
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

During a survey of operations of the Domestic Intelligence Division 1/6-25/55 consideration was given to changing to a quarterly basis (1) the monthly report each field office is required to submit to the Bureau per No Number SAC Letter dated 3/20/51 covering the above-captioned matter, and (2) the over-all memorandum prepared monthly by the Security Informant - Special Records Unit of the Internal Security Section advising the Director and Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont and Rosen of the total number and types of the Bureau's confidential coverage.

Advantages indicated by the proposed plan were (1) reduction in time and effort involved in the preparation of the monthly reports and memorandum, and (2) an estimated saving to the Bureau of \$1800 per annum. Disadvantages apparent were (1) reduction of close control through the monthly use of the over-all tabulation, and (2) less frequent briefing of Bureau officials regarding the extent of the confidential coverage.

Views obtained from Messrs. Boardman, Belmont and Rosen were unfavorable to the proposal because they felt the disadvantages presently outweigh the advantages.

RECOMMENDATION:

No further action at this time. However, ticklers have been designated for Miss Slusher to be placed in the inspection files of this division so that the matter may be considered further during the next inspections of the Investigative Division and the Domestic Intelligence Division. *W*

HCVP:cs
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

INDEXED-50

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pth
mcJCEX-103

7 JAN 26 1955

273
58 FEB -1 1955

273

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42003

January 19, 1955

MR. BOARDMAN

MR. A. H. BELMONT

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

(TOPLEV) (100-3-99) SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3) 2/27/81 BY 2842 DMD

At the request of the Central Research Section, the New York Office recently furnished copies of a publication entitled "Communist Anti-Semitism," a copy of which is attached. This publication was made available to the New York Office by the Jewish Labor Committee, New York, New York.

This pamphlet reviews the recent manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and the satellite nations, and the Central Research Section feels that it is suitable for use in connection with the captioned programs.

Copies of this publication have previously been furnished to selected offices in which the TOPLEV Program was in effect (66-2542-3-34-4709, 4714). In view of the extension of the Security Informant Program to all continental offices, it was felt desirable to make copies of this publication available to all offices now included under the captioned programs.

A carbon copy of a letter to all continental offices, transmitting copies of this publication, is attached. The original duplicate is being retained in the Central Research Section.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be approved and returned to the Central Research Section, where it will be dated and arrangements completed for transmitting this publication to the Field.

JFC:dje
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Donohue
- 1 - Bufile 100-3-99
- 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

- 1 - Section Tickler
- 1 - JF Condon

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 DMD
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91

Attachments (3)

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

1 66-2542-3-5

NOT RECORDED

170 JAN 29 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office

Sum

UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (66-393)
SUBJECT: TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
PHILADELPHIA DIVISION

DATE: 1/24/55

3) SECURITY INFORMANTS - GEN.

A number of informants in the Philadelphia Office have been hindered in their preparation of reports because of a lack of time and of space in secure locations away from distracting influences or curious eyes. One of these informants is an excellent typist and normally prepares a long detailed, well organized report full of pertinent information regarding meetings of a subversive organization and activities of the members of that group. Until recently this informant was able to type out these reports by working late at night in his office, after the other members of his office force had gone home. Recently, however, he has been unable to do this because another member of the firm has been working late almost every night in that office, handling his own personal business.

This informant has attempted on many occasions to type out these reports at home; however, he has many relatives who visit him frequently and stay late, thus preventing the informant from preparing reports for the Bureau.

Due to these many delays, informant's notes are sometimes held for awhile before his reports are typed. This tends to reduce the amount he can remember and to increase the possibility that his notes might fall into the wrong hands.

Similar problems are encountered by other informants in this office. Some of the Agents handling these informant have suggested that this problem could easily be solved through the use of a dictating machine attached to a telephone. The informant could then call the Bureau office on a special unlisted phone at any hour of the day or night and after proper identification, have his line connected to the dictating machine. He could then dictate his report to the machine in its entirety and the report could be transcribed by a typist as soon as one is available.

NOT-RECORDED

Such a system would allow the informant to call immediately to a telephone as soon as safe after a meeting and furnish complete details. Using a prescribed outline, he can list the persons present, statements made, and other pertinent facts regarding the activity while it is actually very fresh in his mind. It would not be necessary for the informant to retain any notes regarding the meeting, and the information would be in the hands of the Bureau at the earliest possible time for any appropriate action which might be necessary.

ENCLOSURE
ALP: JWA 52
(2 BU, 1 PH)
Enclosure

COMM - FBI
FEB 27 1955
MAILED 28

2.3-55
2.3-55
2.3-55

be necessary.
ut.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

166-2542-3-

NOT RECORDED

DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842192 FEB 8 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL *pm/mc*

109

66 FEB 10 1955

FEB 11 1955

109

7/24/55

Many such dictating machines are available with attachments for recording phone conversations. One which appears to be particularly well adaptable to such a purpose is the Permoflux Scribe dictating machine made by the Permoflux Corporation and distributed by the Scribe Corporation, 2835 North Kedzie Avenue, Chicago 18, Ill. This is a magazine-loaded tape recorder which has a tape which runs for 29 minutes. It retails for \$345 plus tax for a dictating machine and \$275 plus tax for a play back or transcribing machine. Ear sets, foot switches, and other accessories which might be necessary can be purchased, totaling less than \$50. HERBERT K. NEUBER of 1539 Race Street, Philadelphia 2, Pa., is the local representative for this equipment.

Enclosed herewith is an advertising folder describing the above dictating equipment.

A Bell Telephone Company contact has advised that similar systems have been previously installed by them for commercial concerns using the Permoflux Scribe dictating machine connected to telephone lines. These have been installed on both a complete rental basis and with the commercial concern purchasing the dictating machine and the telephone company handling only the connections to the phone line.

In these instances the phone company has connected to the line an attachment which generates an audible "beep" note required by the Federal Communications Commission to let anyone on the line know that the conversation is being recorded.

It was roughly estimated by the contact that complete rental of such a system from the Bell Telephone Company would cost approximately \$25 per month; also that the "beep" attachment might be rented alone, without the dictating equipment for a much smaller amount.

The complete system could be rented for a trial period, or to reduce costs during such a trial period, sound trained agents in this office could easily attach a Magnachord Tape Recorder, which is available in this office, to the phone line with the "beep" attachment.

It is realized that there may be legislation or decisions which would militate against the use of such equipment even for the limited purpose desired. However, since such a system seems to have some obvious advantages if used for certain selected informants dictating routine reports, the Bureau is requested to advise if there is any objection to its use for a short trial period.

1 - Plastiplats
 1 - Bufile 100-3-99)
 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3
 1 - J. D. Donohue
 1 - Section Tickler
 1 - J. F. Condon

January 24, 1955 42004

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOP SECRET (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

There are transmitted herewith, for possible use in connection with the captioned programs, five reprints of an article entitled "The Communists Are After Our Minds," by J. Edgar Hoover. This article originally appeared in the October, 1954, issue of The American Magazine.

Requests for additional copies of this article should be directed to the Central Research Section at the Bureau.

Enclosures (5)

2 - All Continental Offices (With enclosure)

JFC:dje
 (6)

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-8 JAL/BJH*
 ON *4-21-1994*
83-1343

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/81 BY *2642 pm***

NOTE: Re memo W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, dated 1/30/55, advising of request from Baltimore Office for copies of this article and Bureau letter to Baltimore, dated 1/30/55, advising that copies were being reprinted and would be furnished when completed. It was also felt desirable to furnish copies to all offices included in captioned programs.

Original Plastiplats are being retained in the Central Research Section and upon approval it will be dated and arrangements completed for transmitting this article to the field.

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Nease _____

CLASSIFIED AND
 EXTENDED BY *SP-8 JAL/BJH*
 ON *4-21-1994*
 FOR *7/27/81*
 DECLASSIFICATION

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE**

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 31 1955

CONFIDENTIAL
42005

MR. A. H. BELMONT

January 3, 1955

MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

[TOPLEV] (100-3-99)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 P.M. 10-10-50
K.A. EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE 1-27-84
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-84

Re memo, dated December 23, 1954, from W. A. Jones to Mr. Nichols, captioned as above. The Security Informant Desk of the Internal Security Section and the Central Research Section feel that the Director's article, "The Communists Are After Our Minds," which appeared in the October, 1954, issue of the American Magazine, is suitable for use in connection with the captioned programs.

It is noted that by letter, dated December 20, 1954, the Baltimore Office requested that 10 copies of this reprint on plain bond paper be furnished for transmittal to individuals being interviewed in connection with the captioned programs.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) It is recommended that the attached letter to the Baltimore Office, advising that additional copies of this reprint are being prepared in the Bureau and will be forwarded when completed, be approved.

(2) It is recommended that the Crime Records Section be requested to have 500 copies of the Director's article reprinted on plain paper and returned to the Central Research Section, which will then handle the distribution of this article to all continental offices.

JFC:dje
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3
- 1 - Sect. Ticker
- 1 - J. F. Condon

166-2542-3-1
NOT RECORDED
76 JAN 6 1955

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 P.M. 10-10-50
ON 1-27-84
33-1343
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/84 BY 2842 P.M. 10-10-50

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE OF MAIL

1/31/55~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMORE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM 3736~~~~HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH~~HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmj/me J.C.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY

51 FEB 10 1955

FILE NUMBER

66-2542-3-916

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM (86-2542-3)

February 7, 1955
1 - Plastiplate
1 - yellow 100-3-99
1 - yellow 86-2542-3
1 - J. D. Donohue
1 - section tickler
1 - JF Condon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There are attached two copies of a list of books written in recent years by ex-Communists and Soviet defectors. Each of these works describes the reasons why its author became disillusioned with, and eventually rejected, Communism.

These books are being brought to your attention at this time in view of the recent extension of the Security Informant Program to all continental offices.

Enclosures - 2

2 - All Continental Offices (With Enclosures - 2)

JFC:dje
(6)


NOTE:

The original Plastiplates are being maintained in the Central Research Section. Upon approval this letter will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding it and copies of the attached list to the Field.

CLASSIFIED AND
EXEMPTED
FROM
GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE
DATE 7-27-91
BY 2842 PMUMC JC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/88 BY 2842 PMUMC JC

166-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
167 FEB 9 1955



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-27-91
BY 2842 PMUMC JC

ORIGINAL

EX-COMMUNISTS

<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>
Elizabeth Bentley (professed former Soviet espionage agent)	"Out of Bondage"
Louis Budenz (former editor of the <u>Daily Worker</u>)	"This is My Story"
Whittaker Chambers (professed former Soviet espionage agent)	"Witness"
Richard Crossman (Editor)	"The God That Failed" This book contains accounts by Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright, Andre Gide, Louis Fischer and Stephen Spender of their experiences in the Communist movement.
C. H. Darke (English trade unionist)	"Cockney Communist"
Dorothy Day (lecturer and editor)	"From Union Square to Rome"
Bella Dodd (former member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA)	"School of Darkness"
Benjamin Gitlow (charter member of the Communist Party, USA)	"I Confess"
Charlotte Haldane (English authoress)	"Truth Will Out"
Granville Hicks (author and literary critic)	"Where We Came Out"
Douglas Hyde (former news editor of the London <u>Daily Worker</u>)	"I Believed"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmd me JC

66-2543-3-1
ENCLOSURE

EX-COMMUNISTS

<u>Author</u>	<u>Title</u>
Hede Massing (professed former Soviet espionage agent)	"This Deception "
Eudocio Ravines (former Comintern agent in South America)	"The Yenan Way"
Freda Utley (English authoress)	"Lost Illusion"

SOVIET DEFECTORS

Georges Agabekov (former OGPU official)	"OGPU-The Russian Secret Terror"
Alexander Barmine (former Red Army officer and Soviet diplomat)	" One Who Survived "
Gregory Klimov (former Red Army officer)	"The Terror Machine "
Mikhail Koriakov (former Soviet diplomat and army officer)	"I'll Never Go Back "
Victor Kravchenko (former member of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission)	" I Chose Freedom "
W. G. Krivitsky (former Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence for Western Europe)	"In Stalin's Secret Service"
Alexander Orlöv (former OGPU and NKVD official)	" The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes. "
Colonel G. A. Tokaev (former Soviet military aircraft engineer)	"Stalin Means War"

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 2,

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: JOINT ANTI-FASCIST REFUGEE COMMITTEE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950
Bufile 100-7081

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 P.M. 2/2/55
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SYNOPSIS:

By memorandum January 21, 1955, Department advised of necessity for additional witnesses to testify to post-statutory activities of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (JAFRC) in forthcoming hearing before the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB). If no such witnesses available after ninety-day period, Department requests we review status of current informants to see if any can be made available. Department also emphasized necessity for post-statutory witnesses in all cases before SACB.

Bureau policy of not revealing identity of active informants in SACB hearings has been followed to date. Twelve prosecutive and supplemental prosecutive reports on JAFRC furnished Department since October 22, 1950, with availability or nonavailability of each witness specifically set forth therein. Department filed petition concerning JAFRC with SACB on April 22, 1953, with full knowledge that certain allegations in petition were unsubstantiated by available witnesses and since that time has requested Bureau for such witnesses. Department has been furnished several additional witnesses and has also been advised that certain others are not available because they are currently furnishing valuable information concerning subversive activity. No hearing date set for this case before SACB as yet.

In view of our responsibility under Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA - 50) of furnishing Department witnesses to testify to subversive nature of Communist front organizations, it is felt that consideration may be given to revealing active informants to testify in certain instances inasmuch as failure to do so may preclude Department from proceeding against such groups in certain cases. It is felt we should place burden on Department

Attachments (2) 2-8-55

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Thornton

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) 10/6/87
DATE

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WCT:hlf
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 6062 BJA/1992
ON 11-22-93

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-7081-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

with regard to JAFRC case, however, and point out our responsibility for safeguarding internal security of country and that disclosure of our informants would impair our coverage of subversive activities. It is also felt we should request Department to specifically advise which witnesses are believed necessary to successfully present JAFRC case in order that efforts may be made to supplant these individuals with available witnesses or to give additional consideration to making them available. Field should be instructed to intensify efforts to develop available post-statutory witnesses and further advised that if unsuccessful, it may be necessary to reveal active informants who will have to be replaced. New policy of Department of interviewing witnesses prior to filing of petitions should prevent recurrence of present JAFRC situation.

RECOMMENDATION:

There are attached for your approval appropriate communications to the Department and the New York Office in accord with the above.

✓
PK
2/15
sent to
9/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETAILS:

By memorandum dated January 21, 1955, the Department has advised that in connection with the contemplated hearing regarding the JAFRC before the SACB under the ISA - 50 at least one reliable, well-informed witness, who can testify to the period subsequent to the passage of the ISA - 50, is essential to the presentation of this matter before the SACB. The Department also requested that if no such witness is available at the end of a ninety-day period we review the status of our current informants who could testify to this period but who are unavailable due to their informant status. The Department also emphasized the importance of developing post-statutory witnesses in all cases under the ISA - 50.

BACKGROUND:

Since the inception of our program regarding proceedings against Communist front organizations under the ISA - 50, we have followed the policy of not disclosing the identity of any of our confidential informants during the course of hearings before the SACB. This policy was formulated following a conference between the Director and the then Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, on September 27, 1950, relative to the enforcement of this statute as it related to the disclosure of confidential informants of the FBI.

The JAFRC was among the first group of organizations upon which prosecutive summary reports were prepared in October, 1950, and referred to the Department for consideration in connection with this statute. The initial prosecutive summary report was prepared by our New York Office under date of October 22, 1950, and eleven supplemental prosecutive reports, prepared by our New York and other auxiliary offices, have been referred to the Department since that time. Each of these reports specifically indicated the availability or unavailability of each witness set forth thus affording the Department a complete picture of just what evidence was available in this case. The Department apparently saw fit to proceed against this organization and on April 22, 1953, the Attorney General filed a petition with the SACB seeking to cause the registration of this organization as a Communist front. Since that time advice has been received from the Department that additional witnesses will be needed to substantiate the allegations as set forth in this petition especially as they pertained to post-statutory activities of this organization. The SACB has not as yet set a hearing date for this case.

Every effort has been and will continue to be made to provide these witnesses from previously disclosed sources.

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PRESENT STATUS OF JAFRC CASE:

The JAFRC was formed in March, 1942, through a merger of three organizations concerned with Republican Spanish refugees of the Spanish Civil War. During World War II, the JAFRC was very active in soliciting funds to aid these refugees. Since around 1950, however, the principal activities of this organization have been in connection with soliciting of funds for Communist causes and issuing literature which has closely adhered to the Communist Party line.

The present headquarters of this organization is located in New York City with the only other existing chapters being situated in Boston and San Francisco. Officers of the JAFRC and some of its Board members are the only persons active in the organization in recent years. One of our informants, [redacted] is a member of the [redacted] organization in San Francisco, California, and is in a position to testify to [redacted] activities of this organization. The Department has been advised, however, that due to the informant status of this individual he is not available to testify. *gfu*

b7D

With regard to the Boston Chapter, it is noted that the Vice Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary were all interviewed in the Fall of 1954 and were partially cooperative and willing to testify. The Department advised, however, that the testimony of these individuals would be of little value to this case.

Attempts to interview two present and two former officers of the JAFRC in New York have met with negative results. The New York Office has one informant, [redacted] who is in a position to testify to [redacted] activities although he is not a Communist Party member. The New York Office has advised that exposure of this informant would seriously impair the security coverage of the New York Office. *gfu*

b7D

All of the above offices have been alerted on previous occasions to the necessity of developing available witnesses in this matter who could testify to activities of this organization since the passage of the ISA - 50, and it is felt that the lack of such witnesses is due primarily to the fact that in recent years the activities of this organization have been guided by a limited number of people thus reducing the number of potential witnesses who could testify to such activities.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUREAU RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ISA - 50:

With regard to the ISA - 50, it may be noted that we do have the responsibility of developing legally admissible evidence from available sources in order that the Department may proceed against Communist front organizations under this statute. Although we have been successful to date in avoiding the necessity of disclosing active informants to testify in any hearings before the SACB, our success in large part has been due to the fact that the organizations proceeded against to date have been the older nation-wide groups which have been in existence for many years. As a result, we have been able to utilize the testimony of such individuals as [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] and other old-time defectors from the Communist movement who were in positions of importance in this movement and who have been able to establish the Communist origin of these groups. Also, due to the lengthy existence and nature of these groups they have been afforded coverage over a period of years by many different informants, several of whom have since been discontinued for one reason or another, thus becoming available to testify and providing current testimony concerning the Communist affiliations of these organizations in the post-statutory period.

With regard to possible future proceedings against some of the newer Communist fronts, however, as well as that concerning the JAFRC, the situation may very well develop whereby our failure to furnish an active informant to the Department for the purposes of testifying will result in precluding the Department from proceeding against a particular organization. While it is realized, of course, that we have the responsibility for safeguarding the internal security of the country, it is believed that in these instances careful consideration should be given to the desirability of revealing an active informant rather than causing the Department to fail to proceed against an organization. Such consideration would necessarily be on an individual case basis and in no instance should an active informant be disclosed unless absolutely necessary.

OBSERVATIONS:

With regard to the matter at hand, the JAFRC case, inasmuch as the Department apparently felt that sufficient evidence was available on April 22, 1953, to have this organization found a Communist front by the SACB as indicated by the filing of the petition, it is believed that we should place the burden

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of this matter on the Department and point out our responsibilities for safeguarding the internal security of the country and that the disclosure of our active confidential informants can very possibly endanger our responsibility in this regard.

It is also felt that we should pin the Department down as to just which informants they have specifically in mind, based upon their review of our reports and other communications, who can insure the successful presentation of this case in order that renewed efforts can be made to supplant their testimony or, if not successful in this, that this matter may be re-evaluated.

It is also believed that the field should be advised of the Department's desires in this case and of the possibility that if additional witnesses cannot be developed it may be necessary to utilize active informants who will then have to be supplanted by the field.

As a final observation, it may be noted that the twelve original petitions which were filed with the SACB under date of April 22, 1953, were apparently based upon a review of the prosecutive summary reports and other Bureau communications with little consideration given to the availability of witnesses to testify to the allegations set forth in the petitions. This, of course, has placed us in the position of having to try to provide witnesses to prove these allegations when the Department was well aware of the fact that no such witnesses were available when the petitions were filed.

Recently, however, the Department has adopted the policy of interviewing witnesses prior to the filing of a petition against an organization. This policy should eliminate the possibility of the Department including any allegations in future petitions which cannot be substantiated by available witnesses.

JB

Jim

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

- 1 - Plastiplate
- 1 - Bufile 100-3-99
- 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3
- 1 - J. D. Donohue
- 1 - section tickler
- 1 - J. F. Condon

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV (100-3-99)

February 2, 1955

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

There is attached a title index of the main public source material forwarded to the Field from December, 1951, through January, 1955, for possible use in developing additional security informants.

This index has been prepared as a reference in view of the recent extension of the Security Informant Program to include all continental offices and because copies of some of these publications were sent only to selected offices, in accordance with a specific request.

Enclosure

2 - All Continental Offices (With Enclosure)

JFC:dje
(6)

NOTE:

Original Plastiplates are being retained in the Central Research Section. Upon approval this letter will be dated and arrangements completed for transmitting the index and letter to the Field.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842pm/mct

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DATE 7-27-91 BY 2842pm/mct

DATE 7-27-81 BY 2842pm/mct

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CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-99-1007

COMMUNISM AND AMERICAN LABOR

American Labor Unions
Communism and Labor Unions

COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY

Democracy Versus Communism

COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

The Deadly Parallel

COMMUNISM AND THE NEGRO

The Phantom American Negro
What America Means to Me
The Negro in American Life
The Negro and the Communists
* The Communist Party--Enemy of Negro Equality
Excerpt from Article on the Annual Convention of the NAACP
Keep an Eye on the Communists
The American Negro in the Communist Party

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842/mc
mejc

COMMUNIST AIMS, PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

Brief on Communism: Marxism-Leninism
Primer on Communism
How You Can Teach About Communism
The Communists Are After Our Minds
Questions For Communists
Documentary Proof that the Communist Party, U. S. A., Teaches
and Advocates the Overthrow and Destruction of the United
States Government by Force and Violence
The Kremlin Speaks

COMMUNIST ANTI-SEMITISM

Communist Anti-Semitism
Jewish Life Behind the Iron Curtain and in Western Europe
Excerpts from Report on Plight of Jews in Countries Behind the
Iron Curtain Delivered at Meeting of National Executive Committee
of JLC, March 12, 1950

* - Publication not sent to the Field, but which selected Field Offices were
authorized to purchase.

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-

EX-COMMUNISTS

What To Do With the Ex-Communist
Breaking the Communist Spell

LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION

Slave Labor in the Soviet World
Forced Labor in the Soviet Union
Proof of Soviet Slave Labor
Facts About Communism--Labor
* Elements of Soviet Labor Law
A Red Paper on Forced Labor
* The Uprising at Vorkuta

PURGES AND "CRIMES" IN THE SOVIET UNION

Where Are They Now?
You Can't Win

SATELLITE NATIONS

The Kremlin's Trojan Horses

SOVIET TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION

Who Is the Imperialist?
Proof of Guilt
For a Lasting Peace
Marx on the Truman Doctrine

THE ROSENBERG CASE

* They Screamed for Justice
Plain Facts About the Rosenberg Case

* - Publication not sent to the Field, but which selected Field Offices were authorized to purchase.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date January 19, 1955

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

From: [Redacted]

Field Office or Division New Orleans

SUGGESTION: It is suggested the file number of each informant be reflected on the ledger sheet regarding that informant which is maintained by the employee handling the confidential fund and related material. This would enable the person handling the fund to place the office file number on the Form 221a after an expense check is received in payment of the voucher, and route the form to the appropriate file, thereby facilitating the work of the Chief Clerk's Office. As an alternative, the Agent preparing the forms could place the informant file number on the 221a.

Its advantages are: The placing of the informant's file number on the Form 221a would eliminate the necessity of a clerk's searching the names in each instance. Often times only a symbol number for an informant is reflected on the form, requiring additional work for the clerk to determine the proper file for the 221a.

It should save at least \$ Unknown annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of any further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

I feel that this suggestion has merit and should be adopted. It will save considerable clerical time in checking the general indices for the proper file numbers.

Special Agent in Charge

(Title)

62 MAR 2 1955

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 PMU

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3482

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File

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE FBI HANDBOOK

There should be added to Part I, 26a-9a, page 19b, of the FBI Handbook, the following new paragraph?

Every three months each Special Agent handling a security informant must dictate a memorandum from the Agent to the Special Agent in Charge to be placed in each informant's file. This memorandum should set forth any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness, or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by the informant and the steps being taken by the Agent to prevent any such situations later becoming a source of embarrassment to the Bureau. This information should also be included in the letter of justification submitted every three months to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. If the source or the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every three months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in the memorandum for the Special Agent in Charge. These letters containing this information should also set forth the recommendations of the Special Agent in Charge concerning the continuance of the informant.

Security Info - Gen.

The above new material should be added to Part I, 26c-3, page 20 e, of the FBI Handbook, entitled "Confidential Source." The information is identical except that the words "confidential source" should be used in place of "security informant."

The first two sentences of above material should be added to Part I, 26D, "Source of Information," page 20.

*Handbook
Revised
fmb*

166-2542-3-
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167 FEB 24 1955

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 phome JC

58 FEB 25 1955

2 fmb

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File

PROPOSED CHANGE IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

To Section 108-E, Volume III, Manual of Instructions, should be added the following:

14. A statement as to whether informant has shown any indication of emotional instability, unreliability, or of furnishing false information.

Security Info - Gen

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DATE *7/27/81* BY *2842 JMD*
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-19341-

Manual of Instruction
Revised
fmb

166-2542-3-
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167 FEB 24 1955

66 FEB 25 1955

2-fmb

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February 10, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

DATE 2/22/81 BY SP4 PMV/MCT/C

MR. NICHOLS

MR. BOARDMAN

MR. BELMONT

MR. ROSEN

Security Informants -
927-421

I have been impressed with the number of elements that have developed incident to the Matusow case as to the handling of sources of information and informants by this Bureau.

I think that we should immediately prepare an SAC Letter stressing the extreme necessity of very carefully screening all sources of information and informants in both the criminal and subversive fields and requiring that indication be promptly given of any aspect of unreliability, emotional instability, or inconsistent information. When such is received from the field we at headquarters should promptly and incisively point out to the Department the doubt which has been raised so that there may be a specific record of the Department having its attention called by the FBI to any questionable source of information or informants.

Furthermore, our investigative staff should be cautioned about giving any information to an informant or source of information, as in the Matusow case Matusow claims in his forthcoming book to have procured information obtained from the files of the FBI. Emphasis should also be stressed as to the undesirability of Agents discussing between themselves, in the presence of or within hearing of a source of information or an informant, any information concerning investigations being conducted by the FBI or having been conducted by them.

In the Matusow case it appears that the Resident Agent at Santa Fe failed to make an appropriate record of the visits paid to him by Matusow when Matusow was an informant or at least a source of information. This should not exist because while it may be an added burden, nevertheless, we have found from experience the value of written records of what business transacted between our Agents and sources of information or informants and in the Matusow case it would be particularly valuable to have had written memoranda of exactly what was discussed and said on each occasion when Matusow was in contact with representatives of the Bureau.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

83 FEB 23 1955

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166-2542-3 ✓
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There are no doubt many other aspects of this matter which have come to your attention and I want close collaboration between all parties in getting an appropriate SAC Letter to the field so that we may avoid making any mistakes in the future which would tend to cause embarrassment to the Bureau by accepting information from questionable sources without proper protective steps being taken by the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

S/ J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	<i>1:41</i>
DATE	<i>1-28</i>
BY	<i>J. E. H.</i>

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
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Mohr _____
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Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JEH:mpd (8)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 2/10/55

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #46-55
MADE BY [REDACTED]
NEW ORLEANS OFFICEb6
b7cALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 PM [REDACTED]Tolson
Boardman
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SUGGESTION CONCERNING INFORMANTS - CEN

It is suggested the file number of each informant be reflected on the ledger sheet regarding that informant which is maintained by the employee in the field office handling the confidential fund and related material. This would enable the person handling the fund to place the office file number on the Form FD-221a after an expense check is received in payment of the voucher, and route the form to the appropriate file. FD-221a is the form used by the field to request funds for payments made to informants (copy attached). As an alternative, the Agent preparing Form FD-221a could place the informant file number on it, since the Agent preparing the form undoubtedly will know the informant's file number.

ADVANTAGES:

Suggester believes the placing of the informant's file number on Form FD-221a would eliminate the necessity of a clerk searching the office indices in each instance to determine where the form should be filed. Often times only a symbol number for the informant is reflected on the form which requires the clerk to determine the informant's name and then search the name in the indices to determine the file number.

RECORDED - 60
INDEXED - 60

66-2542-3-918

DISADVANTAGES:

None noted by suggester

EX-103

24 FEB 18 1955

OBSERVATIONS:

SAC Laughlin, Washington Field Office, thinks this is a good idea. Mr. Laughlin further advises that this procedure is presently being followed in his office.

Inspectors B. C. Brown and J. E. Nugent, Training and Inspection Division, favor adoption of this suggestion.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

RTH:cs

The Conference of 2/8/55, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont, DeLoach and Harbo, unanimously favors the alternate form of the suggestion, i.e. that

cc: Messrs. Harbo and Sizoo
new

Attachment

(5)

MAR 2 1955

FILED

the Agent preparing Form FD-221a place the informant file number on it. If approved, the attached SAC Letter should be distributed to the field.

RB

JH
1/11

✓
~~_____~~

CITY _____

DATE _____

Request of Special Agent in Charge, FBI, _____

_____ dollars, and _____ cents,

(\$ _____), which money is to be paid by me on _____

to _____

for information concerning the case entitled _____

Signed: _____

Special Agent

Authority (Date) _____

Period Covered by Payment _____

Authorization Checked _____

Check Number _____

Receipts Received _____

Voucher Prepared _____ Item _____

APPROVED:

SAC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 pmj/mjc

66-2542-3-918
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum •

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 17, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTSGenL.

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

In my memorandum to you of February 14, 1955, entitled "Edward Oliver Lamb, Security Matter - C" Bufile 100-14646, it was pointed out that explanations had been requested of the Miami Office and SAC Edward J. Powers for the apparent failure of Miami to submit to the Bureau pertinent information obtained from an informant regarding the investigation of Lamb.

Mr. Tolson wrote instructions on that memorandum to the effect that SAC letter should be prepared repeating the regulations set out in the Bureau's Manual regarding the forwarding of information of this nature to the Seat of Government and also providing that all Agents be so instructed again. The Director noted "Yes."

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for your approval is a letter to all Special Agents in Charge embodying the above instructions.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm/mere

Attachment: Letter 2-18-55

cc - Bufile: 100-14646

cc - Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue
 Mr. Vosburgh
 Mr. Short

(JGS:ldd)
 (8) MAR 1 1955

RECORDED - 866-25-42

FEB 23 1955

INT 866

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Memphis (134-00 & 137-00)

SUBJECT: ^{SECURITY} CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS, SOURCES AND
WITNESSES -- SCREENING OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

DATE: 2-21-55

42001

Re SAC Letter 55-15, Section B.

In order to comply with the instructions contained in referenced communication, an appropriate memorandum has been sent to all Agents assigned to the Memphis Division. In addition, the contents of referenced communication will be discussed in detail at the Semi-Annual Agents' Conferences to be held at Memphis March 1 and March 8, 1955. Appropriate ticklers have been set up to follow the matters outlined in the letter which require attention at stated intervals. I am giving this matter my personal attention. Every effort possible will be made to comply with the Bureau's instructions so that there will not be any embarrassment to the Bureau.

CEP:MBS

(3)

REGISTERED MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY SP4 JAM/mc JC

RECORDED-21

EX-121

66-2-4-920
6 FEB 25 19553911
66 MAR 4 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *RE*

FROM : E. D. Mason

SUBJECT: TESTING INFORMANTS

DATE: 2-16-55

Tolson ☒

Nichols ☒

Belmont ☒

Harbo ☒

Mohr ☒

Parsons ☒

Rosen ☒

Tamm ☒

Sizoo ☒

Winterrowd ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Holloman ☒

Gandy ☒

In discussing several matters with SACs Soucy, Crosby and Robey on 2-14-55 the topic came up as to the importance of corroborating information received from informants; particularly security informants. SAC Crosby stated that from time to time as a report is crossing his desk he designates an Agent to check out various aspects of information reported by the informant. He cited one instance wherein an informant reported that another person was in Cuba; however, investigation by an Agent of the San Juan Office showed this information to be untrue. Crosby stated that although a tremendous amount of investigative time can be expended in verifying or disproving information furnished by informants, he feels this technique to be indispensable in detecting those informants who now furnish unreliable data. *So we have*

The other SACs mentioned, and Crosby concurred, that from time to time they deliberately ask an informant to obtain information on a given matter when the true facts are already known to the field office and this is done as a means of testing the informant's subsequent report.

The SACs felt that it would be desirable for the Bureau to prepare a monograph as to what types of information can be corroborated and what indications of unreliability can and should be detected as to informants. SAC Crosby specifically mentioned that he felt the Central Research Section could be very helpful in this regard.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Favorable consideration be given to SAC Crosby's proposal that a monograph be prepared as to the verifying and the testing of information received from informants.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 PM DMJ/C

RECORDED 13

cc: Mr. Belmont
Mr. W. C. Sullivan

INDEXED - 13

10 MAR 3 1955

EDJ:mas
(5)

107

(See Addendum, page 2)

66-544-3-921

P
27

2. That the Central Research Desk prepare the monograph.

ADDENDUM: (WCS:mjh 2/21/55) The point made is a good one. Central Research has an exhaustive monograph on Informants already in preparation and it will have a section entitled "Testing and Verifying the Veracity of Informants." Therefore, a separate study will not be necessary. W. C. Sullivan

File

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmc
me JC

PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
AND RULES AND REGULATIONS

There should be added to Section 107 G of the Manual of Instructions, entitled "Security Informants" the following:

Every three months each Special Agent handling a security informant must dictate a memorandum from the Agent to the Special Agent in Charge to be placed in each informant's file. This memorandum should set forth any personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness, or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by the informant and the steps being taken by the Agent to prevent any such situations later becoming a source of embarrassment to the Bureau. This information should also be included in the letter of justification submitted every three months to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments. If the source of the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every three months after the date of designation containing the same information set out in the memorandum for the Special Agent in Charge. These letters containing this information should also set forth the recommendations of the Special Agent in Charge concerning the continuance of the informant.

The above material should also be added to Section 107 T of the Manual of Instructions, entitled "Confidential Source," except that the words "confidential source" should be substituted for the word "informant."

The first two sentences of above material should also be added to Section 87 D 3 of the Manual of Instructions, entitled "Panel Source," and the words "panel source" should be substituted for the word "informant."

The first two sentences of above material should also be added to the Manual of Instructions, Section 6 K, entitled "Sources of Information," and the words "source of information" should be substituted for the word "informant."

The following addition should be set forth in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions, Subsection H, "Report Writing," and Section 107 T entitled, "Confidential Sources."

In security reports it is necessary to cover the identity of an informant or source by a T symbol and information attributed to such an individual must be paraphrased and summarized to be certain the identity of the source or informant is properly concealed. However, in preparing such a report and setting out information from an informant or source, the information should be as complete as possible without revealing the individual's identity due to the fact that action is predicated on this information by other Government agencies and it is incumbent upon us to be certain that these reports and the information contained therein

me
C

Security Info - Gen.

OK for

OK for

58 MAR - 11 1955
Manual of Instructions
+
Manual of Rules & Regulation
Revised form

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167 FEB 25 1955

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are as complete as possible so that proper evaluation may be made by the individuals and agencies to whom they may be disseminated.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 5, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS - Confidential
CONTROLALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmj
me JC

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

This memorandum is submitted in compliance with Mr. Boardman's request that an analysis be made of "the Bureau instructions to the field relative to the handling of informants to see whether we are doing a proper selling job in the initial development of the informant and consistently thereafter from the standpoint of emphasizing to the informant the necessity for never divulging, through public media, details of the activities on which he has been engaged as an informant for the Bureau."

The Bureau has been most explicit in the procedure and the steps to be taken in selecting and developing security informants. During the initial phases of an informant's development he is specifically advised as to the necessity of maintaining his relationship with the Bureau in strict confidence. Agents handling informants must become so well acquainted with the informant that the informant will not breach the confidential relationship and if there is the slightest indication the informant may do so, the agent should be able to anticipate this action and forestall it. A signed statement is obtained wherever possible in which the informant agrees not to make any disclosure or exploit, in any way, information which he may obtain or any activity in which he may engage in behalf of the Bureau both while serving as an informant and, thereafter, unless authorized to do so by the Bureau.

When an informant is discontinued, the field must continue to maintain close contact with him so that he will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which might be against the Bureau's best interest. A determination must also be made by the field as to whether the informant has plans for publicizing his informant activity in any way.

In addition to instructions set forth in the Manual of Instructions, the Bureau has, by SAC Letters Numbers 25 dated January 7, 1952, 53-55M dated August 11, 1953, 54-450 dated August 24, 1954, 55-5K dated January 25, 1955, and 55-15 dated February 17, 1955, given additional specific instructions to the field to further insure against an informant publicizing his relationship with the Bureau.

Attachment sent 3-8-55
cc - Messrs. Boardman Belmont
Baumgardner Keay
Rose

RECORDED-85

66-2542-3-922

BFR:lad (6) FD-27
60 MAR 28 1955

EX-125

21 MAR 10 1955

The above information is stressed during New Agents Training, In-Service Training, Special Security Schools and conferences held at the Seat of Government and is also brought to the attention of the field in correspondence emanating from the Bureau.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division's analysis of this matter reflects that existing instructions stress the necessity for proper indoctrination of the informant from the first contacts to insure against their disclosing their relationship through any media.

These instructions have been formulated as a result of extensive research; and by study by special conferences over a long period of time, using actual experiences as a basis for arriving at policy to cope with problems arising in the field. Instructions stressing the absolute necessity for continuous strict and close control of security informants were submitted to the field as late as January 25, 1955, by SAC Letter #55-5 and February 17, 1955, by SAC Letter #55-15.

Inasmuch as there are indications that some discontinued informants are considering writing articles due to their financial distress, it is believed that we should reiterate and re-emphasize to the field the absolute necessity of complying with all Bureau regulations and instructions relating to the proper indoctrination, development and control of security informants. The field should be specifically instructed that a proper selling job must be done in the initial development of the informant and consistently thereafter, from the standpoint of emphasizing to the informant the necessity for never divulging through any media, details of the activities on which he has been engaged as an informant for the Bureau. These instructions to the informant must be properly worded and phrased so as to prevent any possibility of the Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your approval, there is attached an SAC Letter containing appropriate instructions in accordance with this memorandum. Manual & handbook changes are necessary and are being prepared.

✓ JBR HK 7-5 JMA

9

RH/HB

- 2 -

OK

JTB

MR

The Attorney General
Director, FBI

February 17, 1955

PPS FILED

In view of your interest in the recent prosecution of Communists in Louisville, Kentucky, I thought you would get a personal interest out of reading the attached editorial in the Louisville Courier-Journal of February 6, 1955, which, of course, takes a very strong stand, as could be expected, against the so-called 'paid informer.' One cannot help but wonder if this is not an advance publicity campaign in anticipation of the additional trials scheduled to take place in Louisville.

Attachment
cc - Mr. William P. Rogers (Attachment)
Deputy Attorney General

cc - Mr. Boardman

cc - Mr. Belmont

LEN:ptm
(6)

Security Informants - general

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmd/mec

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy

MAR 11 1955

66-2542-3
NOT RECORDED
MAR 9 1955

EB 2 51 PM '55

RECEIVED DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
MAR 11 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

Exposing the Scandal of the Paid Informers

RATIVES WALTER may be quite correct in saying that the ex-Communist, HARVEY MATSOW, is still a Communist. We wouldn't know, nor, we suspect, would Mr. WALTER. For Matsow reveals himself to be a liar of such perversity that no investigation is likely now to establish the truth or falsehood of any statement he has ever made.

But the point to be deplored is not that Communists might have made use of a professional liar, but that we practically invited them to do it. For at least five years it has been the practice of the Justice Department and its subsidiary, the F.B.I. to use the shabbiest type of ex-Communists as paid informers. This practice can be condoned; the stool pigeon is not an admirable member of society but few police departments could operate without him. The Justice Department, however, went further than this. It crammed the files of hapless civil servants with the "unevaluated" testimony of people such as MATSOW, or PAUL CATCH and MANNING JOHNSON, who have now been openly accused of perjury.

The accusers then appeared in court as "experts" or "consultants," with a vested interest in making their testimony positive and certain. CATCH and JOHNSON were paid almost \$10,000 each in two years for their "expert" testimony. MATSOW has been used less often as a witness, but has earned \$25 a day as consultant to the immigration service, has worked as a special aide to the McCARTHY committee, and to the Ohio Un-American Activities Committee.

HARVEY MATSOW is not an admirable character. His present confession is probably a publicity dodge to boost sales of his book of recantation. But his revelations are useful. They should force Congress to demand an accounting from the Justice Department. Without the prestige that comes from being introduced as a government witness or described as "on the payroll of the Justice Department," few of these people would ever have been built up into the menacing figures they became. The revelation now that some of them made a profession of bearing false witness will surely halt a system that is becoming a national scandal.

The testimony and the loyalty of such people

can obviously be bought. Where the Department of Justice has done as all a generous thing in buying it so much as in giving it a respectable it could never deserve. If the Communists played people to take advantage of our national madness by hearing false witness and then expounding it, they have done only what we deserved when we allowed informers to assume a moral and patriotic to which they were never entitled.

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Carson	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

John Edgar Hoover

We know

9994
For

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2552 PML
mctc

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

DATE OF MAIL 3-2-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LANTIERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 2536~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DM
me JC

SUBJECT: JUNE MAILREMOVED BY 59 MAR 18 1955FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-923

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

~~SECRET~~

DATE OF MAIL 3-2-55

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. LAMPHARD TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM 1736~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

DECLASSIFIED BY *8962/8/8/8*
ON *4-21-94*
83-1343

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 PZ

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

~~Class. & Ext. By 2842 [unclear] / mac/ [unclear]
Reason-FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2, 2, 3
Date of Review 7-30-91
7-30-81~~

REMOVED BY 59 MAR 18 1955

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING

STUDY (S) OF class
DATE 11-10-81

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-924

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-11-2001 BY SP-6/SJS/AN

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *WB*

DATE: MARCH 11, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
INFORMATION CONCERNING
66-2542ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DM
mcjm

Tolson	☒
Boardman	☒
Nichols	☒
Belmont	☒
Mohr	☒
Parsons	☒
Rosen	☒
Tamm	☒
Sizoo	☒
Winterrowd	☒
Tele. Room	☒
Holloman	☒
Gandy	☒

By airtel 3/8/55, captioned, "Civil Rights Congress; IS-C," the Philadelphia Office reported that at a Civil Rights Congress meeting March 4, 1955, in Philadelphia, Steve Nelson spoke of an informer in California, stating that the FBI had forced him to be an informer inasmuch as they were holding a charge over his head alleging that he had seduced an 11-year old girl. The Director noted: "What about this?"

The Bureau is unable to identify any active informant or discontinued informant of any field office with this individual.

In order that a complete check may be made regarding this matter, it is deemed necessary that all California Offices check their security informant records regarding this matter and immediately advise the Bureau if they have ever utilized or attempted to utilize any individual as an informant who can be identified with the individual referred to by Nelson.

ACTION:

There is attached for your approval a teletype to the San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices directing them as above. You will be immediately advised upon receipt of the requested information if any of these offices have utilized such individual as an informant.

*✓ attached & seen**WB 66-2542-3-935*

RECORDED - 83

6 MAR 15 1955

Attachment

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Rose

BFR:DE (5)

EX-117

66 MAR 21 1955

FBI FILES

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: Feb. 24, 1955

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: ~~Security Information~~
SCREENING OF SECURITY INFORMANTS

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 gmc

The field was instructed in SAC Letter 55-13(B) dated February 11, 1955, to carefully screen and evaluate each current security informant and advise the Bureau if there are any weaknesses, signs of instability, untrustworthiness, or unreliability and, if so, what steps are being taken as safeguards to be certain their operation does not result in embarrassment to the Bureau.

These letters are now being received and where the field states there are no such weaknesses and recommends the informant be continued and the review of our file indicates nothing to the contrary, if you approve, these letters will be stamped "Approved" and dated, and a copy transmitted to the field with an 0-25 routing slip.

Any letter from the field indicating a weakness, or any weakness developed in a review of an informant's file at the Bureau, will be set forth in a memorandum recommending continuance or discontinuance of the informant.

As you know, we will receive a separate letter from the field on each active confidential informant. These letters are pouring into the Internal Security Section and by February 25 it is expected we will have 1,095 letters. A review of 1,095 files on a desk which is already swamped with work is a tremendous task and before it can be accomplished there will be a serious delinquency on the Confidential Informant Desk.

In an effort to hold this delinquency to a minimum, one of the eight supervisors which are in the Internal Security Section on loan has been assigned to the Confidential Informant Desk. However, this supervisor will only work through February 25 at which time he will return to his own Section.

ACTION:

We are making every effort consistent with our present personnel and the other problems in the Internal Security Section to keep our work on a current basis. Nonetheless, it is inevitable under current conditions that we will have a delinquency. We can and will work out from under the delinquency in time. I will keep you advised of the progress which is being made on the desk.

FJB:mn

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Donohue

13 MAR 15 1955

67 MAR 22 1955

RECORDED-11
INDEXED-11
12/25
to Belmont
re add'l
informants
Q 926

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 15, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND
SOURCES OF INFORMATION3-14-97 102ALM/H
3-14-97 102ALM/H
3-14-97 102ALM/H
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 dawme SCTolson
Boardman
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In connection with a letter appearing in the "Washington Post and Times Herald" for March 4, 1955, captioned "Truth and Justice," memoranda have been prepared concerning [redacted] all of whom have furnished information to the Bureau in the past. These memoranda are attached.

[redacted] has been associated with the Communist movement from about 1925 to 1942. He discontinued his relationship following differences he had with a Communist Party functionary and in 1947 began to furnish information to the Miami Office. He has been paid a total of [redacted]. He has testified before various Congressional committees and has been used as an expert witness in numerous trials and hearings. His reliability has been attacked by the [redacted] and others who have stated that [redacted] is an unreliable witness. [redacted] has denied all such allegations and on August 2, 1954, made a press release concerning a libel suit to be filed against the [redacted] and the "New York Herald Tribune."

[redacted] was a Communist Party member from 1938 to 1939 and a Bureau informant from April, 1942, to February, 1944, when he entered the [redacted]

[redacted] as a consultant and witness. [redacted] furnished derogatory information concerning [redacted] in a United Nations loyalty investigation, stating that [redacted] had been introduced to him as a Communist Party member in 1935. The [redacted] claimed [redacted] had given false testimony regarding [redacted] later was cleared by the Loyalty Board.

Inasmuch as there has been no positive indication that [redacted] or [redacted] have furnished false information to the FBI, we have not made any re-evaluation of the reliability of either of these persons in Bureau files as we did in the Matusow case.

Attachments (4)
cc - L. V. Boardman
A. H. Belmont

INDEXED-88
RECORDED-88

EX-112

cc - F. J. Baumgardner
G. F. McInturff

12 MAR 23 1955

MAR 31 1955

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b7D

Concerning [] however, it is to be noted that this individual has admitted testifying falsely before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1953. [] during his testimony, alleged that he had been engaged in espionage and later admitted that these allegations were false and were for the purpose of enhancing the sale of a proposed book. Extensive investigation was conducted; however, the Department, by letter dated November 30, 1954, declined prosecution of [] for perjury. Inasmuch as [] admitted perjury, Bureau files containing information furnished by him were corrected to show his unknown reliability and other agencies which had received information furnished by [] were also advised of the unknown reliability of [] as an informant.

Handwritten: Harlow
Regarding the writer of the letter appearing in the "Washington Post and Times Herald" on March 4, 1955, this person is undoubtedly identical with S. Ralph Harlow, a professor at Smith College, who was the subject of a summary memorandum September 8, 1951, which is attached. Briefly, it appears that Harlow has been affiliated with several Communist front organizations, including the Friends of the Soviet Union, the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, the Committee for Peaceful Alternatives to the Atlantic Pact and others.

RECOMMENDATION:

This is submitted for your information.

Handwritten: JB
Handwritten: jlm
Handwritten: [Signature]

March 15, 1955

[redacted]
[redacted] was a member of the Communist Party from [redacted] and was used as a paid Bureau informant from [redacted] to [redacted] at which time he [redacted]. He has not been used as an informant since that time but has been contacted from time to time for information in his possession concerning Communist matters. After his [redacted] [redacted] was used by the [redacted] in many deportation cases.

b7D

The testimony of [redacted] in the case of [redacted] before the Supreme Court, County of New York, reflects that [redacted] was a witness from February 2 to February 5, 1951. Under cross-examination he was questioned at great length concerning testimony previously given by him in the [redacted] case and at the [redacted] hearings conducted by [redacted]. The defense attorney charged that [redacted] perjured his testimony in the above-mentioned cases. This was denied by [redacted]. The defense attorney moved to the court that [redacted] be committed for perjury; however, the court denied the application pointing out that the records in the [redacted] case and the [redacted] hearings reveal that the court had ruled that [redacted] did not give perjured testimony.

b7D

In the [redacted] trial in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in April, 1951 [redacted] admitted in cross-examination that in a previous case on the west coast in 1948 he had not told the truth regarding the furnishing of reports on Communist activities to any Federal agency. This case was a deportation case against [redacted].

b7D

In his testimony at Pittsburgh, [redacted] said that since he had given his promise to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to maintain secrecy, in his opinion it would not be a violation of any oath if he maintained such secrecy for security of the nation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pho me JC

3-10-97 SP2ALH/ML
FOIA #357145

ENCLOSURE

66-2542-3-927

As [redacted] was appearing before the [redacted] in September, 1951, the above information concerning [redacted] testimony in the [redacted] trial was furnished by letter dated September 24, 1951, to Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General was also advised that [redacted] was instructed, as are all informants, to maintain the informant relationship as confidential but no instructions were given to him or to any informants to deny the relationship under oath.

b7D

The April 23, 1951, issue of the "People's World" contained an article entitled "Yes, I Lied, FBI Witness Admits on Stand." This article reflected in substance the testimony of Johnson in the Steve Nelson case during which he admitted lying under oath. The April 20, 1951, issue of the "Daily Worker" and the April 21, 1951, issue of the Pittsburgh "Courier," a weekly Negro newspaper in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, contained articles identical in substance to the article which appeared in the "People's World," as mentioned above.

On July 2, 1954, attorneys from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice contacted the Bureau concerning [redacted] former Communist Party members who furnished derogatory information concerning [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] The Departmental attorneys referred to information given by [redacted] to the effect that [redacted] had been introduced to them individually as a Communist Party member at a meeting of top leaders of the Party fraction of the National Negro Congress held in Washington, D. C., in 1935. The Department was interested in determining whether there might possibly be some perjury involved in connection with the testimony of [redacted] before the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Review Board.

The July 2, 1954, issue of "The Washington Post" contained an article written by the Alsop brothers, columnists, which article contained verbatim quotations from the transcripts of the hearing on Bunche. The article alleged that Johnson and Patterson gave false testimony concerning Bunche before the Loyalty Hearing Board. The article further stated that a transcript of the hearings was forwarded to the Department of Justice "for investigation of perjury." The Departmental attorneys requested that [redacted] be reinterviewed by the Bureau.

b7D

[redacted] was reinterviewed on July 7, 1954, in connection with the request from the Department and he reiterated statements made to the Bureau when interviewed during the United Nations loyalty investigation of Bunche. He referred to the article by the Alsop brothers, mentioned above, and stated it was part of a planned program to discredit ex-Communists who have been testifying as Government witnesses. He expressed willingness to cooperate with the Bureau and a desire to assist the Bureau at any time. Additional investigation did not result in the obtaining of further evidence either confirming or refuting their testimony.

A report reflecting the results of the interview with Johnson was furnished by letter dated July 9, 1954, to the United States Civil Service Commission and to Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III.

On February 21, 1955, the Attorney General transmitted a letter to the Bureau entitled "Ex-Communists as Witnesses." This memorandum reflected information concerning the unreliability of Harvey M. Matusow and others and requested the Bureau to mark its records to show the unreliability of Matusow.

The memorandum stated that Assistant Attorney General Tompkins will complete his report as to whether the action of [redacted] in the [redacted] case requires any additional action in that proceeding and whether it requires any reappraisal of their reliability as Government witnesses in future proceedings. No action was requested of the FBI by the Department in the above-mentioned memorandum and the Department is in possession of all reports in the Bunche case.

It is to be noted that on May 28, 1954, the Chairman of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board advised the Bureau that the Loyalty Board had cleared Bunche on that date.

March 15, 1955

RE: [redacted] with aliases
ESPIONAGE - R
PERJURY

b7D

Biographical Data:

[redacted] was born [redacted]
[redacted] He entered
the United States in [redacted] and became a United States
citizen by derivation through the naturalization of
his father on [redacted] He has been employed as
follows:

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 dph/mcjc

66 - 7542 - 3 - 927

ENCLOSURE

Communist Party and Related Organizations:

[redacted] has publicly admitted that he was a Communist Party member from 1936 to 1945. He has stated that in 1945 he stopped paying dues, but he still considered himself a Communist. [redacted] has also admitted that he was affiliated at various times with the [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] In addition he has subscribed to the "Daily Worker" and contributed to "Glos Ludowy" (Polish newspaper in United States that follows Communist Party line). He has also associated with a number of Communist Party members and officials.

Travel to [redacted]

b7D

On [redacted] left the United States for [redacted]. While in [redacted] he worked for the [redacted] as a translator and news analyst. [redacted] claims to have become disillusioned with conditions in [redacted] and reports that the enchantment of Communism turned out to be a fraud. He left [redacted] on [redacted] and arrived in the United States on [redacted]

[redacted] as a Bureau Information Source:

b7D

Following his return to the United States from [redacted] was interviewed by Bureau agents on [redacted] and on a number of occasions thereafter. During the interview he was co-operative and he expressed a desire to be of assistance with respect to Communist matters. He was utilized as a Bureau confidential source (symbol [redacted] from [redacted] [redacted]. During this period he was paid a total of [redacted] for information he had furnished. On [redacted] it was determined that [redacted] had furnished false information to the Jenner Committee and that he was a pathological liar. As a result his services as a confidential source were discontinued.

By letter dated May 8, 1953, addressed to Newark, the office of origin, instructions were set forth that all information furnished by [] should be reviewed. Newark was also instructed to determine what information furnished by [] was disseminated to any outside agency and to take appropriate steps to have corrections made to indicate that [] is an individual of unknown reliability. Newark was also instructed to refer [] in future communications as an individual of unknown reliability.

b7D

As a result of these instructions and subsequent file checks at the Seat of Government, information furnished by [] as it appeared in Bureau and field office files, as well as files of outside agencies was corrected to show [] was of unknown reliability.

Testimony Before Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (Jenner Committee):

[] testified in Executive Session of the Jenner Committee on February 13, 1953, and on March 31, 1953. He also testified before the Committee in Public Session on April 28, 1953, and his testimony was televised. [] testified concerning two espionage incidents in which he stated he was involved. In substance, these incidents are as follows:

b7D

(1) Between 1941 and 1943, at the direction of the Communist Party [] took samples of an insecticide and the formula for making the insecticide from the Dupont Company where he was then employed. He turned the material over to [] who was then a Communist Party []. Shortly thereafter, [] took a week off from work [] obtained some chemistry books and prepared a report on the process of production of the insecticide which he also gave to []. [] was told by a Communist Party leader in Ohio that the formula "would be of great use to our comrades in Russia."

(2) Between 1943 and 1945, at the request of [] took [] of parts used for [] from the [] [] wrapped the [] in a [] [] would have them reproduced in a back room. Photostats were made by one of [] [] would then return the [] file. The Photostats of the [] were turned over to [] presumably by the [] or someone on his behalf.

b7D

Investigation of Espionage Allegations and Interviews With

As a result of [] testimony before the Jenner Committee, extensive investigation was immediately instituted in an effort to prove or disprove the espionage allegations. The investigation reflected that not only were the two espionage incidents false, but also many other items which [] related to the Committee were false such as minor incidents that occurred during his school days, the degree of association with known Communist Party members and [] alleged activities. Investigation indicated that [] was a pathological liar.

Thereafter [] was interviewed on April 30, 1953, May 1, 1953, May 2, 1953, May 14, 1953, May 15, 1953, and May 16, 1953. He was confronted with the results of the investigation. On May 2, 1953, in sworn statements, [] admitted his prior testimony before the Jenner Committee was false. He stated he fabricated the stories in order to enhance the literary value of a book he intended to write. He admitted that he never engaged in any espionage activities.

[] was recalled by the Jenner Committee and he testified in Executive Session of the Committee on May 6, 7 and 8, 1953, at which time he repudiated his prior testimony.

Prosecutive Action:

On May 20, 1953, the Department was requested to furnish an opinion as to possible prosecutive action against [] for a violation of perjury or related statutes. Subsequently, on June 2, 1953, and on August 20, 1953, charts in the form of comparative analyses of discrepancies in [] testimony were furnished to the Department for its assistance.

By memorandum dated June 28, 1954, the Criminal Division of the Department informed that [] false testimony constituted a valid basis for initiating.

prosecutive action for perjury. The Criminal Division informed that it contemplated presenting the matter to a Federal Grand Jury in the near future.

By memorandum dated November 30, 1954, the Internal Security Division of the Department advised that upon reconsideration prosecutive action against would not be undertaken.

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March 15, 1955

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED TO 2842 Pmc SC

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE 11/1/81 FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91
7-27-81

I. BACKGROUND

[redacted] was born at [redacted]

on [redacted]

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[redacted] also allegedly made remarks in the presence of other [redacted] advocating the overthrow of the United States Government. [redacted] sentence was later reduced to three years [redacted]

Classified by 492 c/s/jcl
Declassify on: OADR 5/31/85
2229/234

II. COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITY

[redacted] was associated with the Communist movement from about [redacted] In [redacted] and [redacted] he was active as an [redacted] (later known as the [redacted] - cited by Attorney General). During the [redacted] he traveled throughout the country as a [redacted] and was very active in Communist inspired strikes during this period. In [redacted] was removed as the [redacted] in [redacted] because of differences he had with a [redacted] relative to CP policies. As a result of this removal, [redacted] discontinued his relationship with the Communist movement and since that time has become anti-Communist in expression.

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From [redacted] was the subject of a security-type investigation by this Bureau concerning his activities in the Communist movement.

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DECLASSIFIED BY 806 BJA/HJS
ON 11/1/81
83-1343

III. RELATIONSHIP WITH BUREAU

In [redacted] appeared at the Miami Division of the FBI and advised he had decided to furnish information concerning Communist activities. Since that time he has furnished valuable information to the Bureau on numerous individuals.

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ENCLOSURE

DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 Pmc SC 66-2542-3-927

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prominent in the Communist movement and also has submitted important information on various aspects of the Communist apparatus in this country. He has been used as a source of information on Communist matters since [redacted]. From [redacted] to [redacted] he was paid a total of [redacted] for services and [redacted] for expenses). The maximum payment in any one year was [redacted] paid to him in [redacted]. These payments were made to [redacted] on a C.O.D. basis.

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IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND COMMITTEES

[redacted] has testified before various Congressional committees since [redacted]. He has been used by the United States Department of Justice as an expert witness in numerous Federal trials (eg. [redacted] cases), and in numerous hearings by the [redacted]. He was used in loyalty hearings by agencies of the [redacted]. [redacted] He was also employed at various periods of time, in the past few years, as a Consultant for [redacted] in connection with their investigations concerning deportations and denaturalizations.

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V. DATA CONCERNING TESTIMONY FURNISHED BY [redacted] DURING TRIALS AND HEARINGS

1. During the month of May, 1949, eight articles appeared in the "Miami Daily News" which were purported to be written by Crouch. These articles were edited by William C. Baggs of the "Miami Daily News" and carried accounts of Crouch's past activity in the Communist movement. They were highly colored and written for public consumption. [redacted] advised the Bureau previous to the appearance of these articles that he did not possess any factual information regarding a number of the items appearing in these articles. The Director agreed that it was not desirable to interview Crouch concerning every statement appearing in these articles and noted "It is an outrage that much exaggeration is used when the true facts would be equally impressive." This matter was called to the attention of the Department of Justice.

2. On May 9, 1949, the "Washington Times Herald," page 1, carried an article stating that Crouch had given secret testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee last week. The

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article went on to describe the contents of the testimony given by Crouch. The Attorney General telephonically contacted the Bureau on the evening of May 9, 1949, concerning this matter. The Attorney General stated he had talked to Congressman Wood of the House Committee relative to this matter and the Congressman denied that the Committee had issued any press release concerning Crouch's testimony. Crouch was contacted by the Bureau on the evening of May 9, 1949, and he emphatically denied talking to the press about his testimony before the House Committee. He stated the Committee told him not to disclose the testimony to the press and he denied violating this ban of silence placed on him by the Committee. The Attorney General was advised of the above matter by letter dated May 10, 1949.

3. [] testified before the Department of Commerce Loyalty Board on [] in the case entitled [] Loyalty of Government Employees." The Loyalty Board questioned the reliability of [] and requested the Bureau to (a) give its characterization of [] as to his reliability and (b) to advise if [] testimony before the [] was similar to that given before the Loyalty Board concerning []

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In reply to request (a) the Loyalty Board was advised as follows: [] voluntarily contacted the Miami Office of the FBI advising he desired to furnish information to the FBI. Since that time he has furnished considerable information to the Bureau, much of which is corroborated by information from other sources." The Department of Commerce was also furnished a Photostat of an article that appeared in the March 12, 1952, issue of the "Washington Evening Star" describing Crouch's testimony in the Smith Act cases in Baltimore. This article gives a summary of Crouch's background and refers to his testimony as expert testimony.

In reply to request (b) the Loyalty Board was advised that this request should properly be made to the Attorney General as it was the Attorney General's responsibility, not the Bureau's, to make contact with Congressional committees. The Bureau files do not reflect whether the Loyalty Board pursued this matter to the Attorney General.

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4. The January 18, 1953, issue of "The Washington Post," page 5-b, carried an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, newspaper columnists, in which they urged the Attorney General to investigate the "Professional Informers" in this country. In this column, the Alsop brothers named Paul Crouch, Louis Budenz and Harvey Matusow and were uncomplimentary concerning the veracity of these three men as witnesses. This matter was called to the attention of the Department.

This article was the beginning of a series of statements by the Alsop brothers, Drew Pearson and by various publications, such as the "Daily Worker" and many others, concerning the reliability of Crouch as a Government witness.

5. The May 18, 1954, edition of the "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" carried on the front page an article captioned "Crouch Faces Perjury Probe Over Trial Here." The story was written by Joseph and Stewart Alsop and states that the Attorney General had decided to investigate Paul Crouch for possible perjury and to determine his suitability for future use as a Government witness. The contents of this newspaper clipping were furnished to the Department.

6. In a hearing before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on March 19, 1954, at New Orleans, Louisiana, [redacted] was asked if he had given the FBI full information concerning his activities in the CP and [redacted] answered as follows: "As much as I could and I would estimate 5000 hours of consultation and typing material for the FBI. I have not yet given it all. This matter is so voluminous I would say I have devoted approximately 5000 hours to giving the FBI information on the Communist conspiracy." He was contacted by the Bureau after his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, at which time he stated that he could not honestly say that he had furnished all the information in his possession to the FBI. He stated he was involved in the CP for a period of 17 years and during this period he worked in several parts of the country with numerous individuals. He emphasized the fact he never knowingly withheld any information from the Bureau, stating that on occasions, certain incidents occurred which refreshed his memory concerning persons and events within the CP, and it was at that time that he furnished same to the Bureau. This matter was called to the attention of the Department.

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7. In a hearing before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee at New Orleans, Louisiana, on [redacted] stated that a White House espionage ring operated from [redacted]. A review of Bureau files failed to reflect that this information had ever been previously furnished by [redacted]. He was immediately contacted concerning his espionage allegation before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and during the interview he explained that the gathering of general intelligence information was probably more descriptive of what he meant, rather than the term espionage, as he actually used it. He previously furnished the identity of CP members in contact with the White House during pertinent period. This matter was fully investigated by the Bureau and it was determined that there was no espionage violation in this matter. The results of the investigation by the Bureau were furnished to the Department.

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8. During an interview with a highly reliable and confidential security informant in the New York Office on May 20, 1954, the informant mentioned [redacted] name in view of the recent newspaper publicity concerning his testimony. *NY*

The informant stated that he has known [redacted] since about [redacted] at which time [redacted] was [redacted]. [redacted] he came in contact with the CP and it was ascertained at that time that he was in reality extremely raw and undeveloped concerning the CP and the Communist movement.

[redacted] went to the [redacted] which was a two-month trip. Informant met [redacted] in about [redacted]. He said that there had been a great deal of publicity concerning [redacted] in view of his [redacted].

[redacted] According to the informant the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern was in session at that time, to which [redacted]. He stated [redacted] was not a delegate but spent his time traveling around making speeches. He stated that from [redacted] he lost track of [redacted]. In [redacted] was

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sent to Denver, Colorado, for assignment and [redacted] he sent [redacted] to Salt Lake City to be the Utah organizer for the CP. The informant stated he personally departed Colorado in [redacted] at which time [redacted] was still in Utah. In [redacted] informant saw [redacted] in Charlotte, North Carolina, during the National textile strike. At the time, [redacted] remained in North Carolina for a couple of years, after which he was moved to the west coast where he evidently left the CP at some unknown date. *(u)*

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Informant stated that [] leaving the CP was entirely unnoticed^{b7D} by CP leaders; further that all of [] assignments had been of a third or fourth rate character, such as section organizer or in charge of some unimportant state organization. Informant stated that within the CP, [] was never regarded as an important personality. He has had no importance as a writer, speaker or organizer. Informant stated that in the eyes of the CP leaders Crouch had never really fully grasped the CP program, its aims and its objectives. According to informant, [] has never been known as a liar within the CP. He stated that [] movements within the Party were very circumscribed and that in reading newspaper accounts of [] testimony for the Government, particularly in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, he had received the impression in some instances it may have been exaggerated or slightly stretched; however, informant stated he did not know the specific questions asked [] or the specific purpose of [] testimony and therefore he is unable to truthfully evaluate such testimony by newspaper accounts. According to informant he learned from Art Shields, National Journalist for the "Daily Worker" that the use of [] by the Government as an expert witness constitutes a laughing matter within the CP and that the Government must be in severe straits for witnesses if they are forced to use [] *RC*

The above material as received from informant was furnished to the Department and INS.

9. In May, 1954, [] prepared a 14-page memorandum^{b7D} containing the so-called derogatory allegations made against him. This memorandum contains 14 allegations and his reply to each one. The original memorandum was directed to General Swing of INS, with copies to the Attorney General and Director Hoover. Each allegation and reply in [] memorandum is briefly summarized here:

First derogatory allegation. That [] is still a Communist (from statement by Senator Wayne Morse, Congressional Record, April 19, 1954).

Reply by [] That in view of his public record during the past five years of fighting Communism, his confidential assistance to the FBI, testimony in five Smith Act trials and some fifty-five other proceedings and hearings, he will not dignify this allegation by other than an emphatic "No."

Second derogatory allegation. That on his radio network [] said [] had given Government agencies a statement that Representative Condon of California is or was a member of the Communist Party.

Reply by [] Completely untrue.

Third derogatory allegation. That [] smirkingly admits he is a "professional witness." ("I. F. Stone's Weekly" of March 29, 1954.)

Reply by [] Absolutely and completely false. *CONFIDENTIAL*

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Fourth derogatory allegation. That [] made claims and inferences of untrue statements about [] [] cites three references to articles by the Alsop brothers, April 13, 16 and 19, 1954; articles in the "Sunday Worker," "The Honolulu Record," and "The Nation.")

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Reply by [] That for years he has cooperated fully with the FBI in this matter and has given the Government all information he possesses on this subject. [] stated that in view of current investigations involving [] this memorandum is not the place for information or comment on any factual matters concerning []

Fifth derogatory allegation. That Judge Holtzoff said, "I am amazed that (the Justice Department) should employ him." (Alsop column April 16, 1954, and "The Worker" April 25, 1954.)

Reply by [] That Judge Holtzoff later said his statement was taken out of context and made before he knew that [] was out of the CP and had been fighting it for years, and he was fully satisfied with [] employment by the Government when he learned these facts.

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Sixth derogatory allegation. That the Alsop brothers stated a third party branded [] story as untrue and referred to this third party as a "competent witness" who charged [] with false testimony before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

Reply by [] That this third party and "competent witness" is one [] concerning whom [] gave testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security in [] [] sets out the complete background on [] who in [] was [] [] and later became employed in the Government. According to [] was a member of the CP in the [] and with [] was a [] to a National Convention of the CP in New York City in [] [] states that the [] [] later was employed in the Veterans Administration, but was dismissed after a loyalty hearing. [] also states that in 1951 in Executive Session before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security he warned the subcommittee of [] friendship with a man in [] who later became a high Government official and close to [] (This undoubtedly refers to [] to []

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[redacted] and [redacted] was also employed in the Government. After loyalty hearings both were declared eligible on loyalty, but both resigned on [redacted] when the new administration took over.) [redacted] states that he has requested the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to call Parks and himself to testify under oath and he has also asked for the opportunity to give out the above facts publicly. b7D

Seventh derogatory allegation. That the Department of Justice did "not have confidence" in [redacted] during the trial [redacted] (Also column April 16, 1954, "Sunday Worker," April 25, 1954.)

Reply by [redacted] That the Government attorney who handled the Weinberg prosecution stated, "At no time during the Weinberg trial was there any lack of confidence by the Department in [redacted]"

Eighth derogatory allegation. That in the Philadelphia Smith Act trial [redacted] said he knew [redacted] and in the Harry Bridges trial in December, 1949, [redacted] said that he "did not know. [redacted]" (Also column May 19, 1954.)

Reply by [redacted] That this charge is a skillful Communist-type trick and a thorough and detailed investigation should be made of it. According to [redacted] discontinued use of that name about [redacted] two years before [redacted] met him. [redacted] stated he personally met [redacted] in [redacted] and was associated with him more or less frequently until [redacted]. He always knew him as [redacted] and never by any other name after the late 1920's and at no time after 1930 did he hear him called [redacted]. [redacted] stated that many former Communists, such as [redacted] and [redacted] others, could testify that they were at meetings where [redacted] and [redacted] definitely indicated that they knew each other very well. To show his official status with the Young Communist League, of which [redacted] was a [redacted] member, [redacted] sets out 30 references to the "Young Worker," which show [redacted] (the "Young Worker" was the official organ of the Young Communist League). After attempting to present proof that he knows the present [redacted] the former [redacted] then attempts to explain the incident in the Harry Bridges trial when he said he did not know a [redacted]. According to [redacted] the name [redacted] was so incidental in the Bridges trial that he does not recall it at all. As to how he remembered the name of [redacted] points out that in 1953 he submitted a memorandum of nine pages to the Immigration and Naturalization Service which contained 38 names, one of which he listed as [redacted] real name [redacted]. b7D

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In reply to the question how did he know in the Philadelphia trial that [] are the same person, [] states that he has recently been working with investigators of Government security agencies on matters pertaining to that individual and his recollection was refreshed and he knew it was [] and not [] that he had heard a few people mention in 1927 and 1928. b7D

Ninth derogatory allegation. That [] identified [] by sight and by name on entering a crowded courtroom but at the Bridges trial in 1949, [] did not recall the name. (Alsop column and "Daily Worker," May, 1954.)

Reply by [] That he has not had time to complete research dealing with this matter, but he states that [] in the "Young Worker" signed an article [] and not [] and [] requested INS to obtain a copy of the "Young Worker" for July 21, 1930, containing an article by [] [] claims that he will produce evidence to prove that he knew [] personally and that they were both high-ranking officials in the Young Communist League. b7D

Tenth derogatory allegation. That [] could not identify a Communist []

Reply by [] That due to lack of time, he could not set out a documented reply to this allegation, but he quoted from testimony of February 11, 1953, in which he, [] did state in court that he knew [] [] was the subject of a deportation case handled by INS.) [] set forth additional testimony in which he said that he could not make a positive identification of [] over a period []. With regard to this matter, [] then suggested that the full transcript of Burck's testimony be sent to the Justice Department for possible perjury prosecution on several counts. (It is not clear from [] memorandum as to what Burck testified.) b7D

Eleventh derogatory allegation. That it has been insinuated [] has given untrue testimony concerning his education in Socialist literature during his childhood and he quotes the Alsop column for April 19, 1954, as follows: "... He was clearly an infant prodigy, with access to a library without known parallel in the rustic South of that simple and remote period."

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Reply by [] That []

with a large personal library. One of his

[] in addition, within a short distance of his birthplace [] said there were two Socialist papers and one anti-Socialist publication and the editors of these papers had used libraries of which he made extensive use. [] also said that at the age of [] he became []

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Twelfth derogatory allegation. That [] had some "historic interview" with an FBI man in the presence of Judge Oscar C. Dancy of Brownsville, Texas, but the judge, as far as he knows, never saw [] in his life. (Alsop column, April 19, 1954.)

Reply by [] That the term "historic interview" was coined by the Alsop brothers as a "straw man" to knock down. According to [] the conversation in question was so incidental and casual that he has now almost forgotten what was said on the subject of Communism, and there is no reason why the judge should have recalled it for two weeks, far less for some eight years.

Thirteenth derogatory allegation. That [] has given conflicting testimony regarding his work as [] and on a third occasion, he has sworn that he only interested himself in barroom talk." (Alsop column April 19, 1954.)

Reply by [] That this is an absurd charge and [] challenges the Alsop brothers to produce places, dates and pages of transcripts. According to [] such a charge that he was only interested in barroom talk when he was in charge of the very serious work of infiltrating the Armed Forces, is to question his sanity rather than his veracity. [] states that his extensive and destructive work in this field as a Communist is heavily documented and a study of all the available material would require many weeks of research. He stated that on occasions where his recollection was refreshed with documents, his testimony was more detailed than on other occasions and more exact on dates. b7D

Fourteenth derogatory allegation. That [] was the author of "imaginary" and "semifiction" material written in 1925 before his arrest and court-martial for the formation of the Hawaiian Communist League. (Alsop column April 19, 1954, and Communist publications.)

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Reply by [] That he has not read the transcript of his court-martial for about 25 years, but he believes this allegation refers to material which he prepared before his arrest. According to [] he []

[]
At that time, like all Communists, he regarded U. S. Government tribunals as hostile enemy courts and his answers during his court-martial must be considered from that standpoint. However, he states that he has repeatedly and publicly repudiated all of his writings and actions during the time that he was a Communist and will join everyone opposed to Communism in condemning everything he did as a Communist and all his writings while under Communist influence. [] states that he deeply regrets his 17 years in the CP and some 10 years previous to that time when he was under Socialist and Communist influences.

In his memorandum [] pointed out that he desired an immediate investigation of the points set out in his memorandum. This matter was referred to the Department and INS, stating that no action along this line is being taken in the absence of instructions from the Attorney General that such action is desired. Crouch was advised that his memorandum was referred to the Attorney General.

Concerning allegations number twelve and [] reply, the Bureau contacted Judge Oscar C. Dancy, County Judge, Cameron County, Texas, at Brownsville, Texas, on July 14, 1954. Judge Dancy stated he never knew [] and that no Special Agent of the FBI ever interviewed [] in his office. This information was furnished to the Department and INS.

By memorandum dated June 2, 1954, from Mr. Boardman to The Director, it was pointed out that in order to determine the veracity of the allegations made against [] and his replies, intensive and exhaustive investigation would be required, as they encompass cases such as the Harry Bridges case, the Dr. Oppenheimer case, the Philadelphia Smith Act trial and many others. b7D

10. [] Department of Justice, confidentially advised Mr. Nichols of the Bureau on June 1, 1954, that the Department was receiving a considerable number of press inquiries concerning [] reportedly being banished by the Department of Justice. [] told Mr. Nichols that he had no information concerning this matter and that he had discussed it with Deputy

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Attorney General Rogers and General Swing of INS and that they both had told him they knew nothing concerning this matter. [redacted] b7D

told Mr. Nichols that he had ascertained that earlier in the week [redacted] had called INS to inquire as to whether they had any work for him; that he had been released by the Internal Security Section of the Department and desired work with INS. He was told INS had no work for him and that they would call him when they needed him. [redacted] advised that actually what happened was that [redacted] of INS had asked [redacted] of the Internal Security Section of the Department

to get [redacted] out of town the week prior to the [redacted] [redacted] The Internal Security Section of the Department arranged for plane reservations for [redacted] to leave Washington at 2:00 P.M., [redacted]

The reasoning for this move was that it is the Department's policy that people should not be carried on the payroll unless they are actually used, as it unnecessarily involves per diem costs. [redacted] advised Mr. Nichols that this whole matter came about when [redacted] went over the heads of his Department to issue instructions to get [redacted] out of town. The Director noted "We must meticulously stay out of this [redacted] matter. It is strictly a Dept. matter."

11. By memorandum dated June 28, 1954, [redacted] advised this Bureau that he was requesting the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate Committee on Government Operations and the President of the United States to see that the FBI is directed and authorized to make a full and complete investigation of all charges concerning his reliability as a witness and also the fact that the Department of Justice is considering prosecution of him for perjury. This matter was immediately referred to the Attorney General and he was advised that no action was being taken by this Bureau in the absence of any instructions from him in this matter. INS was also advised of this matter. b7D

12. [redacted] made a press release containing the full text of a complaint in his libel suit against the [redacted] to be filed before the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The suit for damages was in the amount of [redacted] and it generally encompassed material to the effect that the defendants contrived to cause it to be believed that Crouch was a liar, a professionally mendacious witness and an unreliable informant. This was immediately called to the attention of the Department and INS.

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13. The Honolulu Division advised by letter dated [redacted] intends to file a libel suit against the [redacted]

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[redacted] at [redacted]
Honolulu, asking damages in the amount of [redacted]
suit will be based on the [redacted]
[redacted]

14. The "Daily Worker" edition of December 14, 1954, page 3, carries an article which states that the "Daily Worker" was [redacted] by [redacted] for [redacted] for defamation of character.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

By letter dated June 3, 1954, the Bureau advised all pertinent offices that in view of the considerable newspaper publicity that had been afforded the conflicting statements and testimony given by Paul Crouch as a Government witness in court action and other proceedings against Communists and alleged Communists, no additional interviews should be conducted with [redacted] concerning any matter without specific authority from the Bureau. However, each office was advised that if [redacted] should volunteer any information it should be accepted and the Bureau immediately informed.

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Mr. Nichols

March 8, 1955

M. A. Jones

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

QUESTIONS ASKED ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS WHEN TESTIFYING BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
MARCH 8, 1955
MORNING SESSION

THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmc

Security Infts. - Gen. mc JC

In accordance with your request, the above session was attended by SA Frank J. Hudson of the Crime Records Section. The following pertinent questions were asked of Attorney General Tompkins by members of the subcommittee.

Senator Stuart Symington asked Tompkins whether or not the information obtained from informants is ever evaluated by the FBI. Tompkins replied that the FBI does not evaluate any information.

Senator Cotton of New Hampshire questioned Tompkins regarding the terms "Agent" and "informant." Tompkins replied that the term informant embraces those who have been put into the Communist Party by the FBI and also those who might furnish valuable information.

Senator Symington asked how frequently do informants turn over information that proves to be unreliable. Tompkins advised that he could not categorically answer that question, but he knew that the Bureau checks on informants, and if any information proves to be unreliable, the Department is notified.

Tompkins' testimony touched on the activities of the Inter-departmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. He discussed a Working Committee which prompted a question from Senator Symington regarding what the definition of the Working Committee was. Tompkins replied that members of the regular committee were often bogged down with detail and that the Working Committee was formed to handle such matters and make available their results to the whole committee. Senator Symington also asked whether or not the Director of the FBI doesn't sit in on all conferences. (During this portion of the questioning, there was confusion between the witness as to whether or not witness was talking about the IIC or the ICIS). Tompkins advised that he didn't know whether or not the Director attended all meetings but that he would find out.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Wick _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

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Memorandum for Mr. Nichols

March 8, 1955

Senator Symington also asked why the Central Intelligence Agency was not mentioned as one of the members of the afore-mentioned committees. Tompkins advised that there were a number of agencies who were not members, but when information pertaining to their particular branch was being discussed, these nonmember agencies were always invited to attend.

Senator Humphrey asked Tompkins regarding the testimony of the head of the Civil Defense before the Armed Services Committee that his men did not have "Q" clearance and hence could not contain information regarding radio activity fall-out. Senator Humphrey asked whether or not this matter shouldn't come under the joint jurisdiction of IIC and ICIS. Tompkins was unable to give a definite answer to the question.

There was considerable questioning regarding differences of opinion in security matters and the Wolf Ladejensky case was singled out. Senator Humphrey asked if this had been brought before the ICIS, and Tompkins replied that it had not and that in his opinion this was not the proper place. Tompkins was asked if no one believed it important enough to be discussed with ICIS and didn't the fact that conflicting rulings by two or more agencies place a matter within the purview of ICIS. Tompkins advised that he did not believe that this was true. Tompkins was asked if the matter was not worthy of high level consideration, and Tompkins stated that it had been given high level consideration and that it had also been studied by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice.

Senator Symington asked where such matters should be handled in the Executive Branch, and Tompkins replied that they should be handled at least at the Presidential appointment level.

Senator Cotton asked if there wasn't any agency which inspects or checks the various agencies to be certain that the policies of the Government security program are consistent. Tompkins advised that the Civil Service Commission has this authority. Tompkins was then asked what if differences are detected what action is taken, and Tompkins replied that the matter is reported to the National Security Council and that this agency in turn forwards it to the President.

Senator Symington asked Tompkins what the difference was between Top Secret and "Q" clearance. Tompkins advised that "Q" clearance pertained to the Atomic Energy Commission. Tompkins' answer was not satisfactory for Symington, and he asked that the full details be looked into so that he could fully understand it. The question was also asked as to whether or not "Q" clearance was available to FBI Agents, and Tompkins stated that he did not know but that he would get the answer.

Memorandum for Mr. Nichols

March 8, 1955

Senator Humphrey asked Tompkins for the the official views of the Department of Justice regarding comments of former Senator Cain of Washington which were concerned with the security program of the Government. Tompkins advised that he would make available such views to the committee.

Senator Humphrey asked if there was any conflict between the Espionage Acts and the Atomic Energy Act and if there was any rule why they couldn't be placed into one act. Tompkins advised that he was making a study of this matter. Senator Humphrey asked if an offender might be prosecuted under the provision of more than one statute and advised that he thought this could occur. (That is a subject could be charged and tried under a provision of the Espionage Act and also be charged and tried ~~under~~ a provision of the Atomic Energy Act.

In this same vein Senator Humphrey cited the Peterson case where he had been tried and sentenced to seven years under the provisions in the Espionage Statute (disclosure of classified information). Senator Humphrey pointed out that had Peterson been tried under Section 227 of the Atomic Energy Act the penalty would have been much lighter.

Senator Humphrey also inquired of Tompkins as to whether or not he felt that the Government was getting toward more justice and fair play with regard to the employee security program. Tompkins advised that he felt there was justice and fair play.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Newark (66-1520)

SUBJECT:

DATE: 3/8/55

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Enclosed are two copies of memorandum captioned "Confidential Informants" submitted by SA RICHARD C. LEE.

This memorandum suggests that three descriptive designations be applied to informants; (1) known reliability, (2) normal reliability, and (3) unknown reliability.

It is recommended that the Bureau give favorable consideration to the adaptation of these descriptive terms.

Enclosures-2

ABH:hp
(4)

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2542 PMP
mejc

1 ENCL

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44 MAR 22 1955

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INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC H. G. FOSTER

FROM : SA RICHARD C. LEE

SUBJECT:

DATE: 3/8/55

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

In connection with the criminal and security informant program, it is suggested that the Bureau give consideration to the evaluation of information furnished by informants as follows:

1. The term "known reliability" be applied to information furnished by a source not subject to question, such as technical surveillances, microphone surveillances and confidential sources.
2. The term "normal reliability" be used in connection with live informants (security or criminal) who have furnished enough information of a reliable nature so that a determination can be made by the agent that the informant is "normally reliable."
3. The term "unknown reliability" be used in connection with the information furnished by informants who have not previously furnished information and whose reliability has not been established.

It is believed that the limitation of the phrase "known reliability" to technical, microphone surveillances and confidential sources would more accurately describe the reliability of the informant without disclosing identity. It is also believed that the use of the phrase "normal reliability" more accurately describes the reliability of live informants who do normally furnish reliable information but who may, for reasons beyond the control of the Bureau, furnish inaccurate information either knowingly or unknowingly or who may by some subsequent action on his part cause some question to be raised with respect to information previously furnished by him.

The third designation, that of "unknown reliability" would continue to be used as at present and it is believed is descriptive.

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ENCLOSURE

66-1529
RCL:hp
(4)

DATE 2/27/81 BY

2842pm

mcjc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

1 - Plastiplate
1 - Bufile 100-3-99
1 - Bufile 66-2542-3
1 - J. D. Donohue

1 - Section Tickle
1 - J. F. Condon

March 9, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY SP42 JMC
mc JC

The election of Georgi M. Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. shortly after Stalin's reported death on March 5, 1953, provided an excellent example of the sublime faith of the Communist Party, USA, in the superior character of every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. Commenting on Malenkov's succession in the April, 1953, issue of Political Affairs, William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, attempted to allay any doubts that the future of the Soviet Union might not be in the most capable hands.

"The multitudinous writers and commentators are now shouting that the death of Stalin has created a grave crisis in the Communist world, one that could lead to an outbreak of a world war...."

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 JMC
ON 11/11/94
83-1343

"The prompt election of Georgi M. Malenkov to Stalin's post has not liquidated this provocative agitation throughout capitalist circles, but merely given it a new twist. The great crisis over Soviet leadership, which obviously does not exist, is now, they say, merely postponed. The Soviet system is supposed to be in a crisis, which will be especially aggravated by the 'inexperience' of Malenkov, etc. Let us, therefore, analyze briefly this political nonsense, which is at the same time dangerous war propaganda."

"... Lenin and Stalin... dwarfed the bourgeois statesmen of this epoch; and, so, too, have the succession of outstanding foreign ministers of the U. S. S. R... Marxist-Leninist leaders... (are) on an altogether higher level of political understanding than the puny bourgeois politicians heading the capitalist countries."

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"... Modern bourgeois 'political science' is only wishful thinking. The capitalist political leaders blunder along empirically, proceeding from one superficiality of analysis to another. The men now standing at the head of the

2 - All Continental Offices

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CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFIED AND
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CONFIDENTIAL

world's capitalist governments, including that of the United States, are political semi-literate.... the bourgeois economists, ideologists, and politicians blunder along without any inkling of where their society is heading.

"Malenkov has been trained in the very best Marxist-Leninist tradition. He long had the tutelage of the greatest teacher of them all--Stalin--and he got his experience in the heart of the world Socialist movement, the Soviet Union. This constitutes the best possible preparation for the heavy tasks of leadership that have now come to him. Malenkov is a Marxist-Leninist of a high order--anything else is unthinkable for a man holding his high position in the great Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. . . . The new leader's speech, the main report to the recent Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was a ample demonstration of his power of Marxist-Leninist analysis. One thing is certain--his superb Marxist-Leninist training and his high natural ability, will make him a giant compared to the petty politicians currently heading the capitalist states of the world."

"...The prompt election of Malenkov demonstrates how the Party, while mourning the profound loss of its great leader Stalin, brings forth a capable successor and proceeds to the fulfillment of the basic tasks confronting it."

Political Affairs,
April 1953, pp. 10-21.

After Foster's emphasis on Malenkov's "experience" and Stalin's "mentorship" as the perfect preparation for the job of Premier of the U. S. S. R., * Malenkov's recent resignation, giving as his reason the lack of experience, must have been somewhat disillusioning.

"I clearly see that the carrying out of the complicated and responsible duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers is being negatively affected by my insufficient experience in local work, and the fact that I did not have occasion, in a ministry or some economic organ, to effect direct guidance of individual branches of national economy."

Daily Worker,
February 9, 1953, p. 2.

* I. e., Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

After being proved completely wrong in his evaluation of Malenkov's capabilities, Foster, apparently wiser from experience, devoted his comments on Nikolai A. Bulganin's "election" to generalities on the peaceful intentions of the U. S. S. R. and the war danger presented by "the agents of big capital" in the United States. It was left to Milton Howard, in an article in the Daily Worker of February 10, 1955, to try to explain Malenkov's resignation as a practical application of "the principle of criticism and self-criticism," and to admit that the job of Premier "is bigger than his previous experience fitted him for."

The above is being brought to your attention for possible use in connection with the captioned programs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. A. E. BELMONT

March 1, 1965

MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOP SECRET (100-3-89)
SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM (66-3542-3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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The Central Research Section regularly brings to the attention of the Field material suitable for use in connection with the captioned programs.

After Malenkov succeeded Stalin as Premier of the USSR in March, 1953, William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, wrote an article in which he asserted American Communists that the future of the Soviet Union had been placed in the most capable hands.

In view of Malenkov's recent "resignation" as Premier of the Soviet Union, Foster's comments are being brought to the attention of the Field at this time. It is felt that this material may possibly be of assistance to Agents interviewing members of the Communist Party, USA, in attempting to develop additional informants under the captioned program.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter to all confidential offices be approved. The original plaintext is being retained in the Central Research Section and, upon approval, it will be dated and arrangements completed for transmitting it to the Field.

JFC:dfe
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. J. D. Doohan
- 1 - Bufile 66-3542-3
- 1 - Section Chief
- 1 - J. F. Condon

Attachment

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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 Dmm/mc
ON 7-2-2001

Reference is made to our conversation of March 1, 1955, concerning the checking of informants in security matters to determine whether the informants are furnishing reliable information.

This is to advise that from the time an individual is first considered as a confidential informant on security matters a system of checks is used to verify or disprove the information furnished by him and to establish his reliability. In addition to investigating the background of the informant definite steps are taken to prove or disprove the information furnished by him. On many occasions two or more informants may be operating in the same area of activity unknown to each other. Their reports are carefully examined and compared and any discrepancy checked to determine the true facts and the cause for the difference in the information furnished. In this way, each informant unknowingly acts as a check against the other and is, in turn, also checked.

Various investigative techniques, such as technical coverage, highly confidential sources, and physical surveillances, are utilized to verify, disprove, enlarge or clarify information furnished by live informants. Independent investigations based upon information furnished by informants and subsequent interviews with subjects of security cases frequently corroborate or disprove information received from live informants.

As a matter of policy if we find any informant is unreliable or is furnishing false information, he is immediately discontinued.

Relative to Harvey Marshall Matusow, who was an informant from June 28, 1950, until December 26, 1950, information furnished by him during that time in most instances was corroborated. Specifically, Matusow while he was an informant in New York furnished information on 143 individuals or organizations, all of

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

which has been checked. In 98 instances the information has been verified or corroborated through the use of one or more of the techniques above described. In the remaining 45 instances it was not possible to verify or disprove the information furnished by Matusow.

As reflected above, in the case of Matusow, as with other informants, independent investigation and constant checking with other informants and sources were utilized where possible to corroborate the information furnished by him when he was an informant, with the result that most of his information was corroborated through other sources.

THE USE OF TEMPORARY INFORMANT SYMBOLS

It has been the policy of the FBI not to reveal in its reports the identities of our regular informants and to protect the confidence of an individual furnishing information who requests that his name be concealed. In such instances, the information is attributed to the informant identified by a temporary symbol, such as T-3 or T-5, and the true identity of the informant is withheld. The concealing of informants in this manner is not done arbitrarily, and the true identity of the persons furnishing information is set forth in each report when this can be done without damaging our security coverage or betraying a trust.

In certain instances, we are able to furnish documentary evidence furnished by an individual or source whose true identity is concealed by a temporary informant symbol, and this is done wherever possible. In many instances, moreover, a source concealed by a temporary informant symbol is not a live informant, but, instead, is a technical surveillance, a microphone surveillance, a trash cover, mail cover, or other investigative technique. The revealing of such techniques is considered highly undesirable. In an estimated 55 per cent of the Security of Government Employee cases the reports contain inanimate sources of this type whose identities are concealed by temporary informant symbols. Other temporary informant symbols would pertain to such sources as live informants and neighbors or professional men who specifically requested their identities not be disclosed.

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As can be seen, all temporary informant symbols do not represent people who refuse to testify to information they furnish. Many such symbols represent our regular live informants, whose identity must be protected in the interests of national security, and others represent investigative techniques which furnish highly reliable and valuable information. Careful consideration is given prior to concealing the identity of an informant or source by use of a temporary informant symbol and in every instance possible, in accordance with the above, the true identity of the informant is set forth for the benefit of other agencies receiving FBI reports.

**INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MATUSEW WHICH
IS CONTAINED IN EMPLOYEE SECURITY CASES**

With respect to employee security cases, it has been determined that Matusow furnished information which is contained in twenty-two cases concerning investigations conducted under the provisions of Executive Order 9835, Executive Order 10450, and Executive Order 10422. These cases contain twenty-seven separate items of information furnished by Matusow. I thought you would be interested in the following data noted in connection with these twenty-two cases:

1. In none of these cases was the investigation opened on the basis of information furnished by Matusow.
2. Six of the twenty-seven items pertain to the employee under investigation. Two of these are supported by corroborating information from other sources included in the reports; one item is of such a nature that it can be corroborated only by the employee involved; and three items reflect only that Matusow did not know the employee.
3. Twenty-one of the twenty-seven items relate to information pertaining not to the employee himself but to relatives, associates, friends, et cetera of the employee involved. Twenty of these are supported by corroborating information from other sources included in the reports. One item is not accompanied by corroborating information.

CONFIDENTIAL

NINE

In other applicant-type cases of an Employee Security nature, which were conducted under the provisions of various pieces of legislation, ten cases containing information furnished by Matusow were noted. These ten cases contain eleven separate items of information from Matusow.

TWO

NINE

TEN

They Three of the items pertain directly to the employee involved. ~~Of these, one is supported by corroborating information;~~ two reflect only that Matusow did not know the employee.

Eight of the items relate to relatives, associates, friends, et cetera, of the employee. Of these, six are corroborated by other sources in the reports, and two indicate only that Matusow did not know the individual.

gls

Note: Data as typed is incorrect. Inland notations are correct figures.

gls

3/8/55

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Holloman _____
Gandy _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Quinn Tamm

DATE: 3-10-55

FROM : C. A. Harris

SUBJECT: POSTING FLASH NOTICES AGAINST
CRIMINAL AND SECURITY INFORMANTS

- Tolson _____
- Boardman _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Sizoo _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

Security Informants - 6-11

Reference is made to the suggestion of SAC Richard N. Hosteny dated February 28, 1955, that a flash notice be established against the fingerprint record of all security and criminal informants so that the field office handling the informant can be advised of all information coming to the attention of the Identification Division concerning that particular informant. SAC Hosteny further suggests that where no fingerprints are on file for an informant, a flash notice be placed against the informant's name.

According to information obtained from the Domestic Intelligence and Investigative Divisions, the Bureau presently has approximately 1,095 security and 1,500 criminal informants as well as 5,000 potential informants of the latter type. Practically all criminal informants have arrest records; however, this is not true of security informants.

Posting of Flash Notices Where Fingerprints are Available:

The posting of flash notices on a current basis where fingerprints are in file does not present any unusual problems in so far as the operations of the Identification Division are concerned. We average over 1,000 of these postings each month and additional flash notices could easily be absorbed once we were over the hurdle of placing these notices against persons already being used as informants.

Flash Notices Unsupported by Fingerprints:

Although at one time it was the practice to post flash notices unsupported by fingerprints, that is by subject's name and description only, we do not presently establish such notices even in connection with security index subjects. The reason for this policy is that positive identifications cannot be effected in the absence of fingerprints.

CAH:brs

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EX-103

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29 MAR 1955

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CONCLUSION:

If SAC Hosteny's suggestion is approved, it is felt that informant flash notices should be restricted to those cases where we have fingerprints in file. Otherwise the notice will be of questionable value. For example, were an informant to give a fictitious name when arrested we would not catch the incoming prints unless we had his prints already in the Identification Division.

A solution to the problem would be to require all informants, particularly those receiving remuneration for their services, to submit to fingerprinting if we do not have fingerprints for them. Another advantage to obtaining such fingerprints would be that we might discover that some informants have records which heretofore had not come to our attention. Knowledge of this record if it exists would be of value in evaluating and controlling the informant.

The most satisfactory arrangement for the Identification Division if it is to post flash notices on informants would be to receive forms 1-12 from field offices on a staggered basis not to exceed 500 a week. This would permit us to process them without interrupting the flow of our other work to a great extent.

The cost of processing flash notices where we have fingerprints on file is approximately thirty cents per notice.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be forwarded to the Training and Inspection Division in order that it can be coordinated with the views of the Domestic Intelligence and Investigative Divisions. If fingerprints are not obtained from those informants who do not already have fingerprints on file in the Identification Division, it is felt that we should only establish flash notices in those cases in which we have fingerprints.

Mr. Rosen

March 22, 1955

Mr. Callan

41998

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION

We have gone over our policies with respect to dissemination of information and it is felt that they are being properly adhered to. It has been determined that the necessary care is being exercised to see that all interested Government agencies, as well as the Civil Service Commission, are being furnished information which is pertinent and of interest to them under Executive Order 10450.

In particular, we are watching to see that our T informants are being kept to a minimum and that all characterizations and references as to an individual's connections which may be considered derogatory are accurate in all of our material which is being disseminated. Further, we are closely watching to see that no information is disseminated which may be considered to be of a trivial nature.

WMM:jrf
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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pml/omc

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 15, 1955

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

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 Boardman _____
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 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
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 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 104-55
 SECURITY AND CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

In the attached suggestion number 104-55 it is recommended that a flash notice be placed in the FBI Identification Division against all current security and criminal informants so that the field office handling an informant will be advised of all information coming to the attention of the Identification Division. If the informant has no finger prints on file the flash notice should be placed against the name. As far as security informants are concerned, this suggestion has been considered in the past and rejected since the majority of security informants do not have criminal records supported by finger prints and a flash notice placed against a person's name only would not pick up an arrest where an individual used a false name. In addition, we require that the contacting Agents maintain close relationship with security informants to be aware of any difficulties in which they may become involved of this type and in that manner we should know when a security informant gets into trouble whereby he is finger printed.

It is felt, however, that a flash notice could be placed against the finger prints, criminal or applicant, of an informant when such prints are on file but it is not believed the flash notice should be placed against an informant's name which is unsupported by finger prints.

ACTION:

In line with the above, it is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for consideration and attention.

Attachment

JDD:sfd
 (4)

cc- Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 7/22/81 BY 2842 RMD/NC/C

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EX-117

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SUGGESTION #104-55

That a flash notice be placed in Identification Division on all criminal informants and potential criminal informants (also security informants) in order that field office will be notified if they are arrested.

Investigative Division agrees with suggestion as an added means of keeping abreast of our criminal informants and potential criminal informants' activities. Of course, as to "mechanics" and costs, Ident's views should be obtained and Domestic Intelligence Division's views should be obtained as to security informants and potential security informants.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 DmJ
mc JC

66-2542-3-930

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : Executives Conference

DATE: 3/22/55

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
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 Winterrowd _____
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 Holloman _____
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 Mr. [unclear] _____
 Mr. [unclear] _____

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #104-55
 MADE BY SAC RICHARD N. HOSTETTER
 SPRINGFIELD OFFICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 [unclear]

SUGGESTION:

SAC Hostetter suggests that a flash notice be placed in the Identification Division against all current criminal and security informants so that the field office handling an informant will be advised of information concerning him which reaches the Identification Division. If no fingerprints on file, place the flash notice against informant's name.

This suggestion comes within the purview of SAC Hostetter's regular duties.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Flash notices are not maintained against either the fingerprints or the name of an informant.

ADVANTAGES STATED:

A further control and check on informants; field offices would be advised of information some informants may try to conceal.

DISADVANTAGES STATED:

None.

OBSERVATIONS:

Assistant Director Tamm of Identification Division states that flash notices can be placed against fingerprints but should not be placed against names, where fingerprints not available because experience shows that positive identification cannot be made without fingerprints. It was once the practice to post flash notices unsupported by fingerprints but this is no longer done, even in connection with Security Index subjects. If these flash notices are approved, the Identification Division would like to receive Form 1-12 (for posting the flash notice) from field offices on a staggered basis, not to exceed 500 a week, in order to process them without greatly interrupting other work. Cost of processing flash notices against fingerprints on file is approximately \$.30 per notice.

Mr. Tamm also suggested that informants might be asked to provide their fingerprints.

cc: Mr. Harbo & Mr. Sizoo

DJD:mew
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Assistant Director Belmont, Domestic Intelligence Division, agreed that a flash notice could be placed against any fingerprints on file for an informant but stated it should not be placed against an informant's name unsupported by fingerprints. The majority of security informants have no fingerprints on file.

Assistant Director Rosen, Investigative Division, agreed that flash notices should be placed against all criminal informants, potential criminal informants and security informants as a means of keeping abreast of their activities. The mechanics of placing these notices should be decided by the Identification Division.

SAVINGS:

None. There would be offsetting costs of \$.30 per flash notice. FBI now has approximately 1500 criminal informants, most of whom probably have fingerprints on file and over 1000 security informants. There are approximately 5,000 potential criminal informants.

PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION:

The Executives Conference of October 19, 1953, considered a similar suggestion made by SA Herbert E. Hoxie of Los Angeles Office and unanimously recommended the suggestion not be adopted. In the interest of economy and efficiency, the Conference felt that there should be no universal practice requiring the placing of stops as to various security and criminal informants.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the policy be adopted of placing ~~flash notices~~ ^{flash notices placed} against the fingerprints of all criminal and security informants as soon as they are made informants. Potential informants should not be included.

2. That no financial award be granted. If an award is granted, it must be computed on the table for intangible benefits which shows that a minor suggestion of Bureau-wide application carries a minimum award of \$100.

3. That if the suggestion is adopted this memorandum be routed to the Investigative Division for preparation of necessary SAC letters and manual changes, consulting with the Domestic Intelligence Division to include proper instructions on security informants.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: RTH:gsr

The Conference of 3/22, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Mohr, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Belmont and Harbo, was unanimously unfavorable. The Conference felt that the cost involved would not justify the results that could be anticipated. With reference to security informants, the possibility of current arrests would be of major significance if the informant were to be used as a witness in the trial of a case. An informant would not be so used without a thorough current check of his activities which would include a check of his criminal record. Criminal Informants would rarely be used as witnesses.

RH

V

g

McInturff
41999

SAC, San Francisco (134-0)

March 31, 1955

Director, FBI (66-2542-S)-933

PERSONAL ATTENTION

**SECURITY INFORMANTS
EVALUATION AS TO RELIABILITY**

Reurlet March 22, 1955, wherein you suggest that the phrase "of known reliability" not be used in describing security informants inasmuch as such a phrase represents a conclusion concerning the informant rather than actual fact. For your information this identical problem has been considered by the Bureau in the recent past and SAC Letter 55-26 dated March 29, 1955 (E) states that henceforth no security informant shall be classified as "of known reliability," but rather, when pertinent as one "who has furnished reliable information in the past." It is felt that this change will be more in line with the Bureau's policy of reporting facts rather than conclusions or opinions.

It is further noted that you suggest that descriptive data as to the nature of the informant's activities which have placed him in a position to obtain information be included in the description of informants in reports. This has been previously considered; however, it is felt that such data would possibly jeopardize our valuable security informants and it has been decided not to include this type of descriptive data concerning informants in our reports for that reason.

Your interest in submitting suggestions such as these is sincerely appreciated.

GFM:sdc
(4)

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pmj/mcjc**

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Boardman _____
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Parsons _____
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Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
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Holloman _____
Gandy _____

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71 APR 13 1955

7/27/81
2842

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (134-0)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS --
EVALUATION AS TO RELIABILITY

DATE: 3/22/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/22/81 BY 2842 PM

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Parsons ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tamm ✓
Mr. Sizoo ✓
Mr. Winterrowd ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Holloman ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

Reference is made to Sections 107H, page 6; 69G, 4, page 21; and page 17, of the Manual of Instructions, setting forth current Bureau policy that informants concealed with temporary symbols should be designated as being of "known reliability" or "unknown reliability". Reference is also made to SAC Letter 55-20, Paragraph I, regarding dissemination of information from sources of unknown reliability, questionable reliability and known unreliability, which sets forth that the phrase "of known reliability" should be avoided as much as possible and that data descriptive of the source should be used instead of the above phrase.

It would appear that much of the criticism presently being directed toward the Bureau and the Security of Government Employees program, for which the Bureau has investigative responsibility, stems from the recantation of witnesses who are known to have served as informants for the FBI. It, therefore, might be well to re-evaluate our procedure with regard to designating our informants as being "of known reliability".

By classifying an informant "of known reliability", we become responsible for attesting to the veracity of the informant with respect to everything he has told us in the past, plus anything he may tell us in the future. If his identity is subsequently revealed the particular information he has furnished in any given case will then be known to have emanated from that source. Now if he recants or is found to be in error with respect to even one item, the fact that he has been described "of known reliability" by the FBI could and has predicated false and unjustified charges of "poor judgment", "bad faith" and worse against the Bureau.

Even though an informant has furnished a large amount of information which has been verified through independent sources, to describe him thereafter as being "of known reliability" tends to make the Bureau responsible for the element of "human error" which is always potentially present as well as for any deliberate falsification or "coloration" which the informant may have made in the past or may make in the future.

It is suggested, therefore, that rather than utilize the flat and unequivocal description "of known reliability", phraseology be considered such as "who has furnished reliable information in the past" or "who has furnished information in the past which has been corroborated through other sources", together with some descriptive data as to the nature of the informant's activities which have placed him in a position to obtain such information.

It is felt that this procedure would be more in line with well-established Bureau policy that we report facts rather than conclusions. In describing sources in the above manner we would be furnishing facts relative to his veracity, whereas in flatly describing the source under existing rules we are stating a conclusion.

RDR:wap

(3)

REGISTERED

60 APR 13 1955

Five prompts
attention

EX-116

APR 22 1955

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: April 4, 1955

FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
GIFTS TO OFFICE CONTACTS,
SOURCES AND INFORMANTS

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

The Executives Conference of March 22, 1955, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Harbo, Belmont, Sizoo, Parsons, Tamm, Nichols and Mohr, considered a practice being followed in some field offices of presenting gifts usually at Christmas time to office contacts, sources and informants and reclaiming the expenditures by means of the confidential fund and the use of the blue slip.

The practice in the field of giving gifts to office contacts sources and informants, has been in existence for a considerable period of time. A check of blue slips indicates that the practice of claiming reimbursement by blue slips from the confidential fund has been in existence as far back at least as 1945. The question of gifts to informants and others was considered by the Executives Conference on January 12, 1954, and as a result of that Executives Conference the practice was continued but the Director specifically prohibited the purchase of alcoholic beverages as gifts.

A partial survey of blue slip items covering the 1954 Christmas season was made and the offices surveyed were Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, New York and Newark. As a result of this survey it was determined that 83 blue slip items were submitted for gifts to office contacts, sources and informants. The total amount of money expended in this manner was \$628.18. Of the offices surveyed, Philadelphia appeared to be the most active in this field with 68 of the so-called gifts being in that division. The cost of the gifts purchased in the Philadelphia Office was \$430.55. The average cost per gift was .633. The gifts consisted of pen and pencil sets, cigarettes, cigarette lighters, wallets, miscellaneous items of jewelry such as earrings, cufflinks and the like. Some of the recipients of the gifts were associated with credit bureaus, telephone companies, newspaper libraries and municipal offices. The latter employees in municipal offices who received gifts were those who had helped the office to arrange for trash covers.

The conference was advised that many offices do not reclaim expenses for gifts to office contacts and sources by means of blue slips and that these items are paid for out of an office fund, usually a

JPM:mn
cc - Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
(5)
Attachments

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collection taken up among the Special Agents in the particular office. It appears to have been the practice, however, to always request reimbursement for gifts paid to informants or potential informants.

The conference unanimously recommended that field offices should not reclaim reimbursement for gifts to office contacts and sources during holiday seasons or at any other time by blue slip since they did not feel that this was a proper expense item to be paid for by the government. They felt that if any gifts were purchased they should be paid for out of any general fund the field office might have collected.

✓

The conference unanimously recommended that field offices not give gifts to informants since such action might be misconstrued by defense attorneys and that the relationship between our agents and informants be maintained on a strictly businesslike basis.

✓

The conference unanimously recommended the attached SAC Letter go forward to the field at this time prohibiting reclaiming of gifts to office contacts and sources through the use of blue slips and advising that gifts should not be made to informants but the relationship should be on a strictly businesslike basis.

I concur. ✓
d *25* *gpc*

SAC, New York

4/4/55

Director, FBI

P
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTIONSSuggested Form For Submitting Data
In Recommending Opening of Files
On Potential Criminal Informants

Security

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pm
mcjc

Enclosed is one copy of a letter dated March 23, 1955, from the Dallas Office suggesting a form for submitting data on potential criminal informants. Also enclosed is a copy of a form proposed by Dallas.

You are requested to review this material carefully and submit a specific recommendation for or against adoption, of the form by April 11, 1955. If you recommend adoption, you may add to the form or delete from it any material which you feel pertinent.

Note that Dallas recommends the use of this form for potential criminal informants. You should state specifically whether or not a similar form should be considered for use on potential security informants. If you recommend that the form be used for this purpose also, state any deletions or additions, necessary. The point here is that, if field offices desire a form of this kind, be used for any purpose, it would be better to set up one form for both potential criminal informants and potential security informants rather than a separate form for each purpose.

Enclosures (2)

- 2 - Philadelphia with enclosures (2)
- 2 - Baltimore with enclosures (2)
- 2 - Washington Field with enclosures (2)

DJD:mpm/hcc
(13)

The proposed form is new and the Bureau has approved nothing like it except the attached Pittsburgh form which is not nearly so complete.

- 1 - Domestic Intelligence Division with enclosures (2)
NOTE: Domestic Intelligence Division disregard reference to consideration for potential criminal informants
- 1 - Investigative Division with enclosures (2)
NOTE: Investigative Division disregard reference to consideration for potential security informants.

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March 31, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. NICHOLS

DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pjm/mcjc

THU 11 5:00 PM 1955

Assistant Attorney General Burger yesterday called to see me and stated that he wanted to sound me out as to an idea which he had before talking with the Attorney General.

Mr. Burger stated that before taking up the Peters Case he, Mr. Burger, thought he had a pretty good idea as to the Employee Security Program, as to various operations of it and the problems involved in it. He stated, however, that after this case had been assigned to him for argument before the United States Supreme Court and he has gone into the matter quite seriously and deeply, he realizes now how completely ignorant he has been about this over-all picture.

Mr. Burger stated he thought there was a definite need for some steps to be taken to educate the public, not only as to the Employee Security Program but several of the other matters about which there seems to be a vast amount of misinformation, such as the use of informants and the use of wire taps. Mr. Burger remarked that he had had one or two meetings with a number of representative members of the press in an off-the-record conference and that he was amazed at their lack of understanding and comprehension of exactly what was being done and why.

Mr. Burger's idea was that possibly David Lawrence, through his magazine U. S. News and World Report, might give a comprehensive treatment of this matter and Mr. Burger thought possibly, through a question and answer session with me, much of the misunderstanding and misconception could be cleared up. I told Mr. Burger that I thoroughly shared his views as to the need for an educational campaign but I did not believe that I nor anyone else within the Department of Justice should be the instrument for publicly putting this across. I stated I thought it could better be handled by having Mr. David Lawrence assign some

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Gandy _____

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TIME	5:45 PM
DATE	3-31-55
BY	280

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
Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, Mr. Nichols

3-31-55

completely competent man to gather this information together with the cooperation of the various branches of the Department of Justice and then thoroughly present it objectively as a research article through the U. S. News and World Report.

Mr. Berger stated he was glad to have my observations upon this and that he intended to see the Attorney General just as soon as possible. Of course, should the Attorney General approve the idea and Mr. Lawrence likewise agree to do it, we in the FBI will extend the fullest cooperation.

Very truly yours,



John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:off (5)



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: March 30, 1955

FROM : L. W. Conroy

SUBJECT: DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
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 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

A survey has been made concerning dissemination matters in the Name Check Section to ascertain whether policies followed are practical and sound. This survey revealed no delinquencies in this regard; however, as a result of the recent Matusow incident and other similar incidents the question arose as to whether the practice of furnishing outside agencies old investigative reports evaluating informants as reliable, when said informants have since been determined to be unreliable, may place the Bureau in an embarrassing position.

This question was the subject matter of Executives Conference memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated March 10, 1955, captioned "Confidential Informants." As you are aware, this memorandum appears to cover the situation so that informants will be correctly characterized in our files, and so that accurate data will be furnished to other agencies. An SAC Letter instructing the Field as to pertinent portions of this memorandum was approved. It therefore appears that the problem being considered in this Section with regard to informants has been taken care of as a result of reference Executives Conference memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

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DATE 2/27/81 BY 2842 pm UmeJC

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March 28, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGE IN
FBI HANDBOOK

The following sentences should be added to the Handbook, Part I, Item 26, Page 17a, at the bottom of A, 2 which deals with investigation required on potential informants:

Background investigation must be completed, definitely establishing that the potential informant can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. No approach can be made to a potential security informant until background investigation completed.

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CONF. INFT. - Security - Conf

SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

January 2

Plastipia

Bufile 100-3

1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

1 - Section Tickler

1 - JF Condon

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COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

CONFIDENTIAL

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a publication entitled "Communist Anti-Semitism," for possible use in connection with the captioned programs.

This pamphlet reviews the recent manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and the satellite nations.

Requests for additional copies of this publication should be forwarded to the New York Office.

JFC:dje
(6)

Enclosures (2)

2 - All Continental Offices (with enclosures - 2)

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REASON FOR EXTENSION 2

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-27-91


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DECLASSIFIED BY 806 BJA/BJS
ON 4-21-92
83-1343

CONFIDENTIAL

March 23, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
SECTION 107, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

It is suggested that Section 107C be changed as follows:

Item three of Section 107C now reads, "Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, reliability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. The extent of these inquiries must always depend upon the individual circumstances, and an extended applicant type of inquiry is not essential. Sufficient information of this nature must be secured, however, to determine definitely whether the informant's background warrants the Bureau's placing any trust in him on a confidential basis." This should be changed to read:

Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employment, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation.

At the bottom of Section 107C the following new paragraph should be added:

Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to approach an individual as a potential informant.

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DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 pjm/mtc 66-2442-3-

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Security Informants - General

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EX-115

March 11, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MRSSRS. HARBO

MASON
GEARTY
B.G. BROWN
BUTTS
J.R. EDWARDS

HEALY
HUGENT
TRACON
VAN PELT

0
Inspections GENERAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/27/81 BY 2842 PMJ
me JC

Re: INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS

On 3/4/55 I met with members of the Executives Conference concerning a number of pressing problems currently facing the Bureau. Several of these matters relate directly to your work and I want you to give close attention to each. Specifically:

1. Reduce to a minimum in our reports the use of T informants. Put yourself in the position of the person against whom charges have been made and who is faced with a number of unknown accusers designated by T symbols. It is recognized that reliable informants must be protected; however, T symbols are not to be used carelessly or promiscuously; neighbors, associates, college colleagues and similar individuals ought to be generally willing to appear openly to testify or to give a signed statement as to information in their possession.

2. The matter of errors in reports is exceedingly serious. I am not satisfied with the vigor shown by field inspectors in detecting weaknesses in investigative reports. During the week ending 3/4/55, 164 errors were detected in reports at the Seat of Government involving requirements as substantive weaknesses. A number of investigative reports contained language which is not specific and clear-cut; it is your responsibility to detect these weaknesses; reduce them to writing; obtain

COMM - FBI

MAILED 28

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Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Based on Director's instructions to the Executives Conference 3/4/55 and the Director's instructions to convey the appropriate message to the field Inspection Staff.

FBI - MEMPHIS
(14)

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explanations, and recommend administrative action where desirable. You must set up corrective procedures. You should carefully go into the matter of preventing errors in reports and also examine field office procedures with regard to fixing responsibility for errors on various employees as well as notifying the Bureau as to any corrections needed.

3. I am very anxious that our long-standing practice of doing things openly continue and that we engage in no procedure which could be misinterpreted by individuals who were desirous of embarrassing the Bureau. In this regard I hold the Field Inspection Staff responsible for not detecting and recommending a change in the practice used on a widespread basis up to 2/20/55 involving the submission of undated amended pages to other agencies in order to bring disseminated reports into current status. Despite our good intentions this practice could quite well result in extreme embarrassment and it is possible for individuals to level charges against the Bureau of operating in an underhanded fashion despite our intentions to the contrary.

4. We must anticipate the consequences of each action; we must anticipate the worst possible interpretation being put on each FBI action by those persons who are desirous of doing harm to our organization; these instructions should be foremost in your minds at all times.

5. I have communicated with you separately concerning the handling of informant matters but I am not satisfied that the Inspection Staff is performing with the desired degree of vigor. You are not displaying the keen insight necessary in order to detect the weaknesses of the program. For example, it was known in 1950 that Harvey Katusow had been diagnosed by the Army as a psycho-neurotic; nevertheless, this person was used in an informant capacity. I need not tell you of the disastrous consequences resulting from the

actions of this person. I wish to make it crystal clear to you, however, that the weakness in Katusow's background known so many years ago should have been ample justification for discontinuing the use of this person in any undertaking. This weakness should have been detected during the course of an inspection. SACs are not adequately supervising informants and neither are the Agents who are handling these informants. I want vigorous recommendations for administrative action for weaknesses along these lines and I expect you to follow through henceforth. The field absolutely must cross check information obtained from informants and if there is any question whatsoever as to the reliability of an informant, the report must so indicate.

6. You should make certain that matters which should be brought to the Bureau's attention are promptly made the subject of a communication to the Seat of Government. Vital information should not repose in field files without being communicated to the Seat of Government. In a recent instance information reflecting on the credibility of a witness was not sent to the Seat of Government although the field office was in full possession of material of a most damaging nature relating to the witness. It is necessary that good judgment and clear thinking prevail in order to keep the Seat of Government informed of matters of interest without deluging the Seat of Government with inconsequential, piecemeal data.

7. I am not satisfied with the caliber of administration of our various field executives. I have observed among SACs coming to Washington a degree of lethargy and lack of knowledge as to the detailed operations of their office to such a degree as to cause grave concern as to whether the office has adequate leadership in order to assure effective functioning. I want you to see to it that field supervisors, Assistant Special Agents in Charge and Special Agents in Charge get down to the grass-roots

level of functions and know the operations of their office intimately; if they do not measure up, you are to recommend their removal.

8. I have not been satisfied with the handling of the Security Index and the Inspection Staff is at fault for not detecting the weaknesses and bringing them to my attention. It is obvious that a good many people currently carried as Security Index subjects could not be held during an emergency period; sufficient facts do not exist to warrant detention. You Inspectors have not been sufficiently vigorous in your analyses of the cases developed. I want you to make certain that all dangerous people are listed on the Security Index; those not possessed of dangerousness (so-called riffraff) should be promptly removed from the Index with Bureau concurrence.

9. Delays are a vital concern; delays jeopardize the functioning of the Bureau; delays cause great grief. When an official of this Bureau is acting for me or when I instruct that a matter be handled urgently, I expect immediate discharge of that obligation. You are to insist that delays be avoided in all matters and that our work proceed at as fast a pace as possible. Daily serious delays are encountered in various phases of our operations and you are to take steps to expedite field and Seat of Government performance in all work assignments.

10. The Responsibilities Program is immediately terminated.

11. Memoranda are too long, too included, not clear. Simplify paper work.

12. The Bureau's manuals are not inviolate; each manual is merely a road map and does not show all of the detours which may be necessary; each manual is a common sense guide. Treat it as such.

13. Despite many previous instructions, I am still not satisfied that newspaper clippings are being thoroughly read, indexed and filed. I want you to see that newspaper clippings are properly indexed in the field and at the Seat of Government.

14. Too many interviews are too long. There are too many instances where an individual is repeatedly interviewed by an Agent. In one instance a person was interviewed for 5 1/2 hours. Obviously, the interview was not carefully planned in advance. You are instructed to provide training in this regard. My comments as to interviews relate to those which Agents have with subjects, witnesses or persons assisting in an investigation; meetings between Agents and supervisors in field offices; meetings between supervisors and SACs; meetings between division heads and Inspectors, and meetings held by Inspectors with SACs. Shorten the interviews and lay the facts on the line quickly, clearly and specifically.

15. Telephone calls are too long; unwarranted expenses are resulting. As of this writing we have a current operating deficit of \$300,000. This deficit must be absorbed. You must bring about the necessary economies and watch expenditures of all types.

16. It is desired that you participate wholeheartedly in eliminating unnecessary paper work throughout the service; accept this assignment in good spirit as a means of bringing about greater efficiency and greater economy.

17. I wish to re-emphasize my instructions that no committee of Congress is to receive any information of a substantive nature from 'SI' files without prior clearance from the Attorney General; the committee itself should approach the Attorney General; the FBI will not convey the request for information to the Attorney General on behalf of the committee.

18. It is necessary that there be a more careful indoctrination of outside groups and outside individuals. SAC Malone recently handled in an effective fashion a meeting of the National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys at Birmingham; good indoctrination made this possible; earlier we had had considerable difficulty with this organization. You should look into the indoctrination of groups by SACs; also whether SACs are properly indoctrinating their own employees as to the various duties of their positions and the policies and procedures relating to their work assignments.

19. I am very much concerned with declines in statistical accomplishments in the criminal field. We are requesting high appropriations and we must have high accomplishments. You are to bear down in firm fashion on this important topic now and pursue it with vigor throughout the remainder of this fiscal year. Right now the field should be laying a groundwork for statistical accomplishments which will accrue during the next fiscal year beginning July 1. If SACs do not bring about a proper level of statistical accomplishments you are to recommend their removal.

20. One of the biggest weaknesses of the Inspection Staff is its failure to analyze policies and procedures to see if they are still timely. A policy or procedure adopted several years ago should not be considered as sacrosanct; successful operation under a policy for a period of years does not necessarily mean that the policy is the best which could be adopted for present or future use. I charge each of you individually with the responsibility of bringing to my attention your observations as to necessary policy and procedural changes. I require you to freely express your views as to any matter relating to the FBI in order that I may have the benefit of your experience, talents and analyses and if a decision has been made as to any

matter under consideration, then I must have the full support, cooperation and assistance of the entire FBI team.

21. The Inspection Staff must get rid of its willingness to accept as satisfactory various procedures which have operated well in the past, look for ways and means of bettering all policies and all procedures.

I feel very strongly about the matters contained in this communication and I want you to put this document in your Inspector's Manual and refer to it frequently for your own guidance and for your use in indoctrinating SACs and other representatives of the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director